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ABSTRACT 
 
 
On the 4 April 2006, a municipal council was dissolved for the first time in the democratic history 
of Spain, making the housing crisis financially and politically apparent. In the Mediterranean 
town of Marbella politicians had been adapting the boundary between building land and the 
coastal commons to their own interests. The power to quantify and reclassify buildable space 
was at the core of an architectural struggle, as urban planning and the provision of housing had 
been designed upon the ambiguity of the highest tide in history. Since the 1988 Coastal Law, 
the Spanish shoreline has not been demarcated in its entirety yet: evictions and eminent 
domain have trapped the littoral commons in Court. Every twist of the shoreline reveals not 
where tides are active, but rather where landscape margins are entangled with real estate profit 
margins. This research investigates speculation and the housing crisis by using the materiality 
of the shoreline to understand dwelling struggles. The calculated construction of ambiguity in 
the demarcation of the littoral is analysed as a form of control and a form of resistance. 
Structured in three chapters, the practice-based research departs from the invention of the 
coastline in Spain to unpack the financialisation of space and the appropriation of the common 
good within the housing crisis. It investigates how the provision of ‘affordable’ homes as 
financial instruments relies on the global circulation of natural capital, coastal wetlands and 
offsetting operations. Through case studies in Europe and the US, it investigates the 
engineering of the shoreline by insurance companies after ‘natural disasters’ and the 
circumvention of mortgage debt offshore. Embedded in an analysis of housing from a critical 
finance perspective, this thesis demonstrates how rather than territorial boundaries being a 
circulation of capital, it is capital what needs to be read as a constant circulation of zoning laws 
and ambiguous borderlines, in order to anticipate alternative futures to housing inequality.  
 
 
Keywords:  
Ambiguity, border, boundary, circumvention, coastal commons, eminent domain, empiricism, 
financialisation, housing crisis, landownership, littoral, mapping, margins, mitigation banking, 
natural capital, offsetting, offshore, real estate, speculation, shoreline. 
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9Dust Over the Canary Islands. 
‘The dust plumes appear distinct from 
each other near the coast, which 
suggests that much of the dust is from 
that region. Near the shore, a sand sea 
straddles the border between Western 
Sahara and Morocco, and some of 
the dust could have arisen there. But 
some dust also blows from further 
inland. Huge sand seas cover parts of 
Mauritania, east of Western Sahara, 
and likely supplied some of the dust in 
this storm.’
LANCE/EOSDIS MODIS Rapid 
Response Team, NASA Earth 
Observatory, 8 March 2012.
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PROLOGUE  
Environmental Protection as Destruction:  
The Port Against the Beetle and the Seagrass  
 
The contested construction of a port in Granadilla—a coastal area of southern Tenerife in the 
Canary Islands, Spain—is a paradigmatic case to dive into the struggle around the pandemic 
production of profit margins through building infrastructure. A coastal mega-project still today in 
the making, Granadilla’s port has undergone constant tensions between business interests and 
environmentalist concerns that expose how local politicians have the agency to literally 
manufacture and govern the spatial extent of their dominions (Fig. 1). Based on an 
understanding of ecology to serve urbanisation, it epitomises how the architecture of boundaries 
is complicit with neoliberal powers in the governance of space, which was one of the main 
causes that led to the 2007-2008 financial bust. This thesis explores the housing crisis precisely 
from the perspective of these frictions that emerge at the frontier of ownership and development 
between land and sea. 
 
In July 2010, a specimen of Pimelia canariensis, a beetle endemic to the Canary Islands, had 
been spotted in the area surrounding the Granadilla port site. Its discovery obliged the local 
authority—as part of their environmental responsibility towards society—to ensure that the 
construction activity of the port was not distressing any endangered species in the area. The 
regional government set up the Environmental Observatory of Granadilla (OAG) as an 
institution charged with watching the changing environment of the coast. Its foundation is the 
result of a top-down response to environmental protests against the proposal for the mega-port 
exactly where the beetle had appeared. Given that the construction of the port had already been 
heavily criticised as further real estate speculation to benefit local politicians, the OAG’s mission 
aimed to safeguard any irregularities derived from building this piece of infrastructure by 
watching its development and ensuring it operated within European green guidelines. While it is 
not clear whether the beetles had been released next to the development area as a tactic to 
delay construction, what is clear is that after the first endangered beetle was spotted in the area 
(and by the media), its presence was used to stop the entire construction project.1  
 
The European Union had ambiguously ruled four years before that the beetles were 
endangered and should be saved. However, as the port was an exceptional opportunity for ‘the 
common good’, the endangered beetles could be kept ‘in place’ by displacing them just a little. 
In order to make this oxymoronic operation succeed, Brussels obliged the local government to 
set up an independent institution that would collaborate with local environmentalists to carry out 
that task: the OAG. As an immediate response, the independent environmentalist movement of 
the island released an open letter, where they complained:2  
                                                
1 Ben Magec, Evaluación de la Utilidad y Cumplimientos del Observatorio Ambiental de Granadilla. Tenerife: 
Ecologistas en Acción Canarias, 2013. 
2 Ibid. 
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a) That no local environmentalist association had approved the foundation of the OAG. 
b) That the OAG, far from being an independent organisation to watch over environmental 
regulations, was actually directed by a former member of the government, who still 
today is supportive of the port. There is indeed a clear conflict of interest. 
c) That previous to the beetle episode, it had been proven that the local government had 
excluded an endangered species of slender seagrass (Cymodocea nodosa) from the 
list of protected species on the island, right before the announcement of the 
construction of the port.3   
d) That after Brussels realised the government’s failure to protect the seagrass, the EU 
obliged the OAG to redefine the extent of the endangered species of seagrass properly. 
However, the OAG adjusted the boundary of the seagrass habitat to a point right 
beyond the development area of the port, in contradiction to the actual extent of the 
seagrass. In the maps included in the environmentalists’ report there are two conflicting 
geometries: the green zone, which corresponds to the actual extent of the seagrass; 
and the marine protected area, whose boundary is right at the edge of the mega-port 
site (Figs. 2-5). 
 
To prove that the OAG did truly care about the protection of the beetles, it eventually produced 
an environmental charade in the form of a scientific report to first, spot all possible beetles, and 
second, carefully displace them. On the 20 December 2010, a group of OAG’s environmental 
technicians scouted the surroundings of the site chosen for the construction of Granadilla’s port 
(Figs. 6-8).4 As the official report notes, they first demarcated three working sites on the coast, 
where the endemic beetles were believed to be most likely living. Once traps were scattered 
around the three sites they were fenced off and the search began. The team combed the terrain 
from 10am to 12:30pm trying to find as many of these beetles as they could. After a total of 2,5 
hours of work, the same team found that no more beetles had been trapped and concluded that 
there were only 18 specimens, one dead. It had been raining for days, so the report argued that 
they did not find any larvae, and thus discarded the possibility of their existence in the area.  
 
The OAG technicians later carefully released the collected specimens in a demarcated zone 
further inland, which was distant enough to not interfere with the new port. In the same way that 
they had determined the lines within which the insects could possibly be living, and not beyond, 
they also defined the lines within which the beetles would live from then on. Among its many 
contradictions, the report meticulously explained how to displace an endangered species to a 
‘safe zone' in order to secure its habitat and the environmental and economic sustainability of 
the surrounding landscape (for humans). The methodology used by the OAG is problematic not 
only in terms of fieldwork duration, but also in the way it uses zoning and displacement as a tool 
to preserve space ‘as it is’. This exposes the irrelevance of their environmental care operations 
                                                
3 Europa Press. 'Greenpeace Echa en Falta a la Posidonia del Listado de Protección.’ 13 September 2010,  
http://www.europapress.es/sociedad/medio-ambiente-00647/noticia-greenpeace-echa-falta-posidonia-listado-
proteccion-20100913133829.html 
4 Pilar Bello Bello, ‘Traslocación de Ejemplares de Pimelia canariensis desde la Zona de Obras del Puerto de Granadilla 
a la RNE de Montaña Roja,’ Santa Cruz de Tenerife, 27 December 2010. 
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and the protection of coastal landscapes in the face of public scrutiny, as well as the 
inadequacy of an approach to territorial planning and the construction of building land that has 
been replicated across Spain and that significantly contributed to the recent housing crisis in the 
country.  
 
Regardless of the reason for their presence, the 17 endangered beetles represent a political 
mobilisation that exacerbated a conflict between the demarcation of their habitat and the 
demarcation of the shoreline. Hence, the port versus the beetle and the seagrass is a 
paradigmatic case of eco-fiction, where greenwashing real estate operations use environmental 
protection as a form of environmental destruction. Analogously, this thesis unpacks how 
architecture in neoliberal governance has become a set of relations for valuing space: adapting 
boundaries and space to a conglomerate of political, economic, and environmental interests. In 
this sense, architecture can be understood as a result of a set of built environments, where 
space is built just as much as the environment is. If we take the root environ from French— 
meaning around, about, approximately—the making of the built environment is nothing far from 
that triple definition of environ-ing: the government of limits that more or less enclose space. 
Architectural processes then are investigated here through a logic based on speculation and 
financial frictions alongside the demarcation of ambiguous limits: a series of articulations 
between what we construct as nature and what we refer to as urbanisation. In them, loopholes 
operate as norms and norms operate as loopholes.  
 
This thesis unpacks the urgency to redefine architectural practice along those speculative terms 
and the way value is created out of the demarcation of space. The boundary between the end of 
the coastal commons and the beginning of buildable land is constantly being reclassified. That 
boundary, which is made out of a very variable offset buffer with an easement of protection (6-
500m in width), is regulated according to the Spanish Coastal Law. Deeply embedded in a 
process of real estate speculation that generates profit margins from the ambiguity of the 
boundary, it follows an understanding of ecology and the built environment based on a 
simplistic, two-dimensional approach. It draws flat lines across the country to limit a highly 
complex overlap of the preservation of life and non-life, with compulsory purchase, housing 
speculation, and tidal movements along the entire coast of Spain. This has resulted in a 
pernicious governmentality that gambles with the spatial dynamics embedded in the 
demarcation of boundaries. In fact, in the genealogy of ambiguity that follows, we shall see how 
the state cannot operate without it. However, as in the case of the beetle and the seagrass, this 
deliberate ambiguity can also be used as a basis of contemporary resistance.  
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1: Masterplan for the new Granadilla 
port. 2013
2-3: Conflicting boundary systems: the 
protected area for the slender seagrass 
(LIC) does not correspond to the extent 
of it (green solid hatch); the port (solid 
red hatch) is clearly situated on top of 
the underwater fields of seagrass, but 
the protected area (blue stripes) ends 
right before the site of the port.
4: Slender seagrass 
(Cymodocea nodosa).
5: Edge of Granadilla port under 
construction. Tenerife, April 2013.
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Traslocación de ejemplares de Pimelia canariensis desde la zona  
de obras del puerto de Granadilla a la RNE de Montaña Roja 
                      8 
Informe de la actuación 
 
 
 
Figura 4. Momento de la prospección levantando piedras  
 
 También se tamizó el sustrato arenoso tratando de localizar larvas, pero las 
condiciones en las que se encontraba, dado que había llovido, hicieron desistir del 
intento.  
 
 Como se ha comentado anteriormente, se prospectó también una zona aledaña 
a la parcela A, que se consideró reunía condiciones apropiadas. Tras 
aproximadamente una hora y media de esfuerzo, se comenzó a examinar la parcela B, 
empleando la misma metodología. 
 
 Los ejemplares encontrados se introdujeron cuidadosamente en envases para 
recogida de muestras (vasitos plásticos de 100 ml), con papel higiénico, de modo que 
se evitase el desplazamiento brusco de los escarabajos en el interior del bote y se 
ocasionasen daños entre ejemplares, en los casos en los que varios de estos 
convivieron momentáneamente en el mismo envase.  
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2 LA ESPECIE Y SU ECOLOGÍA 
La pimelia tinerfeña costera se conoce para la Ciencia desde el siglo XIX, al ser descrita 
en 1839 por M. Gaspar Auguste Brullé bajo el nombre de Pimelia canariensis. Es una de 
las nueve especies de este género paleárctico que habitan el archipiélago canario. Todas 
ellas son endémicas de alguna isla, con la excepción de Pimelia lutaria que puebla las 
islas orientales simultáneamente. 
 
Figura 2. Pimelia canariensis en vista dorsal (ejemplar de colección) 
Las pimelias son coleópteros tenebriónidos grandes y muy robustos, adaptados a la vida en 
ambientes áridos. Se conocen unas 200 especies en la región paleártica (incluye el Norte 
de África). Sus tegumentos son recios, muy esclerosados y de color negro profundo (de 
ahí deriva el nombre de tenebrionido). Poseen una cámara aérea subelitral que hace de 
aislante térmico, y en la cual se abren protegidos los espiráculos abdominales, con lo que 
se reduce la evapotranspiración. Se alimentan de restos orgánicos (detritus vegetal, etc.) y 
aunque suelen aprovechar el agua del rocío o alimento frescos ocasionales, pueden 
subsistir sin estos aportes obteniendo agua por vía metabólica a partir de los lípidos. 
Resisten un 20% de desecación y sus criptonefridios también están adaptados para no 
perder agua innecesariamente durante la excreta (excrementos concentrados en ClK). En 
definitiva, son escarabajos especializados en vivir en ambientes áridos y subáridos, típicos 
pobladores del desierto y sistemas dunares, totalmente inhóspitos para la mayoría de las 
especies de insectos. A las pimelias se les podría aplicar metafóricamente el mote de 
“panzer del desierto”, pero ello no excluye que varias especies hayan colonizados los 
ecosistemas de coníferas y estepas xéricas o matorral montano, y así ocurre también en 
Canarias, donde hay especies de Pimelia que viven en Las Cañadas, los pinares o incluso 
en las praderas húmedas de medianía (p.ej. El Hierro), pero nunca en la laurisilva. 
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INTRODUCTION & LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
‘If property depends on clearly defined boundaries, [...] 
then coastal/marine property is complex and 
problematic indeed. A fundamental notion in managing 
the commons is that one needs clear, agreed-upon, 
defensible and socially and ecologically sensible 
boundaries [...] However, littoral boundaries are liminal; 
they are complex, contextually contingent, and 
changing, challenging those who want solid and easily 
defined property rights or management jurisdictions.’ 
 
—Bonnie McCay, The Littoral and the Liminal.5 
 
 
 
‘[C]alculated ambiguity [is] the ability to give 
diametrically opposed but legally valid answers to the 
same question from different quarters. Thus offshore 
allows individuals and firms to enjoy simultaneous 
ownership and non-ownership, to be high profit and 
loss-making, heavily indebted but also debt-free, and 
for investment to be foreign and domestic.’ 
 
—Jason Sharman, Offshore and the New International 
Political Economy.6 
 
 
 
Aim, Structure, and Practice-Based Methodology 
This thesis investigates the quantification of space and the classification of land in neoliberal 
times by looking at the ways in which architecture is complicit in the construction of value. For 
that purpose, the research begins by looking at the urban planning conflicts along the Spanish 
coast and how the shoreline—a line that does not exist—can work as an object of enquiry to 
understand the housing crisis. The contradiction of looking at the visibility of the non-visible in 
the shoreline itself is, rather than nonsensical, precisely at the core of the notion of ambiguity, of 
being both and neither. Ambiguity is investigated here as an operational spatial practice that 
simultaneously allows for control and resistance based on the limit between land and water. It 
allows for analysing the conflicts around landownership structures, appropriation of the coastal 
commons, injustice around mortgages and evictions through the risks around the nature of the 
coast. Hence, the fact that the shoreline is an abstract threshold, produced through military 
control, speculative interests, and architectural interventions, serves to unpack the collapse of 
‘affordable’ housing and how different local governments have instrumentalised the housing 
question to produce profit margins. As such, the study of the shoreline as a capitalist abstraction 
can advance knowledge of how space is constructed in the neoliberal context and how the 
                                                
5 Bonnie McCay, ‘The Littoral and the Liminal: or Why it is Hard and Critical to Answer the Question “Who Owns the 
Coast?”,’ Marine Anthropological Studies 17 (2009): 8-9. 
6 Jason C. Sharman, ‘Offshore and the New International Political Economy,’ Review of International Political Economy 
17 (2010): 1, accessed 23 February 2017, DOI: 10.1080/09692290802686940. 
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production of subjectivities intersects with architecture.7 As Bonnie McCay remarks, the 
liminality embedded in littoral boundaries challenges the very concept of property, ownership, 
and spatial appropriation.8 Furthermore, from Sandro Mezzadra and Brett Neilson’s perspective, 
the very analysis of the boundary can be a method in itself, whereby the productive power of the 
border unveils the strategic role it plays in global politics.9 The shoreline is regarded here as the 
exercise of ambiguity according to its literal definition, as it is not only a research object, but an 
epistemic angle that provides insight on the tensions that blur the boundaries between inclusion 
and exclusion at the frontiers of capital.10 The immaterial condition of the shoreline that results 
from its contestation in international law means that any working methodology can only 
approximate that condition, and that at different times it must approximate it in different ways. 
 
In a material sense, the conventional approach to studying and analysing the shoreline would 
be to calculate the movement of sands, topographic contours, and geological maps, mainly 
within the fields of coastal engineering, urban planning, and environmental and legal studies.11  
Architectural perspectives have focused on the urban spectacle of mega-resorts – a typology 
that played a crucial role in the financial bubble – and the corruption behind planning 
agreements.12 As necessary as this may be, there is not much analysis that critically challenges 
land use, zoning, and speculation on the boundaries of the coast. This thesis aims to rectify that 
imbalance by investigating that speculation and looking at the ambiguity of boundaries as well 
as the loopholes they have produced and are still producing. This speculation marks an urgent 
need to understand the spatial relations between coastal zoning and the global circulation of 
capital.  
 
The bureaucratic representation of the shoreline as a flat, static margin does not take ecological 
dynamics into account. Twists of the shoreline in legal documents do not explain where tides 
are active, but rather where municipal powers fail to make ethically, socially, and ecologically 
sound decisions in the legislation of the coast. Being a complex ecological dispositif, the 
                                                
7 Sandro Mezzadra and Brett Neilson, Border as Method, or, the Multiplication of Labor (Durham: Duke University 
Press, 2013), 54. 
8 McCay, op. cit., 9. 
9 Mezzadra and Neilson, op. cit., preface. 
10 Ibid. 
11 Miguel Ángel Losada et al, ‘History of Coastal Engineering in Spain,’ in History and Heritage of Coastal Engineering, 
ed. Nicholas C. Kraus (New York: ASCE, 1996), 465-466; Fikret Berkes, Coasts for People: Interdisciplinary 
Approaches to Coastal and Marine Resource Management, New York: Routledge, 2015; Rosemary E. Ommer, Coasts 
Under Stress: Restructuring and Social-Ecological Health, Montreal and Kingston: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 
2007; Philip E. Steinberg, The Social Construction of the Ocean (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001). The 
study by Curtis Ebbesmeyer and James Ingraham is particularly remarkable in its approach. They analysed ocean 
currents by looking at the recovery of 61,280 floating untied Nike sneakers on the US coast from a wrecked container 
ship. See Curtis Ebbesmeyer and James Ingraham, ‘Shoe Spill in the North Pacific,’ Eos 73 (1992): 361-365.  
12 Isabel Concheiro, ‘Interrupted Spain,’ in After Crisis: Contemporary Architectural Conditions, ed. Josep Lluís Mateo 
(Baden: Lars Müller, 2011); José Luis Díez Ripollés et al, Prácticas Ilícitas en la Actividad Urbanística: Un Estudio de la 
Costa del Sol (Valencia: Tirant Lo Blanch, 2004); José Manuel Naredo and Federico Aguilera Klink, Economía, Poder y 
Megaproyectos (Teguise: Fundación César Manrique, 2009); Federico Aguilera Klink, Calidad de la Democracia y 
Protección Ambiental en Canarias (Teguise: Fundación César Manrique, 2006); Mariano de Santa Ana, Paisajes del 
Placer, Paisajes de la Crisis (Teguise: Fundación César Manrique, 2004); Rafael Aníbal, Aquellos Maravillosos Años: 
Escándalos de Corrupción y Despilfarro en España Durante la Última Década (Madrid: Continta Me Tienes, 2012); 
Antonio Romero and Miguel Díaz, Costa Nostra: Las Mafias en la Costa del Sol (Sevilla: Atrapasueños, 2009); Ángel 
Menéndez Reixach, ‘La Nueva Ley de Costas: El Dominio Público como Régimen Jurídico de Especial Protección,’ 
Estudios Regionales 22 (1988): 113-123; Ramón Fernández Durán, ‘El Tsunami Urbanizador Español y Mundial,’ 
Ciudades Para un Futuro Más Sostenible, April 2006, accessed 10 June 2017, 
http://habitat.aq.upm.es/boletin/n38/arfer.html; Marc Badal Pijuan and Daniel López García, Los Pies en la Tierra: 
Reflexiones e Iniciativas Hacia un Movimiento Agroecológico (Barcelona: Virus, 2006). 
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fluctuation of the shoreline must be studied from a combination of zoological, visual, financial, 
and risk perspectives. This multidisciplinary approach is inspired by paradigms like the 
Camouflage Centre established in 1940 by the British War Office that included a magician, a 
surrealist painter, and a zoologist to develop a logic of misdirection.13 In a similar way, the 
research method for this study of the shoreline looks to ambiguity as a form of governance and 
incorporates the material and visual relationships between the climatic events, oceanic currents, 
sediments, shell companies, salt, glaciers, lava; life and non-life, humans and nonhumans that 
are allowed to – or barred from – inhabiting coastal and intertidal zones.  
 
The shore is not a fixed and measurable object, but a dynamic set of relations. The sea never 
stops moving, and even amid the discord of the global political economy, it is a space of 
contradictions and alternatives, of images and laws, of labour and dreams.14 Therefore, rather 
than analysing the shoreline from the perspective of actor-network theory, the shoreline is 
explored here as a set of singularities and exceptions, many times isolated from each other: as 
a financial device that regulates mortgages, indebtedness, evictions, offsetting, insurance, 
conservation, housing, and real estate interests. These relationships might appear only loosely 
connected to the reader. However, given that the shoreline is a line that does not exist outside 
the modern Western legal paradigm, this thesis could never successfully visualise it without 
apparently disjointed cases and relations.  
 
While the clear demarcation of boundaries has been well-studied, much less has been done in 
spatial theory on the notion of productive ambiguity, most work being on land use, vacant 
properties, and urban planning. The blurry definition of a dominion – the extents of possession – 
can lead us to think about an alternative theory of spatial production that results from the 
fragility, uncertainty, and violence of the limit. This thesis aims to elaborate a field of knowledge 
based on the limit as a dispositif and proposes the construction of ambiguity as a binary 
relationship between spatial margins and profit margins.  
 
The shoreline is not a logic of fictitious capital accumulation based on supply and demand 
(consumed now with the promise of a future return), but rather an object of fictitious 
commodification, referring to the ability of neoliberalism to turn almost anything into value.15 It 
does not apply a Marxist labour theory of value, as the research here cannot rely on value being 
objective or value as the calculation of the cost of production. Instead, the idea of commodity 
fetishism is expanded through marginal theory of value.16 The notion of marginal utility proves 
more useful for this thesis: taking value as a biased matter, arbitrary and based on changing 
patterns of pleasure, satisfaction, and desire, how valuable is a commodity to any individual? 
Instead of following the postmodern approach of deterritorialisation where limits disappear, this 
thesis proposes a framework of littoralisation, whereby limits appear, but the speculative 
                                                
13 Michael Taussig, ‘Zoology, Magic, and Surrealism in the War on Terror,’ Critical Enquire 34 (2008): 107-108. 
14 Philip E. Steinberg, The Social Construction of the Ocean (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), 210. 
15 Karl Polanyi, The Great Transformation: The Political and Economic Origins of Our Time (Boston: Beacon Press, 
1957), 68-76; Wolfgang Streeck, How Will Capitalism End? (London and New York: Verso, 2016), 61 
16 Marginalists William Stanley Jevons, Carl Menger and Léon Walras developed it to explain paradoxes like difference 
in value between diamonds and water. Value not related to price, but to the utility assigned to the object. 
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financial relations around them makes them malleable enough to both control and resist at the 
same time. This is the basis for understanding architecture as financial littorals: a juxtaposition 
of law, territory, and both profit and spatial margins. 
 
By visualising the forces that shape the littoral condition, new paradigms around the liquid and 
fluid encounter between land and sea become possible: where the tidal zone becomes 
synonymous with a movable freehold.17 Through a practice-based methodology, an 
experimental series of visual explorations unpacks the multi-scalar complexity embedded in the 
making and representation of a-legal boundaries.  
To understand the condition of the shoreline as a political-economic practice, it is necessary to 
look at the agents involved and the spatial frictions between them. The analysis of the shoreline 
is organised in this thesis around different types of spatial conflicts: politician/developer vs. 
architect; investor/insurer vs. environmentalist/dweller; and banker vs. indebted household 
(Figs. 9, 10). The main body of the thesis is structured in three chapters with corresponding 
project dossiers that interrogate the immateriality of the shoreline as a series of financial 
littorals. These forms of power are investigated at a spatial level through three principles: the 
Shore, the Offset, and the Offshore. Each is a concept used in geography, urban planning, 
finance, and ecology with different meanings; but each of them also requires the existence of a 
baseline, an immediate set back from that reference line, and a faraway displacement of space, 
obligations, responsibility, money, energy, beings, or goods. They are all essential to 
understand the ways in which power and capital flow. 
 
CHAPTER ONE, ‘Shore’, investigates the invention of the coast as a site for the circulation of 
capital by looking at the Spanish littoral. On 4 April 2006, for the first time in the history of 
democratic Spain, a municipal council was dissolved. In the Mediterranean town of Marbella, 
the core of the Costa del Sol, the Court of Justice revealed a network of politicians-turned-real-
estate-investors who had been using their power to adjust the limit between buildable land and 
the coastal commons in their own interests. The real estate boom in the Spanish 
Mediterranean, and the housing crisis that followed, is analysed here through failures in the 
making of the shoreline of the entire country. The 1988 Coastal Law and its subsequent reforms 
have not protected nature as initially promised. Instead, they have instrumentalised scientific 
reports to invent a shoreline, where landscape margins have become entangled with real estate 
profit in an endless number of ambiguous situations. Spanish city planning schemes and 
municipal master plans became powerful instruments in the redistribution of surplus value and 
are now at the forefront of a national political crisis.18 Using satellite mapping, microscopic 
salinity reports, and other scientific evidence, the power to reclassify space and turn nature into 
developable land has led to a second crisis of objective data and the exposure of para-
empiricism.19 As Laura Kurgan notes, even if there is no such thing as neutral data, this 
uncertainty need not create problems; instead, it is only through a condition of para-empiricism 
                                                
17 McCay, op. cit., 9. 
18 Andrés Betancor and Javier García-Bellido, ‘Síntesis General de los Estudios Comparados de las Legislaciones 
Urbanísticas en algunos Países Occidentales’, Ciudad y Territorio Estudios Territoriales, 127 (2001): 99. 
19 Laura Kurgan, Close Up at a Distance: Mapping, Technology & Politics, (Brooklyn: Zone Books, 2013), 34. 
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that we have a chance of operating responsibly in the world.20 The final outline of the Spanish 
shoreline has not yet been demarcated in its entirety; evictions and eminent domain have 
trapped it in court.  
 
Project Dossier 1: The practical component of this chapter consists of a visual analysis of the 
twisting boundaries demarcated along the coastal commons of Spain, between 1988 and 2016. 
Comparing discrepancies between the demarcation of the shoreline and satellite mapping 
served as a method for investigating the crisis of empiricism and the political constructions of 
the shore. The images expose a logic of self-interest. At the same time, coastal fictions and an 
aesthetic of ambiguity in archival and contemporary souvenir postcards (from the 1970s to the 
2010s) demonstrate a shift in the tourist gaze. 
 
CHAPTER TWO, ‘Offset’, investigates how flood risk is reshaping inhabitation and ecology and 
how both the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina and the recent financial crisis have shifted real 
estate investment toward natural capital. In September 2006, one of the largest homeowners 
insurers in the US expanded the ‘coastal area’ from 1000 feet to one mile from the high water 
mark.21 The insurance-engineering of the shoreline is investigated here through the ways both 
space and responsibility are offset by the disappearance of coastal landscapes. ‘Natural capital’ 
not only creates new financial products out of littoral environments, but also plays a crucial role 
in the urbanisation of wildlands. Mitigation banking is a financial practice based on offsetting 
units of coastal biodiversity: it swaps destruction here with reconstruction there. According to 
the ‘No Net Loss’ policy, any development that destroys natural habitats has to be recouped by 
the restoration of an ‘equivalent’ landscape elsewhere. The net amount of biodiversity is meant 
to remain ‘the same’ in terms of surface, quality, or quantity. With this logic of offsetting and 
nature banking, architecture acquires the agency to destroy, displace, and replicate natural 
landscapes miles away from their original location.  
 
Project Dossier 2: This investigates how engineering interests, in particular the US Army Corps 
of Engineers in Alaska, declared coastal settlements at risk in order to provide mitigation 
solutions. It explores the ways in which future projections of the shoreline are modelled and how 
they can be challenged through alternative forms of modelling the future of climate change. The 
project materialised as a collectively produced film about the construction of the shoreline in 
order to generate profit in Kivalina, Alaska (2014). In a second part, the act of extracting value 
from nature is represented here through the emergence of environmental services and habitat 
banking. By looking at the species in the global market of compensation for coastal damage, the 
neoliberal logic of offsetting space becomes clearer. The resultant sound installation at the 
European Investment Bank in Luxembourg (2016) featured the world’s top-banked species. 
 
                                                
20 Ibid, 35. 
21 State Farm Insurance. See Sandra Fleishman, ‘Sea Change in Insurers’ Coastal Coverage,’ Washington Post, 30 
December 2006, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/12/29/AR2006122900626.html 
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CHAPTER THREE, ‘Offshore’, investigates the shift from owning the shore to offshore 
ownership. It explores how the ambiguous condition of offshoring – operating from an 
extraterritorial, exceptional space – allows shell companies to control the global housing market. 
At the same time, it investigates how offshore extra-legality has allowed housing rights. When 
exceptions to property rights become a form of biopower, the same exceptions can also be 
used to contest such practices. This chapter investigates ongoing tactics to resist foreclosures 
that emerged in the European tax haven of Andorra and the outermost region of the Azores: 
house lotteries that crowdfund debt relief. These lotteries, which operate beyond the margins of 
national governance in territories with special status, have recognised the opportunities in 
contesting the right to housing through some of the same techniques of risk and legal maneuver 
that more typically characterise corporate approaches to neoliberalism. This chapter is indebted 
to Michel Feher’s notion of ‘investee activism’ as a way to explore resistance in the age of 
neoliberal appreciation.22 Once society ceases to be organised by employer-employee 
relationships, new forms challenging speculation and neoliberal power emerge through the 
‘investor-investee’ condition. Hence, investee activism involves identifying modes of social 
antagonism specific to financial markets (stakeholder activism in the stock market, borrower 
activism in the bond market, collateral guarantor activism in the derivatives market, etc.) and 
speculating on the potential for contestation and resistance.23  
 
Project Dossier 3: This dossier compiles a series of independent house lotteries implemented in 
different countries. Taking as reference legal contracts developed for house lotteries in Andorra 
and in the Azores, another house lottery was organised in Lisbon to investigate the procedure of 
challenging indebtedness from within the Portuguese legal system. Rather than publicly 
shaming abusive powers and threatening their reputation, this act embraces a-legality and 
circumventions of the law as a mode of offshoring-based resistance. 
 
 
Ambiguity as Control as Resistance 
Fences, enclosures, boundaries, walls, and houses are the five constructed limits that Carl 
Schmitt used to define or contain a secured space–the fence being the original condition for 
safety, and walls and houses its immediate consequence in the form of shelter.24 The German 
term for enclosure, Hegung, indeed connotes instability, from its Greek root Agon (competition, 
agonism) and the contestation of two realities along an intermediary, arbitrating line.25 This 
friction relies on the determination of a degree of secured belonging, where the outside, as 
                                                
22 Michel Feher, ‘On the Age of Appreciation: Lectures on the Neoliberal Condition,’ Lecture series, Goldsmiths 
University of London, 2013-15. 
23 ‘Investee Activism,’ working group with Michel Feher, http://investeeactivism.blogspot.co.uk/ 
24 Schmitt takes this idea from Germanic linguist Jost Trier, who had only referred to the first three (Zaun, Hegung, 
Grenze): ‘In the beginning was the fence. Fence, enclosure, and border are deeply interwoven in the world formed by 
men, determining its concepts.’ See Carl Schmitt, The Nomos of the Earth in the International Law of the Jus Publicum 
Europaeum (Berlin: Telos Press, 2006), 42. 
25 ‘Zaun und Hegung stecken in vielen Kampfwörtern. Hegung gehört zum Wesen des Spiels. Ob Spielbrett oder 
Spielplazt – Rand und Hegung sind es in jedem Falle, die den Raum bestimmen, in welchem das Gesetz des Spiels 
herrscht, aus welchem ausgeschlossen sein soll, was in Gedanken, Formen, Taten spielfremd wäre, während ihm sein 
Recht im Draußen nicht bestritten wird. ludus und Spiel sind Hegewörter, weil die Sonderwelt des Spiels eine Welt mit 
eigenem Nomos ist.’ See Jost Trier, ‘Zaun und Mannring,’ in Beiträge zur Geschichte der deutschen Sprache und 
Literatur 66 (1942): 232. 
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Hardt and Negri remark, is constructed from within.26 Indeed, power is mainly realised at the 
margins of containment, where borders are flexible and identities are hybrid and fluid.27 
 
The logic of enclosing space emerged out of the ownership of earth and the desire for profit.28 
From historical practices that planted hedges as fences, to contemporary financial hedge funds, 
the act of hedging consists of limiting risk while maximising return on investment.29 The opposite 
of such hedged enclosures is an ambiguously defined space, which becomes a priori a 
disruptive force (Figs. 11, 12). This has been previously studied in the fields of law, international 
relations and bilateral treaties, political economy and conflict resolution, Marxist theory, and 
uncertainty and risk analysis.30 However, this thesis neither challenges how capitalism removes 
market walls while keeping accurate borders nor critiques the relationships between uncertainty, 
ambivalence, and opacity. Rather, it investigates how borders are intentionally thickened ad 
infinitum. It aims to understand the limit – not from an economic perspective, but from the 
political condition of littoralised space.  
 
As Reviel Netz remarks in Barbed Wire, with a closed line, and the prevention of motion from 
outside the line to its inside, the idea of property emerges.31 Indeed, violence often controls 
motion not by making the recipient static but by moving the recipient in the desired direction, 
perpetuating a control system based on a differential regime. Fences around animals or human 
prisoners have embedded with them a system of property and ‘civilisation and progress’. 
Modernity, as Netz argues, made possible a total asymmetry between the powerful and the 
powerless.32 In his Discourse on the Origins of Inequality, Jean-Jacques Rousseau also 
questions the validity of the fence as the materialization of possessions:  
The first man who, having fenced off a plot of land, thought of saying, this is mine, and 
found people simple enough to believe him, was the real founder of civil society.33  
 
Rousseau’s boundary is here a legal fiction. Barry Smith and Leo Zaibert cite this assertion in 
their analysis of The Metaphysics of Real Estate to identify fencing as a way of creating 
something that did not exist before; Wendy Brown as well quotes it in Walled States, Waning 
Sovereignty to refer to the enclosure as the legitimation of secular democracy; Stuart Elden 
opens The Birth of Territory with it to locate the emergence of spatial conflicts; and Reinhold 
Martin quotes it to discuss the inequality embedded more than ever in the architectural 
processes through which we are governed by real estate.34 These four citations across the 
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fields of geopolitics, economy, political philosophy and architecture use Rousseau’s quote to 
expose the fictional character of the boundary as a producer of subjectivities. The boundary 
becomes an imaginary line between two nations, separating the imaginary rights of one from 
the imaginary rights of the other.35 
 
Despite Rousseau’s association of enclosures as arbitrary forms of ownership and decision-
making, Elden contests that ‘civil society’ at the time of Rousseau was still meant in opposition 
to the ‘state of nature’, instead of the Hegelian opposition between civil society and the state.36 
Smith and Zaibert, however, look at property rights as a way to analyse the power of the state.37 
Although owning property shares an etymological origin with sitting in German (besitzen - 
sitzen) and Latin (possidere - sedere), a ruler sitting on a throne cannot claim to possess a well 
defined object, given that the symbolic practice of sitting gives no clue as to what the 
boundaries of that object might be; it is too far from the throne to be touched by the ruler’s 
body.38 Hence, the ruler needs the abstraction of the boundary, a line that does not exist, as a 
mechanism to multiply his/her presence and teleport authority to the material edge of the 
dominion. In Brown’s terms, the growing transnational flows of capital, people, ideas, goods, 
violence, and political and religious fealty both tear at the borders they cross and crystallise 
within them, thus compromising sovereignty from its edges and from its interior.39  
 
Rousseau states that the cultivation of land led to a necessary division of space, and that is for 
him the origin of the clearly demarcated boundary.40 However, the Eurocentric genealogy of the 
appearance of the limit can be contested by ancient human settlement along the Nile. As a 
highly organised agricultural society, space was subdivided but edges were blurry, contrary to 
clearly fixed margins. Given that the technology to measure sharp lines had not yet been 
developed, cultivation cannot be considered as the origin of property lines. Without any known 
formal cadastral structure, fields along the Nile River Delta were redrawn after the annual flood, 
redistributing patches of land submerged anew by the rich silt sediments that organised 
boundaries around three flood-based seasons.41 It was not until the later development of 
agrimensura (land surveying) in the Roman Empire that space was rigorously measured and 
mapped by the state for legal purposes (Fig. 13).42  
 
To sustain biopolitical control of peasants, property boundaries needed to be clearly 
demarcated in order to regulate ownership of space and fiscal fertility. But geometric surveys 
did not extend beyond agricultural fields. They did not define how Roman rulers or citizens 
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imagined the world. Space was perceived as a series of routes surrounded by ambiguous 
zones and did not refer to area but to distance and proximity.43 Anything beyond the agricultural 
line or outside the path was part of the unmeasured (Fig. 14). If not conveniently useful as a 
grey zone, the uncharted margins were always subject to improvement, settlement, 
colonisation, or development. Those same zones beyond the lines of measure constituted 
zones of refuge. After the collapse of the Roman Empire, Germanic peoples conceived their 
boundaries as indefinite forests (forst) or marshes (marks) that functioned as the margins of 
inhabitation to be claimed through war. ‘Barbarian’ and ‘uncivilised’ peoples possessed no 
landed property structures in their nomadic and unsettled cosmovision of space; they lived 
beyond the reach of established medieval powers along the so-called outlaw corridor of 
Bohemia.44  
 
Regarding the appropriation of water, different degrees of ambiguity followed different cultural 
traditions. The Indian Ocean was originally perceived as a great void beyond coastal powers, 
whereas for the Roman Empire the Mediterranean was between freedom and enclosure, and 
could foster stewardship but not ownership. Even more extreme, the waters of Micronesia were 
clearly demarcated in a way akin to land-space and subject to territorial control.45 By creating 
lines to appropriate space individually or collectively, power structures have historically invented 
new geometries to control landscapes, waters and people. In the European Middle Ages, 
landed property regimes relied on cadastral maps and navigational charts as efficient and 
violent forms of value extraction; in sum, cartography was at the service of the state.46  
 
Medieval mapmaking and agrarian studies gave rise to boundaries as taxation devices, where 
enclosures facilitated the circulation of commodities. In The Art of Not Being Governed, James 
Scott analyses how conventional maps, in which a kilometre is always a kilometre regardless of 
how the terrain or body of water affects human mobility, are profoundly misleading.47 
Mapmaking could instead rely on another metric that corrects that friction or distortion. Referring 
hill societies in Burma, Scott remarks how the government of time and distance were crucial to 
the authority of the ruler. The cultivation of wet-rice has always been paradigmatic of early 
state-making in Southeast Asia, where the limits to the state were decided by the journey of a 
cart transporting bulk foodstuffs to feed population or collect tributes. Resistance relied on 
residence beyond the mapped line (Figs. 15, 16). The exchange that governmental authority is 
able to control and appropriate is what Scott refers to as state space, as opposed to the 
geography intrinsically resistant to state control, or nonstate space.48 A threshold of distance 
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appears between the ruler’s headquarters and a remote area, where the cost of collecting tax 
(labour and fodder for the oxen) exceeds the value of the collected taxes. State evasion 
appears therefore in settings where political control remains subject to the ‘friction of distance’ 
or its ‘fading sovereignty’. Hence, the territory no longer precedes the map, nor survives it. It is 
the map that precedes the territory.49  
 
By governing the equation of velocity (space/time), the fiction of the mapped boundary can be 
challenged through ambiguous landscapes. Nonstate spaces facilitate zones of refuge that 
escape territorial control: the impenetrable marshes on the lower Euphrates were nonstate 
space until Saddam Hussein drained them to subject its inhabitants to the rule of the state; the 
Pontine Marshes near Rome were drained by Mussolini; the Great Dismal Swamp on the North 
Carolina-Virginia border, the Pripet Marshes in Poland, and the mangroves of the Philippines 
and Indonesia follow a similar logic.50 Although Scott qualifies the constitution of nonstate space 
as an anarchist history, people seeking refuge in the margins did not always intentionally 
confront the sovereign’s power. They might have simply aimed for a more individualistic life, and 
it is unclear whether they ever meant to set up a parallel society. The liminality of ambiguous 
landscapes throughout history has led colonial power regimes to appropriate them; but they 
have also been sites of refuge for all kinds of outcasts. According to that logic, the ‘waste-land’ 
was always the territory occupied by indigenous inhabitants on a haphazard basis.51 
 
The margins of the Medieval European city operated under a logic similar to the nonstate space 
of maroon wetlands, swamps, and mangroves. The zone beyond the city walls was the refuge 
for bandits and outlaws, but also a productive space for inhabitants within the city walls. Unruly 
places trapped between a-legal belonging to the city and to the countryside, it was precisely 
their physical proximity to state space that made them an exoparasite: unsafe and unstable 
social environments that fed on the city’s fortified body while lacking fire insurance, poor relief, 
or the right to be defended in an attack.52 The suburbs beyond the city gates were a site of 
immunity, where smuggling and trading bypassed tolls and tariffs; where hospitals treated 
infectious diseases that could otherwise spread among ‘real’ citizens; where cemeteries with 
rotting corpses would keep plagues in a distant soil; where seductive brothels facilitated illicit 
sexual escapades; and where money-lending could be carried out by sacrilegious groups such 
as the Jews. The margins were the site of a productive, renegade economy that was not at 
odds with the pious activities inside the city walls; quite the contrary, it was highly regulated and 
mutually dependent.53 
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9-10: Manufacturing of the 
Spanish coast according 
to different interests from 
politicians and developers: 
creation of a landfill to extend 
the shoreline seaward and 
make the holiday homes on 
the waterfront be ‘far enough’ 
from the water (above); and 
fishermen’s houses to be 
demolished for being ‘too close’ 
to the water (below). Both 
cases in Cho Vito, Tenerife.
26
11-12: Beating the Bounds. 
Yearly event to make 
inhabitants remember the 
boundaries of the borough 
by walking along them 
(Hungerford, UK, 1913); 
similar festivity beating local 
kids with rods at different 
landmarks along the limits 
(Surrey, UK, ca. 1950s).
13: Contemporary remains 
of the Roman centuriated 
landscape. Béziers, France.
14: Medieval itinerary map: 
the route from London to 
Jerusalem. Matthew Paris, 
between 1250-1259.
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15: The Yǔjī tú Map subdivided 
China into a grid of 100 li 
squares. James Scott uses 
the ancient Han proverb ‘Do 
not make a sale grain over 
a thousand li’, to refer to the 
friction of the terrain, market 
efficiency in tax collection and 
nonstate space (stone carving, 
1136).
16: Index Chart of the Great 
Trigonometrical Survey of India 
by the British Empire to take 
control of the subcontinent. 
James Walker, 1870.
17: Global Linear Thinking: 
Different geographers 
interpretations of the same 
Papal Meridian. It assigned 
the Planet to the Spanish and 
Portuguese Empires, 1493-94. 
Per definition, it was a line 100 
leagues off Cape Verde (later 
changed to 370 miles), whereby 
Spain was entitled to evangelise 
all the territories in the very 
ambiguous space ‘south of a 
north-south’ line.
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From Borders as Circulation of Capital to Capital as Circulation of Borders 
For Carl Schmitt, land-appropriation (Landnahme), or the taking of the soil, is at the core of the 
nomos, the way to govern the planet.54 Embedded in his notion of ‘global linear thinking’ – the 
history of colonialism, of conquering space – is a history of settlement in which order and 
orientation are tightly combined. The first global lines appeared, according to Schmitt, in 1493 
as a form of domination, when the earth was cut into two halves and assigned to two different 
owners.55 By issuing the Bulls of Donation, one of the earliest European diplomatic documents 
on America, Pope Alexander VI shared out the world between the two main maritime powers of 
the time. After cutting a circular line from pole to pole, the Pope granted one half of an unknown 
sphere to the Spanish Catholic Kings of Castile and Leon, and the other half to Portuguese King 
John II. Rather than drawn, the geometry of the Papal Meridian was written in words, given the 
lack of a mathematical method to accurately visualise such a line on a map.56 The Papal 
Meridian described an imaginary north-south line situated 100 leagues west of the Azores and 
Cape Verde islands that split the earth between east and west.57 Every conquered territory 
westward of the line would become property of the Spanish Crown, while anything eastward 
would fall under Portuguese ownership.58 This early act of real estate speculation was literally 
and legally a matter of royal state.59 
 
Ambiguously written, the Papal Meridian took for granted the Spanish league as a unit of length 
equalling 3 miles; but by the end of the 15th century a value equalling 4 miles was 
simultaneously in use.60 Even Schmitt confuses the units, as he refers to 100 miles instead of 
100 leagues.61 Nonetheless, contrary to the current logic of international politics and border 
disputes, the inaccuracy of measurement of the Papal Meridian did not lead to an impossible 
agreement at the time. Quite the opposite, it was precisely that geometric inaccuracy that led to 
further renegotiation between both parties, where no one appeared to lose space by agreeing 
on an uncharted frontier (Fig. 17).62 Troops could be sent to fight and die for boundaries that 
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had no visible landmarks, only linguistic or mathematical existence.63 Like Lewis Carroll’s ocean 
chart in The Hunting of the Snart, the completely blank map was such an ambivalent document 
that everyone could agree on it.64 
 
The multiple genocides in the Americas were legitimised by the Pope as part of the evangelising 
mission of land-appropriation, which was barely addressed in international law.65 The resources 
that the Americas indeed provided for the Spanish and Portuguese Empires took advantage of 
biased definitions of wilderness and human occupation. Violent spatial appropriation followed 
Francisco de Vitoria’s principle of dominium eminens or eminent domain: the power of rulers to 
take or expropriate property for the public good.66 It was lawful for kings and ‘great’ men to take 
land from individuals to build palaces and castles, as these buildings theoretically served the 
public purpose of defending or representing society in political or military affairs.67 In Spain, the 
Siete Partidas law book (1260s) stated that rulers could take property for the common good of 
the land, as long as they were compensated a just price according to the view of ‘good’ men.68 
Following a similar philosophy, the Laws of Burgos (1512) and the Laws of the Indies (1552) 
ruled and shaped Spanish inhabitation of the American continents. Their legacy in 
contemporary politics is still present in the way eminent domain and compulsory purchase 
operate in Europe and the US. Also still in place are the abuses around what defines the public 
good or just compensations. 
 
The Laws of the Indies were based on a debate known as the Controversy of Valladolid (1550-
1551), when two prominent theologians debated the human or nonhuman nature of the native 
dwellers of the Americas. On the one hand, Fray Bartolomé de las Casas, inspired by Francisco 
de Vitoria, advocated for the human rights of American indigenous peoples, based on their 
proven capacity to build extremely advanced architectures.69 On the other hand, Ginés de 
Sepúlveda relegated natives to nonhumans as a result of their anti-natural ritual of human 
sacrifice.70 Sepúlveda presented the natives as savages and barbarians, in order to place them 
outside the law and to make their land free and ready for appropriation, for legitimate 
occupatio.71 De las Casas placed native peoples within the law as humans, but as such they 
were subject to Christian evangelization. Under either approach, indigenous peoples could be 
dispossessed of their bodies, space, and beliefs through the management of ambiguous 
definitions. The boundary between human and nonhuman, godly and ungodly, was less an 
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epistemological question and more a matter of expropriating and dispossessing a people of 
their riches.    
 
Dominium eminens was used by de Vitoria and Hugo Grotius to differentiate between the 
commons at the beginning of humanity with the security of ownership that allowed people to 
agree together to form a common civil society.72 Invented boundaries led to social structures to 
secure the legitimisation of ownership together with the powerful right of supereminens 
dominium.73 Both Grotius’ visions of dominium eminens and mare liberum (freedom of the seas) 
advocated for an internationalist notion of sharing based on extreme necessity; either the 
extreme necessity of any nation to sail its ships across the seas or the extreme necessity of 
expropriation of foreign lands for the common good of the nation: 
The property of subjects is under the eminent domain of the state, so that the state or 
he who acts for it may use and even alienate and destroy such property, not only in the 
case of extreme necessity, in which even private persons have a right over the property 
of others, but for ends of public utility, to which ends those who founded civil society 
must be supposed to have intended that private ends should give way.74 
 
Can any nation give away what it never owned, or discover what already belonged to 
someone else?75 
 
Despite aspiring to end Spain and Portugal’s Catholic monopoly over the Earth, Grotius did not 
propose an open planet for all. He rather aimed to enable his native Holland to take advantage 
of the plunder of entire continents. His ambiguous rhetoric around collective possession was in 
favour of protecting and abusing humankind at the same time. Grotius’ idea of freedom of the 
seas, as the opposite to John Selden’s notion of enclosed seas (mare clausum), was a social 
construction of marine governance that only considered a freedom-enclosure dichotomy from a 
Eurocentric perspective.76 Contrary to the glorification of Grotius’ work, Rousseau criticised his 
masquerade of alter-colonialism, positioning him as a white man, who not only justified slavery, 
but was also the idéologue of barbarous colonisers:77  
[Grotius] spares no pains to rob the people of all their rights and invest kings with them. 
 
Dominium eminens and the definition of the common good relied on the power of ambiguous 
judgement and the state of necessity doctrine. Rather than extreme necessity, eminent domain 
is a matter of created necessity.78 In either John Locke’s idea of political power as jurisdiction 
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over the land or Immanuel Kant’s notions of supreme proprietorship of the soil, land 
appropriation eventually constituted an original spatial order as the source of all further law that 
has the power to justify decisions based on that necessity.79  
 
In the same way that Grotius advocated for eminent domain and freedom of the seas, at a 
European scale France pushed to open its rivers in order to freely circulate goods and capital, 
not for the sake of a more united continent, but in order to dismantle the powers in place.80 The 
aim was to increase freedom of trade by freeing circulation along watercourses in the early 17th 
century. The more mobility German Princes acquired, the faster the predatory Habsburg Empire 
would dissolve into independent nation-states to the advantage of France.81 The need for 
freedom in commerce and circulation would eventually overthrow the neighbouring absolutist 
powers. The Rhine River, traditionally perceived as the natural border of France, shifted from 
being a divisive boundary to a unifying economic corridor, a destructive frontier to circulate 
capital.82  
 
Following the opening of European rivers, the 1648 Peace of Westphalia put an end to the 
ambiguity of sovereignty along natural and naturalised borders. For the first time in Europe, 
stable and static boundaries were to be internationally respected. And yet, Westphalia, rather 
than fixing national borders, perpetuated imperial logics based on the demarcation of precise 
boundaries. Territory is no doubt a geographical concept, but it is first of all a juridico-political 
one: the area controlled by a certain kind of power.83 The materialization of the treaty into lines 
on maps started with the Treaty of the Pyrenees (1659), which bounded Spain and France in 
the eponymous mountains and is considered the first instance of the modern territorial limit as a 
natural boundary.84  
 
The myth of Westphalia is a fallacy produced in the 19th and 20th centuries based on the 
idealisation of sovereignty and 17th century anti-Habsburg propaganda.85 In practical terms, the 
linear and exclusive frontier scarcely existed before the French Revolution, almost 150 years 
after Westphalia.86 It was the great crisis of state legitimacy after 1789 that created the need for 
a new basis to political authority. In fact, it was only in the aftermath of the Vienna and Paris 
conferences of 1814-15 that territoriality based on clearly demarcated limits was fully 
implemented in Europe.87 More than the boundary itself, the real innovation of Westphalia was 
the embassy as a system for extraterritorial exception.88  
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From the perspective of urban transformation, what did follow from Westphalia was the 
defortification of cities across Europe, whereby urban conglomerations started to loosen their 
edges.89 Hundreds of Medieval walls, which had served as clear boundaries between the legal 
and the illicit city for centuries, began to be dismantled. The boundary of the urban realm 
became more and more abstract, subject to regulations, and fluid in the impact of its power. In 
Spain, that boundary also became financial with the first large-scale speculative real estate 
operation, in the year 1600. The entire court of King Philip III moved from Madrid to the 
countryside of Valladolid for a period of just six years. The change of capital was promoted by 
the King’s favourite, the Duke of Lerma, who argued against the lack of fresh and hygienic air in 
the city and the potential menace of revolts. Economist José Manuel Naredo argues that the 
actual intention was to obtain vast economic profits by turning rural wastelands into a 
designated imperial site.90 The fields, which the Duke of Lerma had previously bought at very 
low value, were sold at an inflated price to the court for its new seat. He repeated the stunt 
when the court returned to Madrid. Power, for Fernand Braudel, is the product of bringing 
together the state and capitalism into a common project of development; here, the 
entanglement of capitalism and the creation of a capital go hand in hand.91  
 
Capitalist speculation around the value of land transformed cities’ historical medieval limit into 
public promenades for enlightened pedestrians, with paradigmatic cases all across Europe that 
reframe the role of the state towards life in its cities. De-fortifying medieval enclaves in Europe 
turned boundaries into an open space for the common good and a new site for the invention of 
capital. Evictions beyond the city walls erased the ‘insalubrious’ quarters of the poor. For the 
sake of bourgeois order and hygiene they gave way to leisure spaces built with capital lent by 
newly created institutions. This new spatial order capitalised on the boundary line, not only at 
the level of empires, nations, and rivers, but also at the urban scale, building up toward the 
project of the liberal and neoliberal city. The demolition of city walls has specific narratives in 
each location. In Barcelona, the city wall had long been a contentious boundary for Spanish-
Catalan political relationships in the second biggest city of the country, purposefully limiting the 
expansion of urban growth. The demolition could later only materialised through a watered 
down version of the original Cerdá Plan by accommodating centralist political interests (Fig. 
18).92 In Paris, however, being the capital of France, the boundary of the city was shifted from 
the periphery to its interior by opening wide streets to control its own citizens (no longer the 
outsider). Furthermore, David Harvey points out how the Haussmann’s transformation (1853-
70) was rather made possible thanks to the Péreire brothers—who developed an 
unprecedented system of mortgages and lending facilitating the building boom (Fig. 19).93  
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18: Enlargement Map of Barcelona, Ildefons 
Cerdá, 1859. His original plan consisted on 
an egalitarian non-hierarchical expansion 
based on a grid that reduced the amount of 
‘privileged’ streets. Note that the blocks were 
not intended to be filled in their four sides.
19: Destruction of Paris designed by Georges-
Eugène Haussmann to allow military control of 
the city by widening streets into easy-access 
axes, depicted in black (1853-70). 
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The circulation and accumulation of capital is the subject of a vast literature from Adam Smith to 
Karl Marx, but this thesis does not aim to investigate notions of value in commodity fetishism, 
visibility of labour in its production, or social alienation.94 It rather uses a Foucauldian approach 
to investigate the spatial implications of capital circulation in relationship to the ambiguity of 
boundary lines. Foucault regarded the security of territorial boundaries as a modern conquest 
when compared to the borders for Machiavelli’s Prince.95 While for Machiavelli the main task of 
the sovereign was to demarcate, fix, enlarge, and protect the borders of his territory, Foucault 
argued that once modernity made those borders fixed and certain, the main preoccupation 
became how to ensure circulation of capital through them. Consequently, instead of 
understanding spatial boundaries as the circulation of capital in a Foucauldian sense, this thesis 
proposes to read capital as the circulation of borderlines. It is under that framework that the 
construction of space in architecture and geography is entangled with the idea of the urban 
frontier.  
 
 
The Mobile Contours of Frontier Natures 
Frontiers are not lines or zones, but institutions and processes.96 The notion of frontier and 
boundary are inherent to the ambiguity of their inhabitation and the pressure of reinstating some 
sort of ‘legitimate belonging’ to that space. In a Hegelian sense, vagueness and ambiguity 
characterise the liberal position on frontiers; and yet, liberalism assumes the existence of the 
territorial state as a given, standing above civil society and regulating it.97 A frontier can also be 
understood as the moment when a community occupies a territory that is later shaped by the 
activity and growth of that community, or by the impact it has on another community.98 If the 
frontier is a diffuse zone of relations where humans and nonhumans dwell, the boundary 
governs that area in international law through a line without width. A frontier population is 
marginal, and it is typical for people belonging to both sides of the frontier to engage in 
smuggling, as a frontier dweller’s political loyalty may be affected by his economic self-interest 
or precarious marginal inhabitation. In the case of Aboriginal Australia, the concept of the region 
or habitat is clearer than any concept of a sharply defined edge; the region does not have an 
edge, but shades off into a margin of uncertainty, a no-man’s-land where other bands or 
communities may be encountered.99  
 
However, frontiers subsequently acquired a new constituency through the invention of the ‘Far 
West’ in the northern half of the American continents.100 Inspired by the violent process of 
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enclosing the commons that had taken place in Britain, after the 1862 Homestead Act a series 
of governmental policies freely granted ownership of land in the US. Any individual, no longer 
just the ruler, was legally entitled to claim a piece of ‘vacant space,’ ‘free soil’, or ‘marginal land’. 
This provoked a prodigious flow of ‘pioneers’ migrating to the American West. Frederick 
Jackson Turner first claimed in 1893 that the frontier was the outer edge pushing further; an 
ever-shifting meeting point between savagery and civilization.101 In quantitative terms, the 
frontier was a margin of a settlement with a density of two or less people to the square mile.102 
Similar to the disagreement in the definition of humans and nonhumans in the Controversy of 
Valladolid, Native Americans were excluded from the calculation of density.103 Robert Wade 
refused Turner’s claim of a European right to cultivate ‘vacant’ land and reframed the dream of 
continental domination.104 The desire to urbanise the continent’s vast surface promoted the 
growth of agricultural economies that violently asserted ownership over areas inhabited by 
Native Americans. Rather than small villages evolving into bigger towns, it was towns that 
appeared first and agriculture that followed. Eastern investors scanned maps looking for likely 
spots to establish a city, usually at the junction of two rivers or the centre of fertile farming 
districts; they bought the land, divided it in lots, gave the place a name, and waited for 
development that would appreciate its value. William Cronon in Nature’s Metropolis also 
criticises Turner’s view of the frontier as bucolic rural plains, and as if frontier history had little or 
nothing to do with cities.105 Contrary to Turner’s idea that cities marked the end of the frontier, 
cities and countryside grew in tandem as a commercial-capitalist complex.106 It consisted of a 
unified process of rural settlement and metropolitan growth that colonised ‘vacant’ land through 
a grid of property lines. 
 
The frontier had to be measured and demarcated if the colonial project was to succeed in 
selling land from afar, which led to simple geometric systems imposed on the landscape, like 
the Jeffersonian Grid.107 In this new boundary-based society, Jeffersonian property became a 
mode of citizenship.108 The settlement of the US coincided with a change in Western views of 
wild nature and democracy. Had Europeans colonised America in the 11th century, the National 
Parks system would have been impossible due to alternate systems of land-ownership. 
However, by considering the ‘Indians’ had to be ‘savage’, ‘uncivilised’ peoples and thus without 
any right to property, European-Americans saw themselves as fully entitled to take over their 
‘vacant’ territory, as the Spanish had already done some centuries before.109  
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Transforming the imaginary wilds of the frontier into mappable territory generated natural 
commons, leading to Yellowstone becoming the first National Park in the US in 1872. Its 
delineation shaped the landscape into a marketable product by reclassifying ‘wild’ space into a 
bounded commodity. Politicians, conservationists, and investors turned wilderness into 
wonderlands to attract tourists and an inflow of capital. In order to distinguish itself from the rest 
of the country, Yellowstone’s marketeers even created ‘spatial oddities’ for people to admire.110 
It is remarkable how the colonial project converted savages into noble savages so nineteenth 
century tourists could revive the magic of the frontier: nature, in the case of Yellowstone, 
needed such inhabitants.111 National parks in the US were not altruistic creations of forward-
thinking individuals; these places held in many cases no economic value, and had managed to 
escape lumbering, mining, grazing, or agriculture because they were ‘worthless’ wastelands in a 
traditional market sense.112 And yet, they provided space for the economic exploitation and 
control of native populations.113  
 
Colonial lines classifying the nature of land often relied on the ambiguity of its common good. 
The study of spatial margins and marginal spaces became more and more a matter of national 
political economy. Since frontier and boundary studies emerged as a discipline in Europe in the 
late nineteenth century, white male thinkers from Great Britain, France and Germany (the main 
players in international – imperial – relations at that time) dominated the field.114 In his seminal 
work Geography of Frontiers and Boundaries, John Robert Victor Prescott situates the 
genealogy of frontiers and modern European boundary theory in 1895 with Friedrich Ratzel’s 
principles of Lebensraum (living space) and Anthropogeographie (anthropogeography), which 
laid the foundations for his Geopolitik.115  
 
Ratzel used the analogy of a living organ to describe the border: states are organisms and 
boundaries their skins.116 For him, the Grenzraum (borderland) is the real space, while the 
Grenzlinie (boundary line) is only its abstraction.117 The borderland becomes the area within 
which growth and decline are both organised and revealed: the site of friction.118 However, 
making Ratzel the founder of border studies flattens a previous non-European history of queer, 
unorthodox, and ambiguous demarcations of space.119 The very act of ‘inventing’ boundary 
theory legitimises the need to impose rigid lines upon the management of an intellectual space. 
Indeed, Ratzel’s Eurocentric white male colonial perspective derives from the 1884-85 Berlin 
Conference (also known as the Congo Conference), when the main European powers carved 
Africa into pieces on paper, interpreted ‘blank spaces’ in the African continent as areas open for 
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exploration and colonisation, rather than the limits of their knowledge of African geography.120 
Prescott and others contested the simplistic classification of boundaries into natural and artificial 
that had been promoted by key figures in military geography like Lord George Nathaniel Curzon 
and Colonel Thomas Holdich.121 Holdich distinguished between frontier spaces being natural, 
and boundary lines being artificial. A limit being natural endowed a frontier with a scientific and 
moral legitimacy, invariably invoking a state’s expansionist tendencies rather than an impulse to 
withdraw back to them.  
 
It became clearer during WWI that boundaries and frontiers were artificially created necessities 
contra natura, even if these taxonomies were still used indiscriminately by forward-thinking 
theorists like Samuel Boggs, Charles Fawcett and Paul de Lapradelle.122 According to Fawcett, 
frontiers were not fixed entities, but distinct regions of transition: while he admitted that all 
regions are transitional, it is only when the transitional feature is a dominant characteristic that 
the region is a true frontier. A decade after the war, de Lapradelle replaced the dated notion of a 
natural boundary with the term limites artificielles dérivées (derived artificial limits). Robert 
Sieger coined ‘organic boundaries’ and ‘boundaries borrowed from nature’ for the same 
purpose, and further employed other terms such as Grenzgürtel, Grenzlinie, Grenzlehre 
(boundary zone, line, pattern).123 Embedded in a war context, Karl Haushofer identified 
Wehrgrenzen as defensive, ambiguous buffer zones that incorporated part of the enemy’s 
territory to deter bombardment.124 In that case, the thickness of the line was intentionally beyond 
the boundary for security purposes. 
 
During WWII frontiers developed into powerful forces of domination that were dependent on 
nationalist politics and that instrumentalised the ambiguity of the boundary to unify both 
language and peoples.125 But by the end of the war, boundary zones were innocently claimed to 
be no longer necessary. Prescott remarks how the understanding of boundary zones was 
intentionally ambiguous in order to conflate the distinction between transitional border zones, 
undelimited areas, boundary zones, undefined boundaries, and no-man’s land. Hence, the 
ambiguity of what aspects of boundaries had ceased to exist was even less clear.126 Boundaries 
could not be studied in general terms, as each context became extremely specific and universal 
taxonomies no longer made sense, with the sole exception of whether they were exercised on 
paper (de jure) or in space (de facto).127  
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The ambiguity of the boundary line begins to be enunciated in Géographie des frontières, when 
Jacques Ancel distinguishes between plastic and mobile boundaries (frontières plastiques; 
frontières mouvantes).128 The boundary for him results from pressures exerted on both sides: 
the line is simply the equilibrium between opposing forces.129 Learning from the military 
construction of the civilian environment, Eyal Weizman’s analogous concept of ‘political plastic’ 
reads architecture as a series of responsive physical structures and built environments, social 
forces slowing into form that ‘behave’ in response to pressures and buildings that ‘perform’ in 
relation to programme.130 The act of delineation, and the malleable politics behind it, is 
eventually what constitutes and adapts the boundary.131 A paradigmatic example against the 
Western understanding of boundaries is the ‘movable borders’ (confine mobili) introduced in 
2007 to re-define the Austro-Italian glacier-border in the Alps as it melts.132  
 
This shift in understanding borderlines as borderlands, which thicken and widen a line imagined 
with no width at all, is what Homi Bhabha describes as a ‘third space’: a realm of negotiation, 
translation, and remaking.133 This is a useful framework not only to address cultural and social 
processes in borderlands created by empire, but it is also a way to conceptualise relationships 
in frontiers lacking colonial stigma.134 The Western view on frontiers has dominated 
constitutional thinking in nearly every highly industrialised country; it has even permeated 
international institutions and international law in South-South diplomacy.135 Counter-models are 
required to dismantle the inequality created by nations of the Global North in an attempt to 
create an outside. As some Mexican protesters now claim, ‘we did not cross the border, the 
border crossed us’.136 Indigenous understandings of landscape, territory, and inhabitation based 
on the absence of Westphalian boundaries have yet to be decolonised. Acknowledging 
immaterial property titles as legitimate ownership/usership of the land, like in recent Australian 
aboriginal lawsuits, might institutionalise orally transmitted songs into legally binding maps.137 
This shifts the logic of humans being landowners to land-users: it is the land that eventually 
owns us.138  
 
In Sandro Mezzadra and Brett Neilson’s terms, these processes consist of differential inclusion: 
the conviction that the figures who inhabit the world’s borderscapes are not marginal subjects 
on the edges of society but central protagonists in the drama of composing the space, time, and 
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materiality of the social.139 From this perspective, the circulation of ambiguous limits can be 
connected to a post-national condition of elusive sovereignty, denationalisation, flexible 
citizenship, supraterritoriality, and extrajuridical spaces. For Jürgen Habermas and Arjun 
Appadurai, the post-national does not come after nationalism, but coexists in time with the 
national, while being challenged by a diasporic non-territorial condition.140 This is also the sort of 
elusive sovereignty enunciated by Jacques Eric Roussellier: a simultaneous de facto 
combination of internal and external sovereignty.141 Saskia Sassen’s idea of ambiguity as 
denationalisation actually consists of a new normative order based on the rising power of 
private authority in domains once exclusive to the state and the blurring between the private and 
public sectors.142 Sassen remarks how this implies a shift in the role of the state from supporting 
strategic industries to establishing conditions for competitiveness and antitrust legislation in a 
global economy.143 Aihwa Ong’s idea of flexible citizenship similarly refers to the cultural logics 
of capitalist accumulation, travel, and displacement that nudge subjects to respond 
opportunistically to changing political-economic conditions. This in turn leads to what Ong calls 
‘graduated sovereignty’, a series of zones subjected to different kinds of governmentality.144 In 
sum, ambiguity for all these thinkers can be read as a progressive dissolution of the 
Westphalian boundary. Instead, they propose a border that has evolved to become malleable in 
the face of ad-hoc, violent, and convenient regimes for increasing the extraction of value. 
 
This transnational organisation is simultaneously public and private, national and international, 
profit-making and charitable, religious and secular, civil and military, and benign and 
nefarious.145 The supraterritorial enables transborder monetary transactions in currencies that 
are not dependent on national geographic boundaries, but are most convenient in a given 
moment.146 Giorgio Agamben’s State of Exception is deeply embedded in the ambiguity of 
extrajuridical opportunism: the government separates the norm from its application in order to 
make its application possible.147 Hence, exception is for Agamben about being outside, and yet 
belonging. The logic of ambiguity embedded in financial littorals that this thesis proposes 
regards the exception as a reversible condition: it is simultaneously about being inside and not 
belonging. Therefore, the goal of thinking about space through ambiguity is not just about 
border control: it is also about giving the border its real power.  
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Calculated Ambiguity: Spatial Margins as Profit Margins 
Both the right’s neoliberal discourse and the left’s post-WWII understanding of ecology 
embraced spatial imaginations of a commons based on free market ideology. The seminal text 
The Tragedy of the Commons by Garrett Hardin generated an ambivalent, market-oriented 
understanding of political and ecological space.148 He argued that communal pastures, 
belonging to everybody and nobody at the same time, would lead to the unmitigated exhaustion 
of resources by many self-interested users.149 Following this line of thought, Michael Heller 
framed the Tragedy of the Anticommons as the equivalent mismanagement of resources, not 
because of overuse, but underuse.150 Given that some proactive owners can take advantage of 
more passive others, the elimination of clear spatial divisions within the commons could lead to 
a dead-end situation where none of the owners can use the common pool.151 Both Hardin and 
Heller dismiss any possibility of collective ownership, arguing that blurry boundaries for 
individual possession are a burden for spatial efficiency. 
 
Elinor Ostrom’s critique of Hardin’s thesis, Governing the Commons, advocated for a renewed 
embrace of that shared space.152 The socioeconomic value of communal ownership, far from 
exhausting local means of survival, has carefully established durable institutions to govern 
those same resources and spaces.153 Among many international cases, the Tribunal de les 
Aigües (Tribunal of Waters) on the Mediterranean Coast, a millenary extrajudicial system 
recognised by the Spanish government, has successfully regulated collective irrigation of 
coastal orchards since the tenth century. This time-based system of sharing common resources 
to organise coastal wetlands does not operate through two-dimensional boundary lines, but 
through the mutual government and fair distribution of velocity and timed water flows: each 
farmer is assigned a shift, a fixed time period to withdraw water; knowing exactly when and for 
how long water may be obtained, but without exactly knowing how much water may be available 
each time.154 This collective usership of coastal waters and multiple tidal zones constitutes just 
one among many ways to contest the financialisation of the shore, as explained in chapter one.  
 
In an analogous way, Ostrom’s work reactivated the discourse on civic resistance to the 
privatisation of public space, raising awareness for the future of humanity and inhabitation. This 
had already been laid out in international law as part of the 1954 United Nations Common 
Heritage of Mankind project (CHM), as well as in a number of transnational agreements to 
maintain the seafloor or the Antarctic as international spaces – each ambiguously set aside for 
the common good, beyond national interests and in the name of human peace.155 Nonetheless, 
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both coastal waters and coastal land are perceived as investment sites and have been 
incorporated within the territorial control of the state and the international community.156 
Immediately after the agreement, the OPEC crisis financialised even more the planetary 
commons, extracting value out of even the definition of the common good, as is described in 
chapter two. Paradoxically, the CHM framework boosted private exploitation and pressure on 
the commons by the very act of demarcating them.157 The emergence of a defined realm 
created conflict around its accurate extent, usage, and shared ownership. The fact that 
economic tensions are constantly moulding the commons has led to a new form of neoliberal 
environmentalism, which ‘protects’ nature by speculating on the extraction of value from it, be it 
real estate potential or prospective natural resources. The perverse logic of the extraction of 
value from environmental protection is what Bram Büscher and Robert Fletcher describe as 
capitalist accumulation by conservation.158  
 
The privatisation of waters and the ownership of the tidal zone lie at the core of the 
financialisation of space. Are they collective resources or private property?159 Both 
classifications imply the extraction of a certain economic value, neglecting any possibility of 
‘untouched’ environment. Indeed, debates around the collective use of the commons eventually 
led to the stewardship doctrine, whereby space suddenly needs to be protected or guarded for 
the common good.160 Under the values of stewardship, the ocean is seen as a socially 
significant space providing resources and/or services. Hence, after a violent era of industrial 
and mercantilist exploitation of the oceans, the rise of stewardship principles reflects the 
spatiality of a neoliberal economy. It legitimises environmental protection in order to regulate the 
extraction of value.  
 
Granting marine governance has led to a system of global ecocracy.161 As opportunities for 
intensive marine resource exploitation outside territorialised coastal waters arise, the ocean has 
become a global resource-space to be stewarded. This process can be connected to the so-
called ‘Cousteauization’ of the oceans: a popular movement to cultivate public interest in the 
ocean’s biota, through figures like Captain Jacques Cousteau, in order to generate financial 
support for further marine research and governmental and/or corporate stewardship of marine 
resources.162 In that regard, the ecocratic system of environmentality can extract even more 
value under the mask of environmental preservation.163 Ecocracy has turned into another 
ambiguous form of law. 
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Neither relying on the historical legacy of governing the commons nor a reliance on international 
regulatory frameworks is sufficient to safeguard the common good. It is a space constructed 
through ambiguous limits that secure economic returns in very different and even opposing 
conditions, precisely because of the flexibility of the limit. Everything that occurs ‘beyond the 
line’ remains outside the legal, moral, and political values recognised on this side of the line.164  
 
Margins and spaces of economic opportunity have materialised in the freedom of the seas, 
where maritime powers have historically instrumentalised the open waters through the figure of 
the privateer: an agent operating at the edge of fluid legalities and escaping national 
sovereignty, all the while employed by specific nations.165 For Daniel Heller-Roazen, the pirate 
is no longer defined by the region in which he or she moved, but the region of piracy derives 
simply from the presence of the pirate.166 Likewise, contrary to a clearly demarcated plot of land, 
a ship is an itinerant form of ambiguous sovereignty. Far from ending with the emergence of 
modern society, piracy’s logic of ambiguity is still very present in business practices known as 
‘flags of convenience’. These practices avoid regulations in the country of the ship’s owner, 
choosing instead to inscribe the vessel in a country with fewer legal limitations.  
 
From a Foucauldian perspective, in law, anything that is undetermined is permitted; in contrast, 
in disciplinary regulation what is undetermined is forbidden.167 This thesis looks at the ambiguity 
and the architecture of the limit as the very appropriation of what is undetermined and what is 
permitted: zones that are neither legal nor illegal, that exist while not existing, and at the same 
time are key to determining the degree of an ambiguous ownership.168 Hence, this thesis is not 
about the spaces of discipline in a Foucauldian sense, but rather about how the boundaries that 
separate the allowed from the forbidden are intentionally thickened. Hans Lindahl has 
introduced another term to define this liminal condition: alegality, which is different from the 
illegal, and yet part of a legal disorder.169  
 
In this sense, the alegal contests the legal order through the legality of illegality, and the 
illegality of legality. Financial littorals are liminal spaces produced through this alegality and 
regulated by offsetting and outsourcing the speculative management of responsibility. If the 
Peace of Westphalia led to a global order, the peace treaties ending WWI and WWII have led to 
a post-Westphalian (post-boundary) era where offshore-like structures have come to dominate 
global space.170 The formation of supranational instruments of governmentality are clear 
examples of power based on adaptable standards and their loopholes, with examples like the 
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade GATT (1947-1995), which would later evolve into the 
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World Trade Organization, the World Bank (1944), the UN Charter (1945), the International 
Monetary Fund (1945), ISO global standards (1946), the 4th Geneva Convention (1949), and 
the Special Economic Zone that have developed since the 1950s.171  
 
This is where Jacqueline Best’s notion of ‘constructive ambiguity’ becomes so relevant.172 
According to her analysis of the 1944 Bretton Woods Agreement – a key moment that 
established the basis for international finance – it did not fail to deliver its ambitious goals for a 
new global and transparent order not because it was too ambiguous, as the media reported at 
the time. Ambiguity, even today, has been taken as a synonym for uncertainty and is plagued 
by negative associations. Its stigma relies on its perceived opposition to clarity and 
transparency, to rational knowledge, and to the production of one truth. Ambiguity has been 
turned into a malady to be eradicated. However, Best argues that if we are surprised in a bad 
way by the idea of ambiguity as a constructive force, it may be because we insist on thinking of 
power and strength as the perfection of information.173 For Bruno Latour, any trace of ambiguity 
is to be rejected, as ambiguity, he argues, is a mistake or the impossibility of asserting whether 
climate change, for instance, exists or it does not.174 To solve any problem, it is necessary to 
know first whether the problem exists with certainty. However, contrary to the Latourian logic, 
ambiguity, and the lack of precision, can also be productive, precisely because it allows the 
problem to both exist and not exist at the same time. Best argues that the Bretton Woods 
Agreement actually failed, because it was not ambiguous enough:  
Whereas the emphasis in the post-war regime was on managing ambiguity by 
regulating capital [...], the contemporary reliberalised regime has focused on eliminating 
ambiguity by deregulating financial flows.175 
 
Contrary to Best’s proposition of embracing ambiguity and the opportunities it could facilitate, 
deregulated financial flows are ambiguous without acknowledging it. The neoliberal strategy of 
financial liberalization has grown into exactly the monster it was designed to avoid. But the idea 
of the calculated, ambiguous zone as a space beyond regulation is not new. Keller Easterling 
remarks, it dates back to Ancient Greek free ports, the Hanseatic League’s free cities, the post-
WWII Foreign Trade Zones and duty-free airports, and, more recently, Special Economic 
Zones.176 These offshore spaces are the result of a ‘hypocritical sovereignty’, where nations 
operate between multiple jurisdictions with potentially conflicting allegiances and laws.177 Zones 
‘cheat’, just as most maritime city-states have cheated for centuries. Ronen Palan claims that 
with the emergence of offshore spaces of exception and overseas extraterritoriality, the state 
does not disappear, but rather enters a secondary, relatively unregulated, juridical space in 
which economic activities can develop more or less without hindrance.178 Palan relates how the 
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juridical space of sovereignty is bifurcating into two simultaneous domains, one still very much 
‘on-shore’, subject to the strict controls, regulations, and taxation and the other consisting of 
‘fictitious spaces’ known as the ‘off-shore’.179  
 
Extrapolating on the notion of offshore economy as an unregulated realm, Jason Sharman has 
noted that extraterritorial financial flows have consciously espoused ambiguity as a form of 
governance: 
The common feature among offshore financial products is calculated ambiguity: the 
ability to give diametrically opposed but legally valid answers to the same question from 
different quarters. Thus offshore allows individuals and firms to enjoy simultaneous 
ownership and non-ownership, to be high profit and loss-making, heavily indebted but 
also debt-free, and for investment to be foreign and domestic.180 
 
By referring to the offshore as deliberate and calculated in its use of ambiguity, Sharman 
exposes its dual logic: the intentionality and need of governments to maintain zones beyond 
their own reach, where economic transactions can take place with minimal intervention by the 
state.181 Henry Kissinger’s notion of constructive ambiguity has come to dominate international 
diplomacy since the mid-1960s as a negotiating tactic that allows contentious discourses by 
disguising frictions under a double-edged calm.182 At the same time, in the field of engineering, 
Lotfi A. Zadeh framed his notion of ‘fuzzy logic’.183 A ‘fuzzy set’ is a class of objects with a 
continuum of grades of membership, ranging between zero and one. The classical example is 
an apple that has already been eaten. If we take a bite out of the apple, it is still an apple; after 
several more bites, we are left with an apple core; at what point did the apple cross over from 
being an apple to being an apple core? Would that change if we could take one more bite out of 
that apple core?184 The encounter between land and sea is a paradigmatic case of a fuzzy 
set.185  
 
Calculated, constructive, or fuzzy forms of ambiguity are crucial in challenging the Kantian 
approach to decision-making through a gradient of all possible possibilities. In that regard, the 
fuzzy becomes a system of partial truth. Even if fuzzy logic is widely accepted within the 
engineering and computer science, it is generally rejected by mathematicians and statisticians, 
as critics argue that it is unscientific by Karl Popper’s standards: gradients of membership are 
not empirically verifiable.186 Yet, it is precisely the impossibility of empirical verification that 
constructs the space of a successful or evil operation.  
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The contemporary, neoliberal world is more and more reliant on the continuous reorganization 
of spatial margins and their associated profits. It allows opposing positions to be simultaneously 
valid. Not every country accepts democracy as a system of governance, but every country 
acknowledges the ambiguity of law as an imperative. Paradoxically, a universalist rule of law is 
the mechanism that facilitates international agreements operating in complete opposite ways, 
both in protected economies as well as deregulated and privatised ones.187 This ambiguity-
based neoliberal order requires an understanding of the rule of law as twofold: resolution of the 
ruler as the decision-maker who governs, and resolution of the ruler as the accuracy of the 
measuring tool. This is the logic of financial littorals that this thesis puts forward.  
 
This genealogy of ambiguity is based on the role that architecture and the construction of space 
play and have played in the making of financially built environments. In this regard, not only has 
ambiguity been used as a form of control, but it also allows challenges to power structures by 
using the circumvention tactics of capital and offshoring. The liminal condition of the shoreline 
as a financial littoral is here a dispositif for investigating the agency of boundaries in the 
urbanisation and environing processes of global speculation. The next three chapters 
investigate the phenomenon of littoralisation from the perspective of the shore, the offset, and 
the offshore.  
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1– SHORE 
Spending the Summer: The Invention of the Coast 
 
 
‘Est autem litus maris, quatenus hibernus fluctus 
maximus excurrit.’ 
[The shore of the sea extends to the point attained by 
the highest tide in winter.] 
 
—Justinian I, Code188 
 
 
 
1.1 Resolution of the Ruler and the Littoral Exercise of Ambiguity 
On 28 July 1988 the Coastal Law was passed in Spain.189 For the first time in the country’s 
history, a law explicitly identified the shoreline as a juridical entity in order to protect it—the 
previous law in 1969 was merely administrative and in any case was hardly enforced.190 The 
1988 law opens by defining the coast according to its length: 7,880km. With this measurement 
of an abstract line that did not previously exist, the shoreline reveals the political, ecological, 
architectural, and economic pressures upon the boundary between land and sea. The shoreline 
is indeed a line that does not exist; it is a thick, liminal zone. This thickness is defined differently 
in different contexts. At a European scale, for example, it is a variable strip, whose width 
depends more on environmental management than existing administrative or planning units.191 
For practical operations, it is considered to be about 10km-wide. In Spain, in order to calculate 
the population of coastal zones, the 1988 Coastal Law defined the thickness of the shore as 
only 5km-wide—meaning that 35% of the population was concentrated in an area that 
constituted 7% of the national territory.192  
 
Colliding with this legal definition, a series of contradictory measurements describe the length of 
the Spanish coast: 8,000km according to the History of Coastal Engineering in Spain by Miguel 
Ángel Losada et al.; 7,879km according to the Spanish National Geographic Institute; 7,268km 
according to the World Resources Institute; and 4,964km according to the CIA-authored The 
World Factbook.193 Mismatching dimensions referring to the same territorial boundary expose 
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different methods of quantifying the space of the littoral and the complexity of forces negotiating 
between land and sea. By 2005, the Spanish shoreline was mapped only along 70% of its 
length (taking the 7,880km figure as 100%); in 2012, the shoreline was still recorded at only 
95,85% of its extent; and as of 2017, the line still has not been fully traced.194 Despite 
acknowledging its total as a round figure, the government simultaneously states the precise 
distances that have not yet been measured. Twenty-nine years after the Coastal Law was 
passed, and even after further amendments in 2013, there exists no official map with the 
complete shoreline of the entire country. Around 3% of the unmeasured length is still under 
litigation, meaning there is still over 200km of contested littoral. How did the state find itself in 
such a situation? What are the forces constructing that territorial boundary? How will climate 
change affect the architecture of a line that so far does not even exist? 
 
This chapter investigates how the littoral has been produced both as an object and as a legal 
controversy: the shoreline has been taken to court in order to unveil the political and economic 
interests behind its making. Furthermore, the very matter of the shoreline exposes how its 
existence is intrinsically connected to the controversial understandings of ecology, zoning, and 
land use that contributed to the housing crisis (Figs. 21-26). The power and authority of 
politicians to reclassify space, to turn nature into buildable land, to change land use categories, 
and to speculate on the valuation of space has led not only to a collapse of the housing and real 
estate market, but also to a crisis of empiricism. Scientific reports demarcating the shoreline 
have been based on factishes: fictions that are used as arguments.195 Following from Bruno 
Latour and Isabelle Stengers, the factish operates as a form of hybrid knowledge between the 
factual and the fetish, based around the entanglement of how different narratives construct 
scientific facts.196 This does not imply that there is to be less trust on the production of truth. On 
the contrary, from an STS approach, to aim and increase awareness on the agency of the 
actual monitoring systems to produce alternative systems of knowledge-production informed 
through other channels. The ultimate goal would be to bypass those power structures that 
produce both a biased problem and a solution for it.  
 
In the Spanish case, this translates into a conflict of interest. The firms commissioned to 
produce outsourced environmental reports to serve as expert evidence in court often find 
themselves in a self-perpetuating cycle: the party who desires a biased ‘scientific’ report 
chooses a docile technical studies provider, who in turn produces a malleable-enough report in 
order to secure future commissions.197 Is there any possibility of an objective measure and 
demarcation of the shoreline? Does architecture have the power to adapt the fetishized holiday 
home that is at the core of contemporary political and housing struggles? 
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21: Overlay of revenue generated by 
the main real estate and construction 
companies in Spain 2000-2007, and 
increase in housing prices in the same 
period
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2000s. Greenpeace.
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In his ‘coastline paradox’, mathematician and early weather forecaster Lewis Fry Richardson 
enunciated that the length of a shoreline relies on the ruler with which it is measured.198 In the 
Spanish context it is important to understand the figure of the ruler both as an object and as a 
subject: the authority who defines a measurement and the accuracy of the tool used in that 
measurement; when a coastline is measured in kilometres, increments less than one kilometre 
in length are ignored. Consequently, the resolution of the ruler is what eventually designs the 
measured object. The reduction of units to the infinite allows for infinitely many types of 
measurement.  
 
In contemporary technology, that ruler has been superseded by pixels. Satellite imagery can 
potentially increase the accuracy of the line, and yet, in most cases it is the microscopic 
materiality of sand that brings the demarcation into question: not the view from above, but from 
below, from the nature of the ground itself. It is not the ‘easily-measured’ high water mark during 
spring tides, but rather the particles of sea salt that have to prove their presence or absence. 
 
Despite a desire for clearly defined boundaries, the Spanish National Geographic Institute (IGN) 
acknowledges the controversy embedded in measuring territorial boundaries. For example, the 
location of the geographic centre of a country is crucial to defining its extremities. And yet, the 
very institution founded to regulate the geography and cartography of Spain claims that the 
demarcation of the geographic centre is unnecessary, given the infinite possible perimeters.199 
The IGN quotes Oscar S. Adams’ Geographic Center of the United States to argue that – 
outside the popular imaginary – there will never be agreement on the territorial centre.200 In fact, 
there is no objective method to locate the geographical centre of a territory; thus, the IGN has 
decided it is more rational to ignore that centre completely.201  
 
If the Spanish geographic authority finds it impossible to calculate the perimeter, how can the 
Spanish Ministry of the Environment argue that there not only is a precise perimeter, but that it 
is legally operable? This contradiction not only challenges the logic of private property and the 
demarcation of building land, but it unveils the logic of power embedded in spatial margins and 
how their ambiguity has been used as a political tool to increase profit margins.  
 
Disguised under an environmental narrative, spatial margins have been at the core of the most 
recent cycle of financial speculation. At the international level, the United Nations Convention on 
the Law of the Seas (UNCLOS) forms the basis for the conservation paradigm of the 1988 
Coastal Law. It was devised at the beginning of the neoliberal age, between 1973 and 1982, 
and is a clear case of how the demarcation of waters and the drawing of baselines is a way to 
extract resources under the masquerade of environmental protection. As explained in the 
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introduction, the ‘Cousteauization’ of the ocean raised awareness of a global ecological threat, 
while allocating funding to the study of extractable resources in the seas. Following UNCLOS 
international regulations, not only the coasts became financialised spaces. Any state was 
entitled to claim its territorial waters at an offset of 12 nautical miles (measured from the low-
water tide), with the possibility of claiming additional territory as part of a so-called Exclusive 
Economic Zone. By scientifically proving that the geological composition of the seabed is the 
same as soil onshore, any nation could expand its dominion – not to protect more of the ocean, 
but to exploit and appropriate additional resources.202 Just like the landward shoreline, the 
territorial sea was subject to factishes supplied by objective reports. Littoral space became a 
resource that needed stewardship. 
 
Taking advantage of this opportunity, Spanish expeditions have sailed the Atlantic over the past 
decades to collect underwater sediment samples as legal evidence to prove the relationship 
between the material composition of onshore soil and the seabed beyond the 370-km width of 
the EEZ.203 In the Canary Islands, the same place where the beetle and the seagrass 
challenged the demarcation of the shoreline, this allowed for the expansion of Spanish territorial 
waters up to 648 km.204 This extension of the zone was based on the discovery of the Garoé 
Pinnacle, a submarine geological formation that proved a material connection to the volcanic 
magma coming from the archipelago. Hence, the UN allowed Spain in 2014 to annex 296,000 
km2 of the ocean and exploit its natural riches.205 Potentially the world’s largest deposit of 
tellurium, a key chemical component in solar panels, was recently discovered 463 km off the 
Canary coasts, where mining companies can harvest economic value from the sun thanks to 
the geological components of the seabed.206  
 
Not only does the geological composition of the soil affect the shoreline dispositif, but seismic 
forces also influence the management of the coast as a contested space of inhabitation. On 1 
November 1755 at 9:40 am, a devastating earthquake of 8.5-8.9 on the Richter scale, followed 
by a tsunami and a series of fires, destroyed the city of Lisbon at the coastal epicentre of the 
Portuguese state. Killing up to 100,000 people, it constituted one of the deadliest events in the 
history of the European continent. After so many buildings were shattered, coastal urbanisation 
at large entered a profound crisis. The earthquake struck at a time when the balance of power 
between church and state, and between science and religion, was quite delicate.207 Indeed, it 
was the first earthquake to be investigated on modern scientific lines, with data collected 
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systematically through an official questionnaire that was distributed by parishes to their 
members.208 Its thirteen questions covered matters such as the timing and direction of the 
earthquake; aftershocks and previous earthquakes; the earthquake’s effects on movement in 
the sea before the tsunami; the number of deaths; the duration of fires; damage to buildings; 
food shortages; and the immediate measures taken by those in positions of civil, military, or 
ecclesiastical authority.209  
 
Determined to use the disaster to destroy the influence of the Jesuits, PM Marquis of Pombal 
replaced the authority of the church with his own dictatorship. In other words, he civilised the 
nation at the same time that he enslaved it.210 Only four years after the earthquake, he expelled 
the Jesuits from Portugal and its colonies and appropriated their large land holdings in Lisbon 
for himself. By blaming the church and religion, Pombal took advantage of new possibilities for 
urban speculation. Indeed, tension between church and state was at the core of larger debates 
around Enlightened despotism at the European level. The battle between divine and rational 
thought provoked a crisis of both power and the shape of urbanity. On the one hand, the church 
argued that the earthquake was the result of divine wrath and a punishment for the city’s moral 
failings. Intellectuals like Voltaire argued that the earthquake was God avenging the cruelty of 
the Inquisition. On the other hand, Rousseau argued that it was the fault of people, for choosing 
to invest in fragile urban buildings and packing them with valuable possessions, rather than 
living in safe, small houses, in natural surroundings, where they could easily escape.211  
 
Despite the fact that the fatal event put Iberian seismology at the centre of discussions on 
whether humans were building too close to the water (and too close to each other), it is striking 
that since the 1755 earthquake, seismology has been left out of definitions of the coast. This is 
especially perplexing as the fault line that separates the Eurasian and African tectonic plates 
tilts the Iberian landmass in 1000-year long cycles. Archaeological remains have shown that the 
land where Barcelona lies today used to be completely submerged, and the shoreline was 
several kilometres further inland (Figs. 27-29). And in excavations of pre-Roman settlement in 
Valencia, structures typical of land activity have appeared under water, indicating that the sea 
level has risen considerably in that area.212 The floodplains in the south of Spain and the sharp 
cliffs of the north are a result of these cycles of tectonic tilt. Furthermore, recent seabed-fracking 
initiatives 30 km off the coast of Castellón have created new fault lines, as the Castor Mining 
project provoked 512 seismic events on Spain’s Mediterranean coast in only its first month of 
explorations.213  
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27: Seismic activity in the Iberian 
Peninsula (1048-2003), Instituto 
Geográfico Nacional.
28: Cycles of sea level change in 
the Mediterranean and main historic 
events. Losada et al., 2011.
29: Historic shift of the shoreline 
in the city of Barcelona during 
Prehistory, Roman period, 1120, 
1440, 1762, 1864, and 1882.
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If we were to consider real estate over longer periods, the repetition of geological cycles and 
appearance of seismic events would render the demarcation of the coast useless for building 
purposes. There is a historic cycle of sea level rise and fall that lasts approximately 500 years, 
which demonstrates the need for a flexible definition of the shoreline. It is a zone that is 
perpetually in motion, shaken by unexpected and literally earth-shattering events that do not fit 
in the legal definition of the littoral.  
 
Changing width and depth over time requires a four-dimensional concept of the coast, which is 
remarkably missing from its contemporary legal rationale. Currently, the 1988 shoreline 
definition poorly addresses its changing character by considering it not as a single line, but as a 
zone of multiple offset boundaries. However, this attempt to regulate the spatial complexity of 
the coastal landscape is still only a two-dimensional logic.214 This conception of the shore 
increases the revenue of major constructor corporations, without addressing the actual 
ambiguities of its character. By trying to facilitate the coast as a space that is public, free of cost, 
and freely accessible to all, the primary effect is for it to become freely developable.  
 
In order to regulate universal accessibility to the sea, the Spanish Maritime-Terrestrial Public 
Domain (DPMT) subdivided it into two main spaces: the end of the sea and the beginning of 
building land. The sea as a public domain is a coastal commons of ‘nature’. According to the 
written definition, the DPMT includes: the shore, tidal rivers, marshlands, coastal lagoons, 
swamps, and estuaries flooded by the influence of the sea; places with loose sea sediments like 
beaches, escarpments, dunes, and verges (with or without vegetation) formed by the effect of 
the sea, coastal winds, or any other natural or artificial cause; territorial and internal waters, 
including both the seabed and subsoil; any natural resources corresponding to the former; 
landfills, either due to sedimentation, accretion, sea recession, and infrastructural or drainage 
works (including lighthouses or signs); land regained by the sea; sensibly vertical cliffs; formerly 
coastal spaces; islets in international and national waters; and harbours.215 The end of the sea 
is also subdivided into: an inner shoreline, which is the actual end of seawater (where waves 
break and die); and an outer shoreline, which is the end of the landscape affected by seawater 
(coastal dunes, marshes).  
 
In contrast, the beginning of building land or the private domain corresponds to human activity 
and real estate interests. This is separated from the outer shoreline through a secondary buffer, 
which includes an easement of protection (100m from the outer shoreline, possibly extendable 
for another 100m); an easement of transit (6m from the outer shoreline, extendable up to 20m); 
and an easement of access to the sea (free public access for cars up to a line 500m away from 
the outer shoreline, and for pedestrians, up to 200m away). 
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As the parameters above indicate, the shoreline does not exist as a line. It is rather a 
considerably wide, politically-constructed zone ranging up to 500m from the water according to 
urban planning codes and up to 5 km according to taxonomies of human geography. The actual 
thickness of the littoral depends on setbacks and offset buffers between the inner end of the 
water and the outermost beginning of buildable land. The shoreline-zone allows for multiple 
loopholes in the definition of physical features. Since 1988 hundreds of legal cases have 
challenged the definition of the shores by taking advantage of these ambiguities. For instance, if 
a natural dune is stabilised and fixed (proving that it no longer moves), it can be automatically 
excluded from the realm of the coast and turned into holiday homes on the seafront.216  
 
In practical terms, these financial littorals are physically built through a series of boundary 
stones (mojones). The average distance between them, 50 or 100 metres, is defined by the 
government and materially structures the resolution of the ruler. However, in legal cases 
involving steep topographies, it has been proven that it would be better to have them in closer 
proximity, possibly even every 5 to 10 metres, implying a tenfold increase in the current 
resolution. Furthermore, when cliffs are modelled in three dimensions at a local, discrete level, 
the representation can actually challenge the outdated two-dimensional calculation that defines 
the average slope of a cliff. If that slope is above the 60° threshold for a segment of the littoral, 
the whole cliff belongs to the sea, whereas if the slope is less steep, it enters the realm of 
buildable land.217 However, high-resolution modelling is carried out only in the case of conflict 
between litigants who can afford it, making precise measurements a valuable commodity.  
 
Apart from loopholes in the geomorphologic or topographic resolution of the coast, the 
ambiguous definition of the seasons also plays a crucial role. As the processes of climate 
change become more acute, millenary principles regulating the impact of seasonal tides on the 
geometry of the shoreline are becoming less relevant. According to the laws of Justinian in 
Constantinople in the 6th century, the highest tide was in winter, as Eastern Mediterranean 
storms are rarely as strong in spring or summer. These old taxonomies have indeed become 
obsolete as the cycles of climate-related events start to follow unprecedented patterns (Figs. 
30-32). However, the manner, extent and permanency of these changes still govern and 
determine the ownership of the soil affected by them.  
 
For the sake of accuracy, and given that weather conditions and tidal movements along the 
Spanish littorals differed from those in Constantinople, Iberian legislators also used climate to 
shape the law. Justinian’s principles were adapted to the western Mediterranean by 
incorporating the higher variability of the Atlantic coasts. In the seventeenth century, France 
refined the principle with the 1681 Ordonnance bylaws that declared the shoreline as the line 
reached by the highest floods in March.218  
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30: The ‘true’ Mediterranean, 
from the olive tree to the great 
palm groves. Fernand Braudel, 
232.
31: Correction of the French 
shoreline measurement 
technologies improved. Louis 
XIV claimed afterwards that 
he had never lost as many 
territories to any enemy as 
he did to his own Academy 
of Sciences. César-François 
Cassini, 1682.
32: Chinese engineering 
processes to claim territorial 
waters by means of artificial 
islands in the South China 
Sea, CSIS/AMTI 2015.
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These yearly fluctuations are still classified as those that observe a fixed periodicity and 
regularity (ordinary) and those that observe no such periodicity at all, occurring seldom and at 
irregular intervals (extraordinary).219 According to the 1969 Spanish Coastal Law, which 
continued the Justinian universalist tradition, the shore is determined by the highest tide during 
ordinary storms. The 1988 Coastal Law, however, extended its definition to the highest tide in 
either ordinary or extraordinary storms, as long as there is known evidence. The main aim was 
to shift the criteria from the frequency of the storm to the measurable materiality of their impact. 
It is nonetheless remarkable how the law still defined extraordinary as an unusual weather 
event that occurs less than five times within a ten-year period (redefined as three times within a 
five-year period in the 2013 amendments). This shortened the cycle of uncertainty, but still 
recklessly acknowledges that houses on the shore can be flooded up to three times every five 
years before considering any change in the demarcation.220  
 
Almost three decades later, that arbitrary definition is still too indefinite to regulate the 
ownership of the coast based on weather and climatic conditions. What does extraordinary and 
known evidence mean in today’s legal context? Do these terms depend on ‘nature’ or can they 
be moulded by human activity/reason/interests? A remarkable case in a coastal village outside 
Valencia exposes the power of real estate in inventing the accountability of weather events: 
after a storm completely flooded the coastal village it was argued that it was only fresh rainwater 
– and not a drop of seawater – that had covered the streets.221 Consequently, the shoreline did 
not need to be redrawn further inland after that extraordinary event. 
 
Seasons and seasonalities are not only affected by climate alterations but by the differential 
flows of tourists, which create the high and the low seasons for flowing capital. After a coastal 
waterfall in Galicia was drained to a hydropower plant managed by one of the largest real estate 
oligarchic families in Spain, the Catholic municipality dictated that water would only flow during 
the ‘tourist season’, Sundays at noon, special celebrations and national holidays.222 Not only is 
the duration of seasons in crisis, but the coast itself has also acquired ‘opening hours’ that turn 
nature into a mediated spectacle. The hydropower company was nevertheless congratulated for 
facilitating such an event.223 It was not the highest tide in winter principle that regulated the 
coast, but a spiritual devotion towards a sort of ‘water miracle’. 
 
Real estate developers trying to shorten the distance from hinterland cities to the shore have 
largely commodified the ‘natural beauty’ of the coast. This making of relative proximity and 
distance to the seafront is contested even today. The continuity of the littoral soil is materially 
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ambiguous. Wind, water, topography, geology, seismicity, and resource extraction all constitute 
anthropogenic forces that make it impossible to trace the influence of the sea on the land, and 
vice versa. And these geo-sophical distinctions have economic implications; they legitimise the 
right of manmade structures to sit at certain distance from ‘the end’ of the sea. According to 
coastal demarcation protocols, some buildings are part of the maritime-terrestrial public domain 
and have to be torn down, others remain on building land and are allowed to stay, and still 
others are allowed to be built anew on coastal wild land. Even though the Coastal Law was 
passed in 1988, it was not until 9 October 2002 that the first structure was forcibly purchased 
and demolished for ‘invading’ the domain of the sea.224  
 
Local and national interest groups have initiated alliances and lobbies since that demolition, so 
that a powerful oligarchy now decides what lies on which side of the line. Given the numerous 
conflicts and significant litigation that began immediately after the general panic at the prospect 
of losing one’s sacred private property – something that capitalist regimes and democratic 
constitutions have always ensured as a basic human right – the Spanish Ministry of the 
Environment published a set of guidelines for surveyors to more effectively carry out the 
demarcation of the coast. The document provides jurists with a procedure on how to properly 
draw the limit between land and sea. However, they still contain problematic distinctions 
between the ‘virgin’ coast and the ‘anthropogenic’ coast, as if the idea of the littoral had never 
been manufactured.225 Indeed, the virgin coast is defined as the one that ‘has practically not 
been modified by human action’.226  
 
This ambiguous definition again perpetuates the notion that an ‘original’ environment can 
coexist with highly urbanised areas and that a ruling authority can itemise the human impact on 
ecological systems. As of the 1988 Coastal Law, this division between natural and artificial 
processes includes at the same time natural impacts on the artificial landscape, and artificial 
impacts on the natural realm.227 This taxonomy is profoundly contradictory – the law juxtaposes 
‘natural dunes formed by natural or artificial actions’ with ‘naturally flooded land that is no longer 
flooded because of artificial means’.228  
 
The intricacy of these oxymorons and word games not only allowed for the aforementioned 
legal loopholes, but is also a direct result of the still-unresolved debate between Voltaire and 
Rousseau. Two hundred sixty-two years after the Lisbon earthquake, the thresholds between 
divine and rational, natural and artificial are still playing the same role in politics. The logic of 
measurement and the paradigm of calculation aim to make the line more and more accurate; 
thinner and thinner and with increased precision. However, this chapter argues that the 
shoreline needs not to increase but to decrease in resolution; to become thicker, higher, deeper, 
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and blurrier. Effectively, the ruler needs to reduce its resolution over the landscape in order to 
rethink the architecture and geomorphology of the coast according to the flexibility of ecology.  
 
 
1.2 The Origins of Littoral Value and Speculation on the Edgelands 
Since the development of bacteriology, Dr Antoine Jérôme Balard's discovery of iodine and 
bromine in seawater, and the parallel discovery of their benefit to the human body, the coast 
has acquired the condition of a consumable commodity.229 The advantages of hygiene have not 
only led to new housing typologies, the circulation of fresh air, and more green spaces for urban 
inhabitants, but they have also led to the development of the coast for seasonal recreation, first 
as a luxury and later as affordable for the masses (Figs. 33, 34). Likewise, nineteenth century 
developers in Spain turned their gaze toward the coast, influenced by the international prestige 
in emerging European bathing towns, such as Bath, Cannes, Biarritz, Montecarlo, Nice, and 
San Remo.230 Little by little, coastal towns shifted to become accessible sites of networking and 
leisure for a new social class on the European Grand Tour: tourists.231 With the rapid expansion 
of bourgeois society, seaside resorts provided an important site for investment and the 
circulation of surplus capital.232  
 
The making of the Spanish coast was indebted to the mid-nineteenth century, when the state 
carried out an unprecedented project of infrastructure-building: new army facilities, prisons, 
schools, lighthouses, roads, railways, ports, sewage systems, and hospitals were built. The new 
railway network shortened the distance between perimeter and centre, and facilitated an 
increasing awareness of the existence of the shores of the country.  
 
The littoral had so far been perceived as a faraway source of fear, frequently attacked by pirates 
and invaders; where mosquitos and malaria were a permanent threat; and where arid sirocco 
winds from the Sahara negatively affected human psychology. Institutions like the Corps of Spa 
Doctors (1816) appeared to legitimise and consolidate the ‘discovery’ of the coast.233 But after 
the 1866 Water Law, the Spanish littoral started to be developed through disease mitigation: the 
Law on Prevention of Typhus (1869), the Law on Public Infrastructure (1877), and the Royal 
Command to Correct the Propagation of Leprosy (1878) began to secure the coast.  
 
On that basis, the later Cambó Law (1918), one of the main precedents for the modern 1988 
Coastal Law, promoted the drainage and sanitation of coastal lagoons, marshes, and swamps 
infested with deadly mosquitos, bacteria, and viruses. The Cambó Law introduced two new 
policies encouraging land speculation: the introduction of tax exemptions allowed those who 
                                                
229 Alain Corbin, The lure of the Sea: The Discovery of the Seaside in the Western World, 1750-1840, trans. Jocelyn 
Phelps (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1994), 70. 
230 Luis Sazatornil Ruiz, Arquitectura y Desarrollo Urbano de Cantabria en el Siglo XIX, (Santander: Universidad de 
Cantabria, 1996), 75. 
231 Ibid, 76. 
232 Anthony D. King, The Bungalow: The Production of a Global Culture (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995), 71; 
David Harvey, ‘The Urban Process Under Capitalism: A Framework for Analysis,’ International Journal of Urban and 
Regional Research 6 (1977), 24-33. 
233 Spain, ‘Real Decreto sobre Creación del Cuerpo de Médicos de Baños’, Madrid, 29 June 1816; ‘Real Decreto sobre 
Creación del Cuerpo de Médicos Directores de Aguas Minero Medicinales,’ Madrid, 1890.  
61 
carried out drainage works to automatically acquire reclaimed land; and the chance to drain 
wetlands that were no longer regarded as ‘unhealthy’.234 In the name of hygiene, the 
‘improvement’ of coastal land made fortunes out of new ownership. Unproductive, idle 
landscapes like ‘insalubrious’ wetlands were turned into valuable agricultural or buildable land 
as part of a so-called ‘Patriotic Award’: swamps were gifted to veteran soldiers as a pension.235 
 
Spanish monarchs promoted this shift of the coast from a site of fear and disease into a site of 
desire, cures, and treatment, as it added economic returns, health values, and social prestige to 
the coast. The fact that the royal family spent their summer holidays in San Sebastián or 
Santander in the Atlantic corniche led to a wave of real estate speculation in former fishermen’s 
settlements. Queen Isabel II herself made an unprecedented land purchase in the coastal 
outskirts of the village of Santander, choosing El Sardinero beach as the site for her royal 
holidays.236  
 
Though the sale to the Queen unravelled in 1857, the possibility nevertheless favoured a small 
group of local tradesmen, who were granted the royal privilege to set up a banking association 
in the booming coastal town.237 One hundred sixty years later, that financial conglomerate has 
grown to an unimaginable scale, but it still carries the name of the town that profited from the 
demarcation of the coast as a site of circulation of capital: Santander Bank. Not only did the 
Queen give them immediate financial advantages to found a new bank, but the frenzy for 
holiday homes near that of the royal family led to the appearance of a new social class of 
renters or hacendados: people who foresaw the demand for seasonal holidays alongside the 
aristocracy.  
 
Coastal leisure is indeed a form of business mediating human relationships and the built 
environment. As part of that summer migration, an unprecedented real estate bubble emerged 
in Santander. It was boosted by capital lending institutions established with the urban 
transformation of Paris, like the Péreire brothers and the Saint-Simonians, as well as the newly 
founded French-Spanish credit society. By financing the construction of the railway network on 
the northern coast, they created a parallel to the train connection between Paris and Nice that 
had led to the invention of the Côte d’Azur.238  
 
New or improved transport infrastructure facilitated the arrival of new property buyers and 
holiday tenants to the coast en masse.239 With them appeared a housing typology imported from 
Haussmann’s Paris. It rationalised rents and maximised profit, without considering the vertical 
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stratification of social classes.240 Holiday-goers were socially homogenous, well-positioned 
families from privileged background, occasionally accompanied by servants who occupied 
windowless bedrooms deep inside fashionable seaside apartments. The domestic space was 
organised to maximally capitalise on the landscape: unusually deep buildings had a minimal 
view toward the sea. The new housing blocks decreased the width of each unit’s oceanfront 
façade in order to maximise the returns in marketing the seaside apartment.241 Those 
prototypical coastal flats thickened in depth as much as the shoreline itself would later. 
 
Spending the summer (both time and money) led to the urbanisation of the littoral by equating 
time, leisure, and profit making. Not only did holiday homes emerge at a wide scale, but seaside 
promenades, spas, hotels, casinos, and other structures providing entertainment also 
blossomed along the ocean frontier: the summer had to be literally spent. By using the 
medicinal properties of steam, mud, algae, and water, the solid, liquid, and gas matter of the 
littoral started to shape both human bodies and architectural forms. It became a site for politics, 
where decision-makers would casually meet and interact. 
 
If Santander and San Sebastián as nineteenth-century resorts for the privileged dominated the 
northern coast, the Mediterranean was rather urbanised for the working class.242 The 
democratisation of beach tourism culminated in the implementation of CIAM’s principles of 
modern architecture on the Catalan coast (Figs. 35, 36). The GATCPAC and GATEPAC 
modern architectural associations were involved in the first attempts to rationalise and extract 
value from the beach for the poor and the middle class, involving key figures of the late 1920s 
like Le Corbusier, Walter Gropius, and José Luis Sert.243 In particular, the Ciutat de Repós i de 
Vacances (1930-32) was a paradigmatic plan for an entire holiday town that would avoid the 
‘exodus of the multitude towards better beaches’ outside Catalonia.244  
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33: Advertising for the 
new Spa San Sebastián in 
Barcelona, ca. 1930s.
34: 19th century English 
bathing machine as a 
mobile space on the coast. 
Photographer unknown.
35: Coastal Baths El 
Postiguet, Spain. Built in 
1864 and demolished in 
1960.
36: Ciutat de Repós i de 
Vacances, GATEPAC 
(1930-32).
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Coastal planners felt they had the responsibility to properly ‘organise the coastal leisure of the 
masses,’ as promoted on the cover of the seventh issue of A.C. Magazine (1932).245 Under that 
motto, a collage showed crowds marching over an urban masterplan that proposed a new 
coastal strip, disconnected both from old fishing towns and the aristocratic, nineteenth century 
seaside. The twentieth century urbanisation of the coast catered to a growing working class that 
started to question the aristocracy’s exclusive use of the nation’s beaches. Instead of the 
bourgeois seaside with a paved promenade, original coastal vegetation progressively blended 
the beach into the purpose-built resorts further inland in a natural way. At the same time, the 
coast offered a tabula rasa for modernist urbanism to implant new typologies and reject 
‘unhygienic’ courtyards in favour of isolated high-rises and linear mega-blocks (without servant’s 
rooms) facing the sea.  
 
From that moment on the beach was an economic phenomenon that kept on growing, 
culminating in a boom of second-home ownership – an approach promoted by Franco’s fascist 
dictatorship. As Franco’s Minister for Housing José Luis Arrese put it in 1957: ‘We want a 
country of proprietors, not proletarians’.246 The shift from tenancy to ownership not only led 
Spain to become one of the countries with the highest frequency of second homes per 
inhabitant, but it also turned the shore into an instrument for the disappearance of housing 
equality. The ownership of coastal homes generated such convenient revenue that it 
increasingly stigmatised the life of ‘poor tenants’ who rented. In sum, the coast had to be 
urbanised in order to modernise. Throughout the 1950s and 1960s the littoral was consolidated 
as the site for holidaymaking through marketing strategies emulating the fantasy of the Côte 
d’Azur. Segments of the Spanish coast started to acquire popular names that had never existed 
before, but that through the branding of light, colour, or properties of the landscape became 
sites of desire: Costa del Sol, Costa Blanca, or Costa Brava.  
 
As described by a technical team hired by the government of Málaga in 1964, the urbanisation 
process was ‘natural’ to coastal villages and part of their imminent future; they had to be 
urbanised if they wanted to survive.247 The entirety of the coast was occupied, with only a few 
exceptions for points where urbanisation encountered ‘natural obstacles’.248 It is remarkable 
how urbanisation was meant to be natural and how nature constituted impediments to progress 
in the Costa del Sol. What ruled was the construction of housing, while plants and animals were 
relegated to buffering wastelands. In this regard, Constantinos Doxiadis’ architecture and 
planning office was commissioned in 1963 to envision how the Costa del Sol could change from 
a series of underdeveloped fishing villages into a site for international tourism and second 
homes (Fig. 37).  
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Even if Doxiadis’ proposal tried to integrate green space between pockets of real estate 
development, the approach nonetheless set the standard for future decades: designated areas 
where nature was supposed to end and building should begin. These invented landscapes 
appeared hand in hand with seasonal apartments built with mortgages and credit. This attracted 
a market of Spanish property owners as well as European investors and tourists, the latter of 
which increased in number exponentially after Spain joined the European Union in 1986.249 
 
The massive drainage operations that started with the Patriotic Award continued with the 
unprecedented construction of dams during Franco’s dictatorship.250 The alterations in the flow 
of sediment toward the coast needed to be counterbalanced with artificial nourishment for 
beaches, which could no longer support the idyllic image expected by tourists. In fact, the 
construction of dams to keep up with the water demand at new resorts is what eventually led to 
the destruction of the beaches that the same resorts depended upon.  
 
New sands were brought in – not to nourish the coast, but to provide concrete for a new ‘brick 
economy’ based on real estate construction as the engine of growth for the national GDP. Sand 
began to operate as an economic indicator of speculation. The use of sand for construction 
mortar reveals the pace at which building activity operates, but it also testifies to the strength of 
the real estate sector. During the housing bubble, Spain was one of the leading European 
consumers and global exporters of mortar sands per capita; between 2007 and 2009, the use of 
construction sands dropped 30%, the highest fall in history.251 In some regions, like Valencia, 
the collapse was astronomical: usage between 2006 and 2013 dropped almost 90%, three 
times the national average.252 Not coincidentally, Valencia was also one of the regions with 
most urban-planning related crimes after the housing bubble. Sand usage indicates both 
environmental destruction and democratic erosion. 
 
Both mortar sand and sea salt are intimately connected in the making of the literal littoral. The 
interconnected circulation of sediments exposes the shoreline as a set of spatial relationships 
that include the river source as well as the ocean and the export markets for capital 
circulation.253 In the 1980s and 1990s, while Northern Europe was speculating on finance, Spain 
was still speculating on building infrastructures in a much less sophisticated system.254 The 
coast was frantically turning wealth and global capital into second homes.255 As a result, the 
popular marketing of the coast shifted from Costa del Sol into dystopian terms reflecting the 
destruction of nature; Costa del Golf alluded to the unsustainable quantity of golf resorts in 
some of the most arid regions of the littoral; Costa Nostra was a word play with the Italian 
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mafia’s Cosa Nostra, given the ways in which capital and crime cooperated through the shady 
granting of planning permission.256 
 
The volume of flows of capital around the shoreline is intimately connected to the class struggle 
of the soil itself. The ways in which rural or natural land could be reclassified into building land 
were – and still are – at the core of the ambiguous making of profit margins out of spatial 
margins (Fig. 38). Since the 1998 Land Law was passed in Spain by the conservative 
government to ‘make available more affordable housing’, corruption in classifying land use has 
reached unprecedented levels. As a reference, Spanish coastal landscapes have been losing 
the equivalent of eight football fields per day since then.257 The law has not facilitated access to 
housing, but rather enriched developers and politicians by initiating the housing bubble. The 
reclassification of land and the shifting boundaries between nature and city have changed at an 
unprecedented rate, especially when compared to neighbouring countries in Europe. 
 
In 2004, Santander Bank – whose headquarters had been located on the most prestigious 
seaside boulevard in Santander since the Queen struck a deal with its founders – decided to 
move to Madrid.258 The global giant, today ranked the 33rd largest public company in the world, 
decided to build a Santander banking city in the capital, moving from the coastal periphery to 
the centre of the territory.259 From there, all main offices began to operate within ‘one of the best 
corporate headquarters in the world’.260 Only three years after, on 13 June 2007 and in stark 
contrast to the obsession with homeownership now deeply ingrained in society, the bank 
decided to sell all its offices and not own any premises for itself, with the exception of the 
original site on Santander’s seafront. The corporate giant tossed nearly the totality of their real 
estate assets at their peak value – a move comparable in scale to the Duke of Lerma moving 
the capital of Spain from Madrid to Valladolid in 1600.261 From then on, the bank would only rent 
office space from other landlords at hundreds of branches across the country. Their total value 
of €4bn was divested from real estate in favour of other financial products. Just a few months 
later, the real estate bubble burst. This raises several crucial questions that remain open for 
further research: how could Santander Bank anticipate and sell the majority of its real estate 
assets at their peak, right before they dropped their value? And if so, what is their accountability 
in the housing crisis that they foresaw in time? 
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37: ‘Study for the Tourist Development of the 
coast between Málaga and Cabo de Gata.’ 
Masterplan separating pockets of natural and 
built environments. Constantinos Doxiadis, 
1963.
38: The class struggle of the soil: Diagrams 
explaining how to reclassify urban, buildable 
and rural land according to the Spanish Land 
Laws from 1956, 1975, 1990, 1998, and 2007. 
Class A refers mainly to ‘urban land’, B to 
‘buildable land’, and C to ‘rural land’. Source: 
Ángela Matesanz Parellada, 2009.
E l concep to de suelo en la legislación u rbaníst ica española. Á nge l a M a t esanz Pa r e l l a da 49
Cuad r o 3: Cuadro comparat ivo
1- Suelo = reserva natural, ecosistema. 2- Suelo = bien natural de carácter excepcional. 3- Suelo =
productor y soporte de actividades productivas relacionadas con sus recursos (agrícolas, ganaderas,
forestales, cinegéticos). 4- Suelo = soporte de vida urbana y actividades económicas (industria,
terciario..) 5- Suelo = recuso económico, bien financiero.
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1.3 Environmental Crisis as the Erosion of Democracy 
The environmental protection framework of the 1988 Coastal Law is both full of contradictions 
and incoherent.262 Indeed, the law was an administrative process that kept things exactly as 
they were before the 1978 Constitution, but this time framed to appear environmentally and 
democratically valid.263 Regardless of the technical assessment of the natural or artificial 
condition of the coast, these facts can nonetheless be nullified in court, as by definition the 
demarcation of the shoreline is a juridical and not merely a technical or administrative 
process.264 This is a key distinction, as any tribunal can then negotiate land ownership between 
a private individual and the State. The court maintains the authority to ‘read technical evidence 
in a completely opposite way’.265 Despite all the effort to scientifically define the end of the sea 
and the beginning of buildable land, the court will always have the last word on the littoral. 
Hence, the courts became a powerful instrument for redistributing surplus value during the real 
estate boom according to the interpretations validating or nullifying city planning schemes and 
municipal master plans. Both the Land Law and the Coastal Law delimit (create, define, assign, 
or attribute) but do not limit (reduce, cut, or coerce) the legal and economic content of 
property.266 Rural land that urban development programs (Programas de Actuación Urbanística) 
deem to be unsuitable for building or not subject to urbanisation (woods or protected areas, 
regional or national parks) is not subject to claims for compensation and cannot be built on until 
the plan expressly sanctions it. These programs of plans, despite being under the umbrella of a 
national framework, are eventually under regional or municipal competence. It allows local 
authorities in power to classify land as fit to be developed according to their own criteria, making 
it gain an entirely different legal status with each reclassification.267 The clash between scientific 
argument and juridical interpretation puts nominally objective reports on a battlefield. Techno-
scientific evidence has become closely connected to profit margins and the construction of 
second homes.  
 
If the increase in housing construction had been mainly related to the construction of primary 
homes, there would not be a housing bubble but rather evolution to overcome a deficit.268 Isabel 
Concheiro argues that real estate bubble is the result of construction for speculation, which 
irreversibly transforms the landscape and creates housing stock that is unnecessary and thus 
difficult to reuse.269 While the housing bubble allegedly only became visible when it burst, it 
could previously be perceived through the exponential use of mortar sands and the increase in 
second-homeownership. Spain, with a total population of 46,5 million inhabitants in 2016, had a 
stock of one million empty houses after the crisis and hundreds of thousands of households 
unable to afford a primary dwelling. The contradiction in simultaneously having an 
overabundance of houses and a deficit of housing is the clearest result of speculation: land was 
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turned into buildings for an artificial housing demand that failed to facilitate access to housing 
for those who truly needed it. The moment the bubble burst was also the moment when the 
processes that had led to the reclassification of space became apparent and were first 
challenged in court. 
 
As presented in the introduction, the first municipal council dissolved in the democratic history of 
Spain was Marbella, on 4 April 2006. Its populist mayor and a former real estate developer 
Jesús Gil y Gil openly stated in an electoral meeting in May 1991 that he was indeed running for 
mayor in order to sell as many flats to Spaniards as to Northern Europeans.270 A decade and a 
half later, the Court of Justice unveiled a network of politicians who had been using their power 
to adapt the limit between building land and the coastal commons for their own interests. Behind 
the scenes, the town-planning advisor had signed over 900 urban-planning agreements and 
granted over 10,000 licenses in 15 years.271 Even if such corrupt practices were far from an 
isolated case, it is not surprising that the revelation arose in one of the few wealthy regions 
where neither of the two major national parties had managed to maintain a clear advantage.  
 
Environmental destruction through the commodification of nominally buildable land had become 
synonymous with the progressive deterioration of the democratic system.272 As economist 
Federico Aguilera Klink has remarked, the main environmental concern even today is 
authoritarian decision-making: the existence of a solution before the problem.273 At the core of 
the housing bubble was the belief in urbanisation as a solution to a housing problem that 
politicians had no desire to address at its root. Instead, the easily malleable boundaries of 
master plans perfectly accommodated the generation of surplus value and profit margins under 
the guise of solving housing deficits (Figs. 39-41).  
 
The construction of housing in the public interest was a fiction: new housing stocks were mostly 
market-rate, while the amount of social housing actually decreased.274  But the national urgency 
of housing ‘scarcity’ still mobilised any decision allegedly ‘for the public interest’.275 In this 
sense, urban planning agreements between real estate developers, construction companies, 
and municipal councils led to dubious legal operations based on the ambiguity of the common 
good.276 Far from benefiting the general interest of the municipality, these agreements modified 
planning laws and master plans by introducing ‘exceptions’ that would allow land to be 
reclassified for the purpose of increasing the housing stock, despite serving real estate 
corporate interests.  
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39-40: Interrupted developments in the 
periphery of Madrid: Seseña (top) and 
Rivas Vaciamadrid (bottom). Photos by the 
author, 2011.
71
41: Interrupted developments in the 
periphery of Madrid: Arroyo del Fresno, 
Cañaveral, Rivas Vaciamadrid, and 
Valdebebas. Google Earth, 3 January 
2011.
72 
This system of governance has been referred to as ‘urbanisation by dispossession’ or the 
‘construction company dictatorship’: if the state used to control construction companies, it is 
developers who now are controlling the state.277 In most cases, contractors did not even 
conform to their planning license a priori, but instead a posteriori – when the illegality of the 
development had been administratively legitimised. In fact, this loophole means that most of 
these actions do not qualify as criminal activity per se.278 Such practices, which could be 
classified under the umbrella of political corruption, have also been described as special 
opportunity crimes.279 They are ‘special’ in the way that they avoid the norm through ambiguity: 
they operate outside the law, while belonging to the space of the law. 
 
The dissolution of democratic politics in Marbella was the moment when the housing crisis 
began in Spain, which also exposed the financialisation of the littoral and the government 
through ambiguity. But the housing problem and the abusive real estate speculation can be 
tracked further back than the 1998 Land Law or the 1988 Coastal Law. As part of the so-called 
democratic transaction (not transition) of the country, the shift from Franco’s dictatorship to 
parliamentary democracy aimed to decentralise power from Madrid. Municipalities were given 
the autonomy to classify land without the central government. However, this well-intended 
redistribution of political agency lacked independent mechanisms of oversight and led to the 
aforementioned high rates of corruption. The environment became entangled in the degradation 
of democratic processes.  
 
This in turn was aggravated by regulation on the financing of political parties – the mayor of a 
small coastal town can strike a deal with a local developer to build a public swimming pool in 
exchange for reclassifying rural land, reducing the municipality’s dependence on funds from 
Madrid.280 Furthermore, there is a profound mismatch in the territorial organisation of Spain, as 
it still maintains a system of 52 provinces inherited from the nineteenth century. The fact that 
they are fairly equal in geographical size is less politically relevant than their current imbalances 
in population density: coastal provinces are far more populated than inland regions.281 Indeed, 
coastal municipalities are the most indebted in the country and, together with Madrid, they are 
home to the largest quantity of urban planning-related crimes. The bust exposed the need to 
rethink not only the role of boundaries in architecture, but also in the territorial organisation of 
the country. 
 
‘Naturalising’ the environment was also the way municipalities were able to destroy it. They 
consistently deployed loopholes and exceptions as a planning tool. Urban planning authorities 
could relocate space outside the rule of urbanism (fuera de ordenación) to discount 
anthropogenic green areas, and then use the figure of express disaffection (desafectación 
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expresa) to explicitly remove land from the coast.282 The environmental and democratic crisis is 
not due to a lack of laws, as there are already plenty; instead, it is a problem of how Spanish 
law is interpreted and executed by biased judges.283  
 
In February 2009, the level of ambiguity in the logic of expropriation and demolition reached 
such a level of political abuse that European Commissioner Margrete Auken put a report 
forward in Brussels ‘On the impact of extensive urbanisation in Spain, on individual rights of 
European citizens, on the environment, and on the application of EU law’.284 Here, Auken 
recognised the arbitrary application of the law: 
The Committee understands and supports the Spanish authorities in their attempts to 
preserve and where possible restore the coastal environment. What it fails to 
understand is why the 1988 Coastal Law has been resurrected at this stage, in this time 
[2008-9], when it has been in practical abeyance for thirty years when so much 
devastation took place. Why is its application such a shambles and so arbitrary when 
traditional coastal housing is being demolished and newly developed modern 
apartments being tolerated? 285 
 
Auken’s remarks can be understood by looking at how the urbanisation and protection of the 
coast formed a power game, whereby a privileged elite had the capacity of manipulation; in 
other words, there was an asymmetry of power.286 In the case of the demolition of the Corralejo 
Hotel on the coast of Fuerteventura, the owner maintained the building on the shore by means 
of exchanging a concession deed: he traded his right to stay for making the island of Lobos – off 
the coast of Fuerteventura, and land that he also owned – publicly accessible as a nature 
park.287 In other cases like in Torrevieja Salt Works, the high value of coastal land led to an 
abnormal increase in cost-intensive soil samples that refined the resolution of the extent of sea 
salt.288 However, fishermen or small property owners, who live ‘too close’ to the sea to be saved 
from eviction and who lack assets to negotiate with or to invest in contesting dubious reports, 
are at a clear disadvantage under the same conditions of the Coastal Law. One of the only 
tactics to resist demolitions, then, is to approve a supra-municipal plan to environmentally 
protect larger pieces of the landscape.289  
 
Conducting external scientific reports to justify coastal demolitions is an intentional practice that 
is meant to offset political responsibility. It puts the entire architecture of the littoral in the hands 
of weak, ‘neutral’ bureaucrats.290 The bias of laboratories providing geological services in these 
assessment reports is so contested that a notary is now required during the extraction of a 
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geological sample from the beach.291 The shoreline changes in such a short time that the draft 
outline of some studies is modified even before the completion of its analysis. This high-speed 
dynamic of the coast, even at the level of juridical contestation, is in stark contrast with the 
absolute and fixed tracing of the shoreline. The dependency of coastal management on capital 
investments or European subsidies has produced a machine of complicit data and para-
empiricism leading to a class of neo-caciques governing the ecology of the country at the same 
time that ‘democracy’ is used to legitimise environmental crimes ‘for the general interest’ (Figs. 
42-43).292 
 
The Director of the Andalusian Institute for Earth System Research, Miguel Ángel Losada, 
envisions the coast as a much more complex mechanism than the single lines defended by 
scientific reports. Indeed, his team has been researching the possibility of applying financial risk 
to the demarcation of the littoral in the same way that insurance companies apply flood 
probability or fuzzy logic.293 Under this programme, the shoreline would be split into a series of 
isolines that determine 0 to 100% chance of that area belonging to a flood zone. As discussed 
in next chapter, this approach embeds a logic of financialisation of the environment for decision 
makers and risks quantifying nature for insurance purposes in lieu of ecological awareness. 
 
After decades with an inoperative coastal law, the Spanish Government introduced several 
amendments in 2013. As stated in the preamble, the main reason for the failure of the 1988 law 
was the ‘perpetual litigation’ it led to.294 The failure was largely blamed on a lack of stewardship 
to help the environment contribute to the general economic interest. The law does not fail to 
regulate the coast, but it does fail to understand the ecological and spatial complexities of the 
littoral. The 2013 amendments assume that the environment needs a human custodian, and 
take for granted that any urban planning will start with ecological destruction. Further, they imply 
that the environment has to service the general economic development of the country – which is 
particularly problematic both in terms of the coast’s ambiguous definition in general and the 
notion that the economy should dictate the shape of ecology. The 2013 amendments approved 
by the conservative Partido Popular openly prioritised property owners over the environment. 
Within the new framework, the shoreline is no longer demarcated by peer-reviewed evidence, 
but by the necessary technical criteria set out by expert consultants. For instance, coastal 
dunes moved to depend on multiple subjectivities around necessity: they are part of the beach 
until the necessary limit that guarantees the stabilization of the beach and the protection of the 
coast. These nuances expose how the factish, far from a literal interpretation of the law, is 
increasingly able to manufacture a financial littoral according to ‘scientific knowledge’ and a 
profit-driven logic. Furthermore, the 2013 amendments paved the way to contest previous 
demarcations and exposed the entire shoreline to be revised if needed.295  
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42: Map of regional caciques 
in Spain, Joaquín Moya, 
Almanaque Gedeón, 1898.
43: ‘Corruptódromo’: urban 
planning related corruption 
cases in Spain, indicating 
parties and location of politicians 
with charges, 2012.
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This reveals the double agenda of a neoliberal understanding of space: the littoral is put to work 
in a way to efficiently yield economic profit and sustainability is often nothing more than an 
attempt to greenwash (and thus justify) any development. Accordingly, the title of the 
amendments shifted from simply referring to the coasts as an entity (Ley 22/1988, de 28 de 
Julio, de Costas) to a title that focuses on the idea of protection of usership (Ley 2/2013, de 29 
de mayo, de protección y uso sostenible del litoral). While the 1988 law expressed some will to 
understand the coast as a legal entity with rights and obligations, the 2013 version explicitly 
commodifies the littoral by subordinating ecology to the extraction of profit, while simultaneously 
being sustainable.  
 
According to this vision, the coast cannot remain idle or unproductive for the sake of the 
environment; it has to be put to work in order to yield ‘sustainable’ profits. Creative tactics have 
followed, and the 2013 amendments, for example, opened the door to artificially flooding coastal 
land in order to exempt it from the natural coast.296 The need to protect the shores for the 
general public is an ambiguous instrument for complying with sustainability concerns from the 
perspective of ‘corporate social responsibility’. This is even clearer in another change: a new 
category of ‘unnecessary terrain’.297 According to this new policy, several coastal towns were 
explicitly excluded from the regulated littoral. They did not need to be protected or unprotected, 
as they were already beyond the possibility of environmental recovery. This condition of ‘arriving 
too late’ allows for sudden destruction if they are declared ‘unnecessary’.298 In all these cases, 
the construction of ambiguous definitions is at the core of the class struggle of the soil. 
 
 
1.4 The Failure of the Section: Salinity Reports as Factories of Truth 
The seashore legally extends to the point reached by the highest tide in history.299 In order to 
prove the highest watermark, aerial photographs and satellite imagery have been used to draft 
the shoreline. However, the pressure of real estate development is such that consultants can be 
challenged to bias technical evidence. Photographs from above, whatever their resolution, can 
only capture a precise moment. They do not prove a timeline of traces of sea salt in surrounding 
areas. Therefore, litigation around the precise demarcation of the shore and the historical 
presence of the sea has led scientific researchers to work at the scale of salinity to arbitrate 
urban planning conflicts. Grains of sea salt have been brought to court to prove or dismantle the 
millenary geology of the beach and its material history. This section analyses the political 
appropriation of salinity to legitimise development in Las Teresitas Beach in Tenerife and 
Cabanes wetlands in Castellón, two cases on the Spanish coast. 
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In the case of Las Teresitas Beach, the soil samples included in the report – with their 
debatable sea salt and fossil sea creatures – aimed to discern the binary ecology-real estate: 
whether the sample site belonged to buildable land or the coastal commons. As part of the legal 
process to demarcate the Maritime-Terrestrial Public Domain in Las Teresitas, the DL-210-TF 
report was produced by the public company Tragsatec in 2008. Tragsatec has grown to become 
the primary producer in Spain of ‘independent’ reports on the geology of the beach for 
urbanization-related conflicts. Despite their popularity, Tragsatec’s work has been questioned in 
the Supreme Court; their geological justification regarding a section of beach in Valencia was 
annulled in 2010 for lack of scientific rigour and for having been fabricated ad hoc.300  
 
Tragsatec’s production of ‘cli-fi’ evidence is intertwined in political and economic power and 
constitutes an assemblage of natural capital and neocolonial interests. The company is part of 
Tragsa, a global environmental and engineering consultancy that has absorbed smaller firms 
with revealing names – for example, Paraguay’s Colonización y Transformación Agraria S.A. 
(Colonisation and Agrarian Transformation Ltd). More recently, their production of questionable 
data became even more apparent in January 2017, when the former President of the Spanish 
Securities Market Commission (CNMV) and former conservative Minister of the Environment 
Elvira Rodríguez was appointed their new president.301 She had also previously been Secretary 
of the State Budget 1996 onwards (during the real estate boom), working for the Minister of the 
Economy and former IMF Managing Director Rodrigo Rato, now sentenced to four years 
imprisonment for accounting irregularities.  
 
Their corporate ambition is to ‘service to the public’ and ‘provide clients with solutions adapted 
to their needs’.302 Nothing is further from reality: Tragsatec’s ‘objective’ technical studies 
precisely adapt to the needs of certain economic interests. In the case of Las Teresitas Beach, 
their 52-page report is an exemplary case of environmental construction in ambiguity (Figs. 44-
47). The report currently sits in a governmental archive in Madrid not accessible to the public. 
However, a compulsory second copy in the regional Coastal Commission in Tenerife makes its 
analysis possible. The shore demarcation is defended through photography, topography, 
salinity analyses, and marine archaeology, as follows: 
a. Aerial photography: A series of images from 1973, 1981, 1989, and 2002 are visually 
compared to analyse the forces modifying the beach over time. The four photographs conclude 
that nearby urbanisation indicates a clear anthropogenic influence, making the beach no longer 
‘natural’. 
b. Topography: Slope variations in the coastal contours were studied by cutting the cliff of the 
beach into four cross-sections to prove their angle at 60°. The threshold of 60° nonetheless has 
to be calculated as an average for a whole beach. The analysis in Las Teresitas concluded that 
the average slope was between 36,02 and 44,82°, the report therefore argued that the site was 
clearly not a coastal ‘cliff’ by definition, but a medium-slope on average. 
                                                
300 Tribunal Supremo, Sala de lo Contencioso, ‘3817/2010 Appeal,’ Madrid, 9 October 2013. 
301 EFE Madrid, ‘Expresidenta de la CNMV, Elvira Rodríguez, Será Nueva Presidenta de Tragsa,’ El Diario, 27 January 
2017, http://www.eldiario.es/economia/Expresidenta-CNMV-Elvira-Rodriguez-Tragsa_0_606139756.html 
302 Grupo Tragsa, accessed 7 June 2017, http://www.tragsa.es/es/Paginas/default.aspx 
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c. Salinity: Through the study of beach sediments, the report reminds its reader that the beach 
is manmade: it is in fact the first engineered beach in Europe, dating back from the Francoist 
late 1960s. Its golden sands were shipped from the Moroccan Sahara Desert, as the original 
black volcanic sands were unappealing to Northern European snowbirds seeking the ‘tropical’ 
Southern latitudes during cold winters. Yet the golden beach is now so ingrained in even the 
local imagination that residents have fought for the beach to keep its natural condition and not 
be built up.303 The samples consisted of three deep test pits (C1, C2, C3) and two samples from 
the surface (M1, M2). The analysis of the five sediment samples concluded that they were all 
‘continental soil’. In order to determine the salinity of the samples, and whether they had ever 
been part of the sea (perhaps at the highest tide in history), the standard method consists of 
circulating electricity through the sand. Their electric conductivity is measured in Siemens per 
unit of length: the more saline, the more conductive. As stated in the report, despite the fact that 
there are various arbitrary salinity thresholds, Tragsatec chose to use the US salinity laboratory 
as a reference in this case.304 It determines 4 deciSiemens/metre as a threshold for salinity and 
electrical conductivity. Given that the samples from Tenerife were under 1 dS/m, it concluded 
that the site was not saline, but ‘normal’ soil. 
d. Marine Archaeology: Despite the fact that the Saharan sand did not have any particles of 
sea salt, the analysis of sea fossil sediments revealed that there were nonetheless sea fossils 
present in soil samples supposedly belonging to ‘continental’, ‘normal’ soil. However, the sea 
fossils were not understood to be because of any seawater impact, but because of the wind. 
The report acknowledged that at some point in history the shells had been blown to the shore 
rather than washed away, splitting the essence of tidal movements between the agency of wind 
and water. It also clarified that other possibilities include sea level rise 11,000 years ago (during 
the interglacial period), when hotter temperatures increased the sea level 2 or 3 m over the 
current level. But at the same time, it discarded this option as ‘not very probable’. It even argued 
that because of the artificial breakwater that protects the beach from winter waves, the beach is 
‘dead’ in ecological terms: no influence by tides, waves, or saltwater could be considered.  
 
The report concludes that even if there was indeed material evidence of a Quaternary beach, 
the fossil sediments do not necessarily indicate the presence of the sea.305 As the beach is no 
longer affected by tidal influence, sea fossil sediments appeared on the surface because of 
human action and not littoral dynamics. Their presence is not natural, as they have not come to 
the surface due to tidal movements; the samples ended up in that spot due to digging for the 
construction of the adjacent road. The existence of sea salt was immediately discredited by the 
possibility of human-initiated movement of the terrain on an artificial beach. With this series of 
assumptions founded on almost satirical interpretations, Tragsatec’s scientific report 
constructed their version of the shoreline based on factishes – with the same evidence, they 
could have just as easily argued the exact opposite.  
                                                
303 José Manuel de Cózar Escalante and Juan Sánchez García, ‘Planeamiento urbanístico y procesos sociales 
deliberativos: La playa de Las Teresitas en Santa Cruz de Tenerife,’  in Toma de Decisiones Colectivas y Política del 
Suelo, ed. Juan Sánchez García (Teguise: Fundación César Manrique, 2004), 33-45. 
304 TRAGSATEC, ‘Estudio Técnico para la Justificación del DPM-T en la Playa de las Teresitas DL-210-TF,’ Santa Cruz 
de Tenerife, 2009, 48. 
305 Ibid, conclusion. 
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The second case similarly looks at the financialisation of Cabanes wetlands in Spain, which 
intensified the debate on the demarcation of the shoreline. Wetlands, the ambiguous landscape 
par excellence, had to be demarcated to fit in either one category or the other. Were the 
wetlands part of land, urbanisation and extraction of minerals would be legitimate; if they are 
part of the common seas, they must remain untouched (Fig. 48). Now, coastal wetlands 
epitomise the condition whereby fresh water is constantly maritimised.306 In the legal battle in 
Cabanes, scientific reports presented by both sides argued opposite things. The Practical 
Salinity Scale Index (PSS-78) determines the percentage of salt that defines brine, saline, 
brackish, or fresh waters. As the salinity of the water was three parts per thousand (the 
international threshold between brackish and saline waters), one side argued that the 
vegetation and waters were characteristic of a fresh water landscape, and the other report 
argued exactly the opposite, both based on scientific evidence.307  
 
Sitting at the threshold of 3 ppt of salt, Cabanes could either be considered part of the land or 
not. One report contended that the salinity levels were slightly above the threshold for saline 
water, and as a result, that the marshes should be considered part of the sea and hence 
environmentally protected. The further environmental debate on whether the fauna and flora 
corresponded to fresh or brackish water also complicated the process; despite the fact that 
there were indications of brackish fauna and flora, it was argued that landscapes can easily 
revert to fresh water ecologies, and should not be taken in any case as a proof of a sea-
identity.308 Confronted with contradictory reports and a dysfunctional standard of measurement 
for a dynamic ecosystem, the judge had to choose according to his own views. He eventually 
decided to exclude most of the wetlands from the shore, as this would effectively allow for major 
economic benefits for the region, in terms of development and employment. 
 
Similar to the conflict of the soil salinity in Tenerife, the case of the coastal wetlands in Cabanes 
is a clear example of how the interpretation of water salinity acts as a juridical threshold that 
makes the shoreline a dispositif of ambiguity.309 Urbanisation was pressing for an alteration in 
the condition of the landscape from other fronts as well: planning permission was granted to 
build within the wetlands in 2003 before the landscape was declared a nature reserve;310 the 
number of ‘accidental’ summer fires increased, which eased the change from protected 
landscape into degraded land; and the wetland flow was altered to pump water for the nearby 
mega-project Marina D’Or, right outside Oropesa, the coastal town where Spanish conservative 
President José María Aznar used to spend his summer holidays.311  
                                                
306 Ministerio de Medio Ambiente, ‘Instrucciones Técnicas para la Realización de Deslinde del DPMT,’ Madrid, 2006, 47. 
307 Yeray Clares, ‘Un Nuevo Informe Demuestra que las Aguas del Prat No Son Saladas,’ El Periódico Mediterráneo, 28 
April 2010, http://www.elperiodicomediterraneo.com/noticias/comarcas/nuevo-informe-demuestra-aguas-prat-no-son-
saladas_555846.html 
308 ‘Asociación Europea de Perjudicados por la Ley de Costas,’ accessed 24 May 2017, 
http://perjudicadosporlaleydecostas.blogspot.co.uk/2010_04_01_archive.html 
309 Ministerio de Medio Ambiente, ‘Instrucciones Técnicas para la Realización de Deslinde del DPMT,’ Madrid, 2006, 48. 
310 Fundación Alternativas, ‘Mapa de Presuntas Irregularidades y Actos de Corrupción Urbanística 2000-2007,’ Madrid, 
2008, accessed 2 July 2017, http://www.fundacionalternativas.org/public/storage/publicaciones_archivos/xmlimport-
GUjYNg.pdf 
311 ‘Destrucción a Toda Costa: Situación del Litoral Español y sus Espacios Protegidos,’ Greenpeace, July 2009, 
http://www.greenpeace.org/espana/Global/espana/report/costas/informe-completo-destrucci-n.pdf 
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These patterns confirm an attempt to urbanise the hybrid coastal landscape at any cost. Due to 
the reduction of water influx into the wetlands and the over-extraction from the underground 
aquifer, salinity levels of water have been changing. Effectively, these changes have led to 
subsidence of the wetlands and potentially sea level rise, as was detected in 2014 when the 
archaeological remains of a Neolithic freshwater well were spotted underwater off the coastal 
limit of the wetlands.312 This even further challenged the environmental logic of one-
dimensional, static lines, as the legal approach failed to consider larger global phenomena that 
closely affect the littoral and tidal zones in four dimensions: length, width, depth and change 
over time. The judge’s line cutting across the coastal wetlands in Cabanes failed to represent 
the threshold between land and sea. He flattened extremely complex forces into a single, 
horizontal, fixed dimension.  
 
Differences in density between seawater and freshwater in estuaries provoke an additional 
vertical stratification that makes the latter float to the surface above saltier waters, which are 
heavier and fall to the bottom. Based on this variability, a sentence in Galicia 2004 refused the 
water salinity report presented as evidence, given that it neither considered vertical gradients 
nor tidal shifts throughout the day or the year.313 These spatial frictions can be read through 
Eyal Weizman’s notion of plastic boundaries and the politics of verticality. In his analysis of the 
Israeli-Palestinian territorial conflict, Weizman remarks on how an Israeli viaduct over 
Palestinian territory is a case of the multidimensional stratification of sovereignty. When the 
bridge’s columns rest on Palestinian ground, the ‘border’ runs, presumably, through the 
thermodynamic joint between the column and the beams.314 Analogously, salinity gradients 
overlap, fluctuate, and dissolve in four dimensions. The threshold separating seawater and 
freshwater, like the joint between two overlapping nations, is subject to cycles of expansion and 
compression. 
 
This understanding of the variable depth of borders and shorelines is indebted to geological and 
tectonic representations of space. Alexander von Humboldt’s Cross-Section of the Earth’s Crust 
(1841), motivated by the 1755 Lisbon earthquake, includes a visualisation of a geological 
section of Europe that shows underground matter to be the source of the perils of volcanic 
eruptions. The original aim of the geological cross-section was to understand material 
discontinuities in the terrain in order to predict accidents and secure populations on the surface. 
Traditional cross-sections of the coast have surprisingly focused nonetheless on the 
bureaucratic forces that have invented shoreline offsets. It has legitimised a procedure whereby 
tidal dynamics can be flattened into lines on a floor plan, as if simply visible from above.  
                                                
312 Pilar Carmona González, José Miguel Ruiz Pérez and Miriam Ibáñez Solaz, ‘Erosión Costera y Cambio Ambiental en 
el Humedal de Cabanes-Torreblanca (Castelló). Datos Para una Gestión Sostenible,’ Boletín de la Asociación de 
Geógrafos Españoles 66 (2014), 165.  
313 ‘La diferencia de densidades entre el agua salada y dulce da lugar a una estratificación en la vertical siendo la 
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analítica la profundidad a la que se tomaron dichas muestras.’ See Sentence A.N. 22-09-04, 1032/2000 (DL-121/1-
Coruña). 
314 Eyal Weizman, Hollow Land (London: Verso, 2012), 180. 
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There is a conflict in the drawing of the littoral as a one-dimensional line ignoring dynamic 
processes and multi scalar gradients.315 Furthermore, climate changes will increase and 
accelerate such transformations, especially in terms of thermodynamic and salinity variation, 
neither of which are considered in current graphic representations (Figs. 49-51). Current 
visualisations of the shoreline are therefore already obsolete. The diagrammatic sections of the 
littoral released by the Spanish Ministry of the Environment are not even true to the text in the 
Coastal Law in their depiction of the highest tide in history and the way salt levels fluctuate. 
Government-drawn sections of the littoral are rather an average abstraction of what a shoreline 
is supposed to look like administratively in order to be easily measured. They cut through 
stereotypical coastal landscapes that represent any condition and none at the same time. The 
typical or average sections never slice through underground streams, swamps, irrigated fields 
with leaking drainage pipes, or nomadic dunes. Otherwise they would need to consider more 
complicated forms of representation for these ambiguous landscapes, which despite being 
included as part of the coast according to law, would not be possible to visualise in the same 
way. Contrary to the graphic legend of their schemes, water is not blue and land is not green; 
the littoral is a financial zone that is murky, muddy, and rather brown. 
  
                                                
315 Carlos Augusto França Schettini et al, ‘Observation of an Estuarine Turbidity in the Highly Impacted Capibaribe 
Estuary, Brazil,’ Brazilian Journal of Oceanography 64 (2016), accessed 25 May 2017, DOI:10.1590/S1679-
87592016115006402; ‘Salinity,’ Australian Online Coastal Information, accessed 28 May 2017, 
http://www.ozcoasts.gov.au/indicators/salinity.jsp 
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44: Las Teresitas Beach, Tenerife, 
Spain, with the original black volcanic 
sands before it became the first 
engineered beach in Europe with 
golden sands from the Sahara. Photo 
ca. 1925-1930.
45: Las Teresitas Beach, Tenerife, 
Spain. Photo by the author, April 2012.
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46: Salinity report DL-210-TF for the 
demarcation of the shoreline. Las Teresitas 
Beach, Tenerife, Spain, Tragsatec 2009.
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47: Salinity report DL-210-TF for the 
demarcation of the shoreline. Las Teresitas 
Beach, Tenerife, Spain, Tragsatec 2009.
48: Cabanes wetlands, Castellón, Spain.
June 2012.
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49: Typical section of the 
DPMT on the Spanish 
shores, differentiating 
the commons from 
private building land and 
the different easements 
of protection, Spanish 
1988 Coastal Law. 
MAPAMA, 2017.
50: Field distributions 
of (a) salinity (g/kg), (b) 
temperature (ºC), (d) 
suspended particulate 
matter (SPM, mg/l), 
(d) dissolved oxygen 
saturation (%), and (e) 
chlorophyll (µg/l) along 
the Capibaribe Estuary 
on October 11th, 2013. 
Carlos Augusto França 
Schettini et al. (2016)
51: Salinity regimes: 
There are four main 
characteristic types of 
salinity distributions 
in coastal waterways: 
stratified; partially mixed; 
fully mixed and inverse. 
Ozcoasts, 2017.
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This dossier compiles the practical component of Chapter 1 on the invention of the coast. As 
developed in previous pages, the emergence of the shore is entangled with the making of a space 
of circulation of capital, whereby the actual demarcation of the coastline as an inhabited strip has 
played a crucial role in the economy of the country. In order to understand how the demarcation of 
the shoreline is not just a simple line, the series of projects that follow made clear how the shoreline 
should rather be conceptualised as a four-dimensional set of power relations building up to the 
housing crisis. This required to use different methodologies to visualise those interconnected 
ecologies. It is worth remarking that it is hard to analytically separate in the methodology whether 
the practice-based research or the research-based practice started first. Both were developed in 
parallel and resulted from the impossibility of actually using maps to question wrong approaches 
to mapping (documents heavily influenced by a colonial tradition as explained in the Introduction 
of this thesis). 
During the making of the applied aspects of the research, it became clear that the failure of 
maps in regulating democratic approaches towards housing needed a different approach beyond 
increasing accuracy and resolution of the map itself. Hence the five sections that configure this 
Project Dossier 1 start by unpacking how that failure of the plan materialised after the frustrated 
attempt of understanding the rationale behind the governmental demarcation processes of the 
coast. First the institutional practice that uses environmental protection to modify the buildable 
character of the coast is exposed (1A). Then the methodology moved on to devise systems to 
look at the construction of imaginaries through the role of static images and not just lines (1B). 
The third section expands the role of fiction and explores moving image to depict the construction 
of the shore (1C). The other two sections delve into more performative acts as alternative forms 
of mapping the littoral exercise of ambiguity. They look at the extraction of value from the soil in 
a conglomerate of image production regimes, urbanisation, agriculture and speculation forces 
making profit out of zoning (‘edible geopolitical maps’ in 1D & 1E). Looked at as a circle of 
causes that led to the housing crisis in the way territorial governance was exercised, they are 
all approximations to unveil the complex logic of speculation and question the role of maps and 
boundaries that are used to regulate housing conditions and circulation of capital along the coast. 
Project Dossier 1
A/ The Failure of the Plan: Exceptions and Mismatches in Governmental Lines
Following the logic of the shoreline as a four-dimensional gradient, other approaches are much 
more comprehensive and can shed light on how to rethink the shoreline from a more ecological 
perspective. In traditional understandings of the territory in Hawaii, the coast spans all the way 
from the source of the river to the coastal hills. Inhabitation on the inland slopes is perceived as 
inhabiting the shore, without any clear sense of property or environmental limits, but with a logic of 
responsible usership. In Scandinavia, new manmade structures built on the coast should not be 
visible from a sea vessel. The role of the human gaze must then be inverted: looking at the water 
from the land cannot protect the coast, but there is a need to displace our reasoning by looking at 
the shore from the water and incorporating ecological dynamics. 
The practical component of this section analyses the boundary lines that demarcate the end of 
buildable land and the beginning of the coastal commons. Every twist of the shoreline explains 
not where tides or sea storms are active, or where recent alterations in seasons affect the line, but 
rather where municipal powers fail to make an ethically, socially and ecologically sound decision 
in the construction of the coast. These decisions are public and easily accessible online in the 
portal of the Spanish Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries, Nutrition, and the Environment, the entity 
in charge of regulating the coast. The portal consists of a digital platform that combines satellite 
imagery that demarcates the shorelines that are officially or juridically agreed upon, and are 
updated. When this research began in October 2011, the government had only released the 
shoreline of four coastal provinces (Tarragona, Balearic Islands, Lugo, and Granada). As of May 
2017, the 24 coastal provinces appear in the portal with their corresponding shorelines, and 
an additional category catalogues the sites where the shoreline is still under litigation or being 
processed. The green line signals the end of the sea; the pink line, the beginning of buildable 
land; and the yellow, a boundary still under legal constestation.
The interrupted sections of the Spanish shoreline reveal the logic of government through ambiguity 
and para-empiricism. More importantly, they reveal the contradictions in the demarcation process 
and the real-estate-oriented logic behind them. By consistently comparing a series of unusual 
line geometries along the coast, the glitch, mismatch, and exception identify the politics in place. 
The geometric inconsistencies, fragmented boundaries, sudden zigzags and other twists reveal a 
state of ambiguity. The mismatches expose the ecological misgovernance of the littoral space, as 
a space of both environmental and democratic crisis. They speak for themselves and reveal how 
environmental protection has been used for environmental destruction in service of the state and 
its associated real estate oligarchy. After the visual analysis of the line, the discontinuities can be 
summarised in the following taxonomies, which can be used as tools to detect unusual decisions 
and exceptional decision-making.
Source for the images in following pages: ‘Visor del Dominio Público Marítimo Terrestre,’ Gobierno de España, 
Ministerio de Agricultura y Pesca, Alimentación y Medio Ambiente, accessed 30 May 2017, 
http://sig.mapama.es/dpmt/visor.html
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52: Cabanes wetlands, Castellón 
X: 260.834,11; Y: 4.451.620,62; Huso: 31 
Landscape Divider:
In case of disagreement on whether to 
include the whole or none, a coastal 
wetland is arbitrarily cut in two by 
demarcating the end of the sea along 
a middle line. In this legal battle, 
contradictory scientific reports presented 
by both sides ended up in the judge 
eventually deciding to exclude most of the 
wetlands from the shore, as this would 
effectively allow for major economic 
benefits for the region. (See pages 74-75 
of this thesis).
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53: Río Vaca, Valencia.
X: 743.224,30; Y: 325.201,58; Huso: 30
Ending the Seasonal River:
Like in wetlands, the mouth of a torrential 
seasonal stream (rambla) is demarcated 
according to the salinity degree of its 
waters and floodplains. However, the 
effects of brackish tidal waters appear and 
disappear almost every season depending 
on the strength of the storm. In this case 
still under litigation, the midline of the river 
is the boundary between two municipalities 
(Xeraco to the north and Gandía to the 
south), so the inclusion or exclusion of 
its banks in either the realm of the land 
or the sea has an impact on the territorial 
demarcation of the two municipalities. On 
the one hand, the north side claims that the 
Southern flood plain should be considered 
as part of the river, so that it could annex 
600m of prime location beach from the 
southern side. On the other hand, the 
south side claims that the river should end 
in a straight line without considering the 
banks as part of the public domain, so that 
their beach does not shrink. The yellow line 
for the moment cuts across a compromised 
version.
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54: Nules and Borriana, Castellón.
X: 748.245,51; Y: 4.414.444,37; Huso: 30
Inter-Municipal Disagreement: 
Because of the different local authorities 
involved in the shoreline’s demarcation, 
the exact same landscape can be framed 
under different offset widths in adjoining 
municipalities. However similar the 
landscape is on both sides, one may be 
more conservative than the other in terms 
of their environmental protection buffer 
zone. Together, they create a discontinuity 
in the understanding of the coastal 
environment. In this particular case, the 
municipality on the north side of the line 
mismatch reduced the public beach and 
the easement of protection to the minimum 
(characteristic of ‘urban artificial areas’); 
whereas on the south side, the buffer zone 
is extended to the maximum (characteristic 
of ‘rural natural areas’).
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55: Platja de la Pletera, Girona.
X: 737.155,31; Y: 4.383.197,27; Huso: 30
Curved Fillet Offset: 
This case indicates an interruption in 
the development. The urbanización 
in the middle of the photograph, 
almost completely enclosed by coastal 
demarcation, shows how only the first 
phase of the whole development managed 
to be built (second and third blocks south 
of it are identifiable by the road that 
should provide car access, but remain 
unfinished). The legal compromise was 
found in letting the first phase stay in 
place while interrupting the development 
of the rest. As a consequence, the offset 
of the shoreline negotiates the encounter 
between the urban and the buildable 
through an unconventional curved fillet. It 
is important to note that the corresponding 
section of that beach, trapped somewhere 
between a nature reserve and an urban 
area, recently became one of the few 
designated beaches in Cataluña where 
dogs are allowed. It is described as a 
‘slightly urbanised natural zone.’
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56: Playa La Torre, Almassora, Castellón.
X: 756.053,78; Y: 4.424.337,44; Huso: 30
Rural Widening (Virgin vs. Anthropised):
The historic Mediterranean orchard 
landscape is not considered as a cultural 
and ecological entity, but functions many 
times as a convenient buffer zone. In this 
case it is apparent how the section of 
the beach in front of the orchards is not 
engineered to maintain a certain width, 
while the urban sections north and south 
from the orchards are two or threefold 
wider with the additional help of the coastal 
terminal groin. Also note the conflicting 
geometries and typologies between 
the deep narrow orchards (oriented 
perpendicularly to the shoreline to profit 
from the streams flowing towards the 
coast), as opposed to the long wide urban 
lots (oriented parallely to the shoreline to 
profit from optimal sea views).
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57: Xilxes, Castellón.
X: 743.549,35; Y: 4.405.935,66; Huso: 30
Narrow Heritage Strip: 
Local residents tried to list these historic 
fishermen’s houses on the waterfront 
(yellow stripes hatch) as culturally 
significant buildings (B.I.C.) in order to 
be allowed to stay in place and resist 
demolition. The narrow and long shape 
of the ensemble is characteristic of 19th 
century coastal villages composed of small 
houses lined up towards the sea. After 
a series of litigations, the 2013 Coastal 
Law conservative amendments declared 
them an urban exemption; together with 
other eleven zones and a total of 10,000 
constructions scattered across the country, 
the coastal amnesty allowed them to stay 
in place for another 75 years.
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58: Puçol, Valencia.
X: 735.052,12; Y: 4.388.486,78; Huso: 30
Minimum Offset: 
When an area is considered to be 
anthropised or substantially transformed by 
humans, the corresponding authorities can 
determine that is already ‘urban enough’ 
to belong to ‘nature.’ Hence, the bare 
minimum offset from the coastal baseline 
can apply, and instead of having a buffer of 
100m wide, only 20m is enough. Declaring 
scarcely inhabited areas as consolidated 
urbanisation is a recurrent instrument 
to allow buildings to stay in place or to 
expropriate as little as possible. In this 
case, the old small historic buildings are 
‘invading’ the coast, but the large resorts 
right behind them (that are disturbing the 
streams and orchard landscape) are saved 
from demolition. When the new resorts 
follow the geometry of the orchard grid 
plots (narrow front and deep sides), the 
resulting building typically have balconies 
oriented in an angle to have sea views 
sideways.
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59: Islantilla, Huelva (top)
X: 124.527,42; Y: 4.125.600; Huso: 30
60: Bega de Mar, Valencia (bottom)
X: 737.431,47; Y: 4.346.582,00; Huso: 30
Front Void: 
In the quantification of coastal occupation, 
the volume of the structure plays a small 
role; it is mainly the footprint which counts 
to the advantage of large structures to 
be kept in place. Therefore, landowners 
of big plots can have a green void facing 
the beach (suitable for private swimming 
pool or lawn) and still be legal; whereas 
small property owners have not enough 
land to facilitate that buffer. Hotels with 
green space at the front can create the 
illusion of open public space. Factors like 
the disturbance of underground water flow 
are not considered when determining the 
quality of the ground surface urbanisation 
(covered in hard impermeable materials). 
The porosity of the flooring finish is crucial 
to the ecology of the underground but 
rarely considered in determining whether 
a structure ‘invades’ the DPMT or not. 
Indeed, dug out parkings and swimming 
pools constitue barriers to underground 
flows (as negative built volumes).
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61: Urbanización Real de Zaragoza, 
Marbella, Málaga.
X: 339.797,45; Y: 4.040.413,82; Huso: 30
Sudden Zigzag: 
The coastal demarcation can bend to 
specific interests. In this case, the line 
breaks into a sudden zigzag to exclude one 
upscale property from the public domain, 
and allow it to stay within the private 
domain of the land. Paradoxically, large 
scale exclusive fincas located on the shore 
still keep parts of the original landscape of 
the coastal dunes, due to the sheer size 
of the property, as opposed to multiple 
apartment resorts that utilize the whole plot 
of land. However, there is no obligation or 
control to avoid gated lawns that affect free 
movement dunes.
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62: Moncofa, Castellón.
X: 744.410,22; Y: 4.408.182,41; Huso: 30
Multi-Zigzag and Non-Parallel Lines:
Adaptation of the shoreline to the shape of 
the new development of an urbanización. 
It is important to note in this case how 
the seasonal stream that runs through 
the middle of the unfinished development 
and the surrounding coastal dunes are 
demarcated with arbitrary offset lines to 
the end of the sea. The contested yellow 
line, which should theoretically indicate the 
end of the beach, does not even match the 
satellite image that shows part of the beach 
beyond the end of it (top). The municipality 
of Moncofa, with a population of 7,000, 
planned 31,500 new apartments to house 
an unprecedented migration of 120,000 
dwellers that never arrived.
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63: Apartamentos Aparwacks, Gola del 
Puchol, Albufera de Valencia Nature Park.
X: 731.206,65; Y: 4.360.713,49; Huso: 30
Trapped Land Enclaves: 
Buildable land is atomised in this case 
into disconnected enclaves of exception. 
Two twelve-floor buildings are exempted 
from belonging to the beach, despite being 
surrounded by land that belongs to the sea. 
Despite being located in one of the most 
unique wetland ecosystems in the country, 
the structures are entitled to be kept in 
place with the ‘minimum possible’ footprint. 
Note how this compromise between 
human inhabitation and preservation of the 
landscape includes the rectangular parking 
areas, built in the middle of the coastal 
dune system, to ‘facilitate access’ to the 
beach.
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64: Marina Alcossebre, Castellón.
X: 269.469,67; Y: 4.459.280,96; Huso: 31
Trapped Sea Enclaves: 
Analogous to the previous type, these 
three blocks are surrounded by water, 
but they have been legally exempted as 
building land. Despite being exclusive 
enclaves, they are allowed to be part of 
the coastal buffer. Marinas are particularly 
contested building typologies, as they 
exist in land that previously did not exist. 
Demolishing them to restore the ‘site’ 
would imply to also restore the dredged 
sea bed, which is an even more expensive 
operation. In the case of inland upscale 
marinas, like Catalan Ampuriabrava, it is 
not less complicated, as restoration would 
imply not only to demolish the structures to 
bring the coastal wetland back, but also to 
dismantle the banked canals. 
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65: El Saler, Albufera de Valencia.
X: 733.004,88; Y: 4.355.871,71; Huso: 30 
Exclusive ‘Green’ Zone: 
Golf courses are commonly used as 
ambiguous green zones: they can 
conveniently be both part of buildable land 
and part of the sea, depending on how they 
are classified. Despite being privately used 
and severely interfering in the water and 
wind systems of the dunes in the area, they 
can count as natural spaces respecting 
the coast. In the case of this golf resort 
developed during Franco times in the 
Albufera Nature Park, it is remarkable how 
despite belonging to the nearby state-run 
upscale hotel (Parador), it is considered 
to be in a location that ‘respects the 
ecological values of the area’.
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66: La Rábita-El Pozuelo, Granada.
X: 332.125,22; Y: 4.155.740; Huso: 30
Greenhouse Ambiguity:
Greenhouses, like golf courses, can be 
part of either buildable land or the coast. 
Despite totally disrupting the effects 
of winds in coastal dune systems and 
increasing water runoff with fertilisers and 
pesticides, they are allowed to stay close 
to the shore, because they are considered 
agricultural use that is to a certain extent 
‘natural’ to the area. As Keller Easterling 
describes, they are part of ‘plasticulture 
urbanism cheating the seasons’. They 
supply off-season produce all year round 
by taking advantage of the fertility of the 
soil and the weather conditions. This part 
of the coast, known as Costa Tropical, 
that stretches to the infamous El Ejido in 
nearby province of Almería, constitutes a 
greenhouse belt that is the most prominent 
agribusiness engine in the entire country. 
Their density is such, that they are also 
described as ‘greenhouse forests’. After 
the crisis, many became abandoned 
though, which worsened the condition of 
the beach. Given that the beaches were no 
longer maintained with seawalls, the beach 
eroded and the plastic and metal structures 
began to collapse onto the water, 
magnifying the spread of the remaining 
chemical substances along the shores.
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B/ The Failure of the Horizon: Shifted Gaze in the Tourist Image
Not only the views from above have constructed the legality of the shoreline. Even from the 
perspective of the human eye, the imaginary of the coast has exposed or masqueraded the 
effects of urbanisation. This section takes a souvenir postcard collection to illustrate the urban 
development of the Spanish coast during the country’s transaction (not transition) to democracy. 
The 1960s and 1970s were the time of the first wave of speculation on second-home ownership 
and the consolidation of mass tourism in Spain. The postcards show beaches crowded with 
holidaymakers. The height of the mega-towers and the tonnes of mortar sands, asphalt, steel and 
glass were a visual indicator of the country’s degree of development and civilisation, measured 
and exported as an image of modernity. The writing on the back of the postcards is banal, and 
could be summed up as: ‘I’m on holiday, I’ll tell you all about it when I get back’. The written 
content was less important than an imaginary of modernity produced through the architecture of 
a place. 
Trying to find the equivalent image of those same beaches, this research sought current 
visualisations of the places captured in the postcards, to understand the contemporary gaze 
through the postcards sold at those same sites today. Each postcard has a corresponding picture 
from the same place in 2012, in the period of crisis following the real estate boom and bust of 
the noughties (Figs. 67-73). Even if the same beach is more urbanised, degraded, or less natural 
than it was 30 years ago, the postcards today still sell us a model of paradise. They avoid image 
framed of the land from sea, possibly to hide the aberrant constructions of the past. The shots 
are instead directed towards the sea. They shy away from showing masses of people. Today, the 
foreground shows fishing boats, luxury cruisers, animals, or deserted locales. Bucolic palm trees 
and natural components of the landscape have replaced the buildings. 
This shift from a concrete-oriented gaze toward a nature-oriented one can be situated as part of 
the aforementioned narrative of environmental stewardship. The shoreline is invented anew in 
order to keep the vacation bubble rolling. Marketing operations need new approaches to attract 
holiday-goers to the formerly glorious Costa del Sol, Costa Blanca, or Costa Brava. In order to 
do so, the images offering the ‘natural experience’ of the coast seem to be the only attempt to 
engage with the four-dimensional condition of the shoreline. The Coastal Law and its demarcation 
system certainly does not. The changing postcard relies then on the government of desire and the 
management of environmental responsibility at a visual and superficial level. 
The collection and recollection of postcards is the result of many field trips along the Spanish 
shores to understand the fascination with inhabiting (seasonally) on that strip. The postcards 
are accompanied by a selection of photographs capturing some of the tensions in the built 
environment that render the littoral ambiguous (Figs. 74-93).
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67: Alicante, June 1968 and 2012.
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68: Benicarló, 29 May 1970 and 2012.
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69: Benicassim, 3 August 1978 and 2012.
Project Dossier 1
106
70: Benidorm, 8 June 1979 and 2012.
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71: Fuengirola, 24 September 1976 and 2012.
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72: Santander, ca. 1975 and 2012.
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73: Valencia, 13 October 1968 and 2012.
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74-75: Concrete boundary stones 
(mojones) to demarcate the Spanish 
Maritime-Terrestrial Public Domain (DPMT) 
according to ‘the highest tide in history.’ 
Mojón in Cape Cope and N. 275 (with 
concrete base). Note how coastal winds 
in a marine environment deteriorate the 
edges of the concrete pole. 
Calnegre, Murcia.
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76: Boundary stone in a wetland 
failing to separate land (the top half 
of the image) and sea (the bottom 
half). It is meant to indicate the 
point reached by the ‘highest tide 
in history.’ 
Alicante, May 2014. 
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77: Postcard depicting Lago Martiánez, a coastal 
pool complex conceived by César Manrique in 
Puerto de la Cruz, Tenerife, 1971-77. This project 
is paradigmatic in the blurring of the shoreline, 
through a landfill/seafill project: walking surfaces 
are gained to the sea, whereas seawater is 
introduced into the pools. Rocks were placed 
outside the pools to slow down the strenght of 
the ocean. The littoral is constructed around the 
slowing down of the speed of the waves.
78: Broken breakwaters in Puerto de la Cruz, right 
outside the Martiánez pool complex. The waves 
from a winter storm have managed to penetrate 
through the concrete seawall and broken it into 
pieces.
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79-80: ‘Stabilised’ coastal sand dunes, Tarifa, Cádiz. Whenever Levante 
winds blow, the dunes cover the road in sand, and vehicles get stuck 
on their way to the beach. The road was built by Franco in 1940 to give 
military access to the coast in case of a British attack from Gibraltar. The 
road needs to be constantly cleared of sand by the Army and a pine tree 
forest was planted to help retain it. Since the 1988 Coastal Law, the dunes 
became protected landscape and were passed on to the Ministry of the 
Environment’s jurisdiction. Lacking former military presence, they struggle 
to keep the dunes ‘in place.’ 
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81: Abandoned greenhouse in Cape Cope, Murcia. A mega-coastal development 
(Marina de Cope) was stopped with the crisis. Coastal agricultural land is still awaiting 
reclassification into buildeable land. Poli-tunnels along the coast of Murcia and the 
plastic city of El Ejido in Almería, often dig out sand from the seabed as a base layer for 
the greenhouses. They not only disrupt coastal winds on their way to deposit sediments 
by the sea, but parts of the tidal zone are literally displaced to grow vegetables in them.
82: Coastal saltworks at San Pedro del Pinatar, Murcia. The different colour tones of the 
seawater indicate the concentration of salt: the pinker, the saltier; the bluer, the fresher.
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83-84: Polaris World, Torre-Pacheco, Murcia. View from inside and 
outside the golf resort. There are currently nineteen golf courses in 
the region of Murcia, one of the most arid coastal areas in Spain. 
The intensive use of water for lawns and hotels has often been 
masqueraded under agricultural irrigation. This has considerably 
contributed to increasing the amount of water divested from other 
basins in the country. Consequently, sediment flows down the local 
rivers have been altered and no longer supply the coast and its 
beaches with aggregates. This has led to regenerations of the littoral 
with sediments from the seabed and other sources.
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85-86: Holiday resorts along Las Américas 
Beach, southern coast of Tenerife. Themed after 
Ancient Rome, Greece, and other stereotypes of 
Mediterranean living, these housing typologies 
are transplanted onto the Canary Islands by world 
holiday operators and hotel chains. They bring the 
architectural imaginary of the Mediterranean onto 
the Atlantic shores off the coast of Morocco.
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87-88: Ten-Bel complex, built in 1963 as 
a resort to enhance the Tenerife-Belgium 
holiday connections, Costa del Silencio, 
Tenerife. At its peak in the 1980s, it had 
5,200 beds. The blocks on top of the cliffs 
are legal according to the Coastal Law, 
as topography over 60° slope is excluded 
from the public maritime domain and can 
be buildeable. A public right of way at the 
edge of the cliff is the only concession at 
the moment (see bottom image, footpath 
on the right).
Project Dossier 1
118
89-90: Widespread architectural typologies 
of the littoral built environment: modern 
blocks with balcony flats towards the ocean 
view. Prime location buildings have fully 
frontal balconies, whereas second-tier 
developments maximise the optimal view 
by designing balconies in an oblique angle.
Top: Puerto de la Cruz, Tenerife. 
Bottom: La Manga del Mar Menor, Murcia. 
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91: ‘Gerontification’ of Benidorm. The 
conversion of most balconies into 
glazed conservatories indicates that the 
apartments are also inhabited in winter. 
Benidorm, has decayed in popularity 
for summer holidays for its architectural 
fabric to such an extent, that pensioners 
have taken advantage of the surplus of 
affordable flats on the coast. Benidorm 
exemplifies a shift from ‘spending the 
summer’ to a city dependent on permanent 
retirement plans subsidised by the state.
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92-93: Arbitrary demolitions on the coast. 
Large resorts have not been demolished 
despite being too close to the water (top: 
Algarrobico, Almería); whereas fishermen 
houses and local structures are easier to 
knock down given that small stakeholders 
lack capacity of negotiation (bottom: El 
Sauzal, Tenerife). In the public taking of 
single story structures and ‘undesirable’ 
impoverished citizens, the government 
does not require big investments to revert 
the coast to its ‘natural’ condition; and 
it can promote it as exemplary acts of 
environmental conservation.
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C/ Where The Sea Ends is Not Necessarily Where the Land Begins
Short film by the author, in collaboration with Borja V. Conde; voice over by Omer Eltigani 
(UK/ES, 2013, 2:39).
Following the logic of the 1988 Coastal Law, the film is treated as an eco-fiction narrative to 
perform the incongruences that the law dictates. It portrays a Spanish legislator, whose life mission 
is to physically demarcate the end of the coastal commons, a line that does not exist. Through 
a combination of voice over and archival material, the moving image brings in the neoliberal 
contradictions around the definition of the end of building land and the beginning of the sea. 
The protagonist in the film has a perpetual task that reminds the viewer of the Myth of Sisyphus 
and a certain philosophy of absurd reasoning. Influenced by the Greek king of the myth and his 
forced task of rolling a boulder up a steep hill for it to roll down and then be forced to roll it up 
again for eternity, the film also portrays unreasonableness through the analogy with the Coastal 
Law. It draws a direct parallel with the hard task of physically demarcating the shoreline as an 
impossible conquest. With sea waves splashing against his feet, the protagonist holds a can of 
green spray. He tries to catch the highest tide and mark the precise extent of the sea in real time. 
But the harsh wind is blowing, and the particles of green spray paint dissolve in water, merge with 
the moist sand or simply fly away. The painted line seems not to stay for long, as there is always 
a new wave that comes in and washes off the green mark. It is hard to determine whether the 
protagonist is punished to eternity to do his job or whether his very reason of being is to keep 
changing the line at every moment. Without it, the world would not need him. 
Accessible at: https://vimeo.com/61849455
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94: Where The Sea Ends Is Not 
Necessarily Where The Land Begins, 
film still.
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D/ Boundary Gazpacho
Geopolitical Cooking Performance by the author, TEDx Talk Madrid, 2012 (17:23)
The controversial Spanish 1988 Coastal Law and the 1998 Land Law are explained through 
an edible map of contested ingredients related to the Spanish real estate bubble; speculative 
demarcation of land, and appreciation of the soil. The format consisted of a TEDx talk in Madrid 
in order to explain the housing crisis through both laws as a visual map explained in 20 minutes 
for 500 people. The Coastal Law defines the shoreline as the extent of the highest tide in history. 
But this definition brings up many arbitrary judgements as explained in Chapter 1. Given that it 
is sometimes necessary to track the prehistoric salinity of the soil in order to find any presence 
of the sea in it, salt itself can also go to court. This is what happened in the case of the Cabanes 
coastal wetlands, where it was necessary to use the international salinity threshold PSS-78, 
which determines that seawater is that one which contains over 3 parts per thousand of salt. The 
Boundary Gazpacho unpacked this and other legal conundrums around zoning for real estate 
profits by using that amount of salt, as well as a selection of ingredients connected to other soil 
struggles along the Spanish littoral for the recipe. Aiming to explore other forms of mapping, they 
featured urban planning related conflicts and marketisation of different Spanish territories in the 
form of geopolitical edible maps of the housing bubble.
Accessible at: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=eIXJski4i78
122
95: Boundary Gazpacho, 
courtesy of TEDx Madrid.
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E/ When Agua De Murcia Lost Its Virginity
Lecture-Performance by the author and Alon Schwabe, FAN Riots, SOS Murcia, 2014, curated by 
Iván López Munuera; re-enacted at CA2M, Madrid, 2015.
The marketing of the Spanish imaginary of the coast abroad experienced a big push during 
Franco’s dictatorship with the architectural display of the Spanish pavilion at the 1969 World 
Exhibition in New York. The lecture-performance unpacks that first moment when nations 
branded their territory through themed foods and spatial inventions by deconstructing the way 
Spain was spatialised in the pavilion: a series of modern open-plan rooms reconstructed the 
recently invented Costa del Sol and other itineraries through the Iberian Peninsula for a foreign 
eye. The performance was structured around the laws regulating the definition of sangría (also a 
newly invented drink for tourists back then) as a territorialised subject within the Marshall Plan. 
By defining what is sangria according to European law and what is not, the making of the recipe 
explored other military agreements between Franco and the US that included the reorganisation 
of national infrastructure projects and urbanisation of the littoral to open it up to global hotel 
chains and circulation of tourists along the newly defined shores of the country. The urbanised/
virgin/militarised coast was investigated through a collection of popular music videos shot on the 
Mediterranean waterfront from the 1960s onwards to understand how the littoral went through the 
making of its new image and how desire and economic interests alongside it were constructed. 
In short, how the littoral was defined through carefully planned diplomatic and real estate profit 
margins.
96-97: When Agua de Murcia Lost 
Its Virginity, images courtesy of SOS 
Murcia and CA2M.
98: After the urbanisation of 
the coastal dunes to their 
utter extinction and the 
banking of the Río Seco river, 
Alicante’s beach had lost its 
main source of sands and 
sediments and had almost 
disappeared. In the 1990s, 
its extreme condition led to 
a large-scale ‘restoration.’ 
2,176,000 m3 of sand were 
brought from the mountains.
Alicante, July 1991.
124
125 
2– OFFSET  
Speculation on Disappearance:  
From Real Estate Boundaries to Banking Nature 
 
 
‘We were land users, not land owners. We were part of 
the environment, we didn't own the environment. And 
that’s why our people thrived. The word subsistence is 
a bad word. That does not define our lifestyle at all. We 
did not subsist, our communities thrived up here.’ 
 
—Enoch Adams, Inupiaq resident of Kivalina, AK 
 
 
 
‘You can't own a place like this. It belongs to the 
planet. I'm only the guardian.’ 
 
—Paul Fentener van Vlissingen, richest man and 
largest landowner in Scotland.316 
 
 
2.1 Conflict of Interest: The Insurance-Engineering of the Coast 
In September 2006, only a year after the devastating Hurricane Katrina, State Farm Insurance, 
one of the largest homeowner insurers in the US, changed the definition of ‘coastal area’ from 
1000 feet to one mile.317 By extending the littoral zone over five times inland in the name of 
security, existing houses were moved closer to the water than they had ever been before. State 
Farm Insurance dropped coverage over coastal properties, which were then stranded in a 
freshly fabricated coastal strip. The decision reclassified space as if the houses on the 
waterfront had already been flooded. Furthermore, this action contested the de jure 
demarcation of the coast by implementing a different de facto line; a more convenient version, 
which pre-empts the insurance company from million-dollar compensations in the case of 
another Hurricane Katrina in the near future. Under the name of environmental protection and 
climate change mitigation, the shoreline was pushed landward to reduce the quantity of insured 
objects (Figs. 99-102). 
 
While far from mitigating the damage to buildings on the shore, this redefinition of the end of the 
sea allegedly protected coastal properties through financial liability (creating new contractual 
obligations or potentially unfavourable exchange of assets). It constituted a form of insurance-
engineering of the coast: it defined a zone where inhabitants were not only at risk, but legally 
detached from the disaster relief provided by home insurance.318  
                                                
316 in 2005 
317 Sandra Fleishman, ‘Sea Change in Insurers’ Coastal Coverage,’ Washington Post, 30 December 2006, 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/12/29/AR2006122900626.html; Bonnie McCay, ‘The 
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318 Robert L. Wiegel and Thorndike Saville, ‘History of Coastal Engineering in the USA,’ in History and Heritage of 
Coastal Engineering, ed. Nicholas C. Kraus (New York: ASCE, 1996): 514. 
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The decision to push the coastline further inland left thousands of policyholders in a new legal 
limbo of potential eviction and the eventual loss of their mortgaged home. In Alabama alone, 
State Farm Insurance refused to renew coverage for about 2,600 homes stranded in the newly 
securitised shore.319  
          
The value of those properties dropped just as much as their protection coverage. State Farm 
had no interest in securing houses that were too far away from the newly created safe ground. 
When insurers abandoned the coastal market, not only did they literally sink mortgages under 
water, but they also redefined nature through financially constructed environments. Home 
insurance policies began to separate hurricane damage into wind damage (covered) and flood 
damage (not covered). They disconnected the effects of wind from water as if they were two 
separate forces in order to isolate the dynamic components of the shoreline. In major 
hurricanes, determining whether a house is destroyed due to wind or water damage thus has 
serious legal and economic implications. Private insurance companies (like State Farm) cover 
structures that are blown away, whereas properties that are washed away are within the 
responsibility of the National Flood Insurance Program (NFIP), which is subsidised by US 
taxpayers.320 As a result, a pile of debris after a storm is a controversy rather than a tragedy – a 
matter of judgement to be assessed according to the perception of facts and the optimisation of 
profit margins.  
 
With the legitimacy to both create the problem and provide the solution, State Farm was 
accused of a conflict of interest.321 The corporation insisted on the power to determine whether 
hurricane damage was due to the movement of water, effectively defrauding the US 
government with intentionally wrong assessments of damage.322 But after the 2016 Department 
of Labour 101 New Fiduciary Rule, State Farm Insurance was forced to reshape sales of its 
financial products and retirement plans. Their sales agents, paid per sale of financial products 
delivered, could not be both brokers and consultants.323 They could not prudently take care of 
money or assets for another person; consultants and brokers will never be able to act in the 
best interest of the client when they have a clear financial benefit from that client making certain 
decisions.324 Whether or not biased advice constitutes a conflict of interest or a value-added 
service remains at the core of the ethical interpretation of profit.325 
  
                                                
319 Garry Mitchell, ‘State Farm Won’t Renew 2,600 Policies in Alabama Beach Towns,’ Insurance Journal, 5 February 
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99: Flood damage after 
Hurricane Katrina (top left).
100: After the Mississippi 
River floodings in May 2011 
and the inoperative response 
from the USACE, residents 
started to build their own DIY 
levees to protect their homes 
(top right).
101-102: New Flood 
Insurance Rate Map 
(FIRM) of New Orleans, 
released by the US Federal 
Emergency Management 
Agency. After reassessing 
the new topography of the 
city, drainage works and 
new levees, they show 
neighbourhoods that do 
not require expensive flood 
insurance any longer (in 
green) and those that needed 
anew (in red). Source: FEMA, 
March 2016.
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Disagreement between US insurers and coastal dwellers on the precise definition of the coast 
after Hurricane Katrina depends on the liminal condition of being simultaneously on land and at 
sea. This ambiguity constituted a powerful tool for State Farm Insurance in their attempt to 
avoid coverage for damaged properties. The redefinition of the coast depended on the profit 
margins of the company and vice versa. Ambiguity in damage accountability along the shifting 
shoreline exposes how tightly a spatial offset (or a buffer zone) is connected to the offset of 
responsibility. The manufacturing of coastal boundaries and the different forms of displacement 
embedded in them are both a result of the different meanings of ‘offset’: a consideration that 
diminishes or balances the effect of its opposite, the amount or distance by which something is 
out of line, and a short distance measured perpendicularly from the main line of 
measurement.326  
 
The shoreline is not a clear separation between where the sea ends and the land begins.327 As 
tornados and tsunamis threaten property-owners and insurers, the coast should at least be 
defined as the space where land, water and air meet (the gas exchange between air and water 
is also fundamental to biological and sedimentation processes).328 The definition of the 
shoreline must respond to physical, ecological or cultural criteria simultaneously, but they rarely 
coincide.329 The littoral is in fact a liminal space that remains transitory, and is permanently 
situated at a threshold.330 This thesis argues that the shoreline cannot exist as a line, but is 
instead a four-dimensional construct, changing over time and transcending microscopic and 
macroeconomic scales. From the particle of sea salt that proves the extent of the sea to the 
liabilities that State Farm Insurance trades in the stock market, profit margins tighten or loosen 
the demarcation of the coast. They make the shoreline into a carefully manipulated financial 
littoral. 
 
A large portion of the destruction wrought by Hurricane Katrina was caused by engineering and 
engineering-related policy failures.331 As part of an economy of prudence and the ambiguity of 
offsetting interests, the US Army Corps of Engineers also played a key role in the looting 
mongering of the shore. Created by US Congress in 1802, the Corps quickly shifted its 
battleground from the military to infrastructure. 332 For the sake of national security against the 
environment, it became increasingly involved in civilian activities as an agency with authority 
and liability over the entire US river system, flood control, canals, boundaries, and water 
transportation.333 During the 1930s, large-scale flood control projects were embraced as a way 
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to create jobs, and the Corps – along with other federal agencies – spearheaded efforts to drain 
wetlands nationwide.334 Water infrastructures were instrumentalised for geopolitical interests, as 
in the case of the canalisation of the Rio Grande River around El Paso/Juarez, which limited the 
movement of the boundary with Mexico in the name of flood control.335 Even the USACE logo, 
consisting of a medieval gate of the French walled city of Verdun, identifies their role as 
guardians of the threshold and reiterates their power to decide what is allowed on each side of 
the boundary. The Corps acts as a bipolar Jekyll and Hyde: the catalyst of capitalism and a 
threat to the capitalist system, a bold innovator and a brake on the wheels of change.336  
 
USACE has been called America’s preeminent engineering organization, a nation builder, and a 
bureaucratic superstar, but also a public enemy, a diligent destroyer of wetlands, a military 
aristocracy, and a ‘lobby that cannot be licked’.337 Its nation building schizophrenia has muddily 
operated between wetland protection and swamp reclamation, between environmental 
advocacy and biased ecology to benefit real estate interests.338 Their notion of the public good 
is both ambiguous and influenced by the views of the political party in power or the 
corresponding chain of command.339 In their promotional material, the USACE defines itself 
through the Mandarin term for political rule (治), as the combination of the characters for river 
and dyke, and conclude that ‘water management (and water reform) is ALWAYS political (治).340 
Furthermore, their scientific analyses have been fraught with errors, mistakes and 
miscalculations, based on invalid assumptions and outdated data.341  
 
In 2000 the Corps helped launch an $8 billion effort to restore the Florida Everglades, a project 
necessary in part because of damage by the Corps' own previous infrastructure projects.342 
Their publicly subsidised beach nourishment programme has proved inefficient, as pumping 
sand along the nation’s shoreline does not provide communities with protection from hurricanes 
and erosion, but rather benefits landowners with beachfront properties.343 It is the urgency of 
climate change that mobilises action and funds; after Hurricane Sandy in 2012, the USACE 
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received significant budget increases.344 The question remains to what extent the infrastructural 
solutions they provide as a public body might incur in a conflict of interest equivalent or different 
to State Farm, a private company operating between assessing damage and providing 
coverage. 
 
  
2.2 Creating Coastal Threat to Provide Mitigation 
In March 2009 the US Army Corps of Engineers released the ‘Alaska Baseline Erosion 
Assessment Report’, tracking the 10,000 named and thousands more unnamed rivers, creeks, 
and streams of Alaska, as well as its 44,000 miles of tidal zones and more than 3 million 
lakes.345 As a result, the 178 communities in Alaska that had reported erosion problems were 
put at the fore. After the investigation, 26 were designated ‘Priority Action Communities’ in need 
for immediate solutions to manage coastal erosion.346 One of these was Kivalina, an Inupiaq 
group of 400 people that had been forcibly relocated in 1905 to a barrier island on the 
northwestern coast of Alaska (Figs. 103, 104). Their seasonal campsite for summer fishing was 
turned into a permanent village, exposed to the winter storms coming off the open Chukchi Sea.  
After building a school on the coastal site, the Bureau of Indian Affairs threatened the nomadic 
residents with imprisonment should they fail to send their children to class every day. By 
converting the nomadic Inupiaq into literate subjects, they also became discipline-able and 
governable by the state.  
 
Within this complex condition and the increase in land loss, a series of local and governmental 
mitigating actions have been taking place over the last decades. The first storm attributed to the 
acceleration of climate change hit the island in 2004.347 The storm eroded large parts of the 
land, with waves reaching up to the doorsteps of residential homes. The residents of Kivalina, 
fighting against the volatile sea, tried to protect their village by building provisory barriers and 
filling in soil and gravel where land had eroded away. In response to this event and to a storm in 
the fall of 2005, the North West Arctic Borough initiated a series of costal management actions 
to fortify Kivalina's shoreline. The first attempt was a gabion basket retention wall, filled with 
sandbags. On the day of its inauguration, in October 2006, the newly built sea wall failed and 
intensified the erosion because of the dredged shoreline. The USACE began to build a rock 
revetment in 2008, a structure projected to last 10-15 years, but due to lack of funds, only half of 
it was executed.348 
 
The 2009 coastal erosion report took the violent colonial project one step further. The USACE 
made the community officially vulnerable to weather as a result of living so close to the sea in 
winter, a location that the people of Kivalina had never chosen as a permanent site. 
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Kivalina’s coastal erosion is aggravated by coastal ice forming later in recent years than 
it had in the past — historically, coastal ice has acted as natural erosion protection, and 
the community is now more susceptible to erosion from storms for a longer period. [...] 
Extreme damage is expected within 10 years.349 
 
Ice protected the coast ‘historically’. But this ambiguous time span can only refer to data from 
the last decades. In fact, the oldest shoreline in the visual timeline presented in the report dates 
back to 1975 (Fig. 105). The USACE claim is partially misleading as the history of the people of 
Kivalina did not even start in 1905, but several thousand years back in time.350 In that sense, 
and contrary to the report’s statement, it can be argued that there is indeed no ‘historical’ data 
that can scientifically prove to what extent ice formation on the coast has been changing over 
centuries or millennia, but only contradictory oral accounts.351 In short, the government that 
settled the people of Kivalina on the coast came to the conclusion a century later that their 
chosen site was not adequate for permanent inhabitation. In a pre-1905 setting, the people’s 
nomadic ‘resilience’ would have responded to the ‘problem’ by migrating to a more winter-
favourable site (Figs. 106-110). However, many of the skills that the Inupiaq used to have to 
move and migrate have been lost. Forced settlement replaced hunting, fishing, and foraging 
knowhow with dependence on federal poverty subsidies. Throughout the last century, the 
residents of Kivalina have tried to relocate their village numerous times to a more favourable 
site, but each attempt has resulted in conflicting interests and federal cost-benefit analyses all 
weighing against the inhabitants’ efforts.  
 
In 2008 Kivalina became an international reference for a climate refugee community – a 
problematic term that, despite highlighting their power to resist, nonetheless victimised them 
even further.352 They successfully pressed charges against the 24 largest oil and gas 
companies in the world, holding them accountable for the global carbon emissions eroding their 
barrier island (Fig. 111-113). Despite increasing the visibility of their cause, the case was later 
dismissed in the Ninth Circuit, on the basis that the extent of global pollution affecting climate-
related erosion at a local scale was rather a matter of political debate in Congress, and not in 
court.353 Environmental responsibility was offset in the same way that the Kivalina shoreline and 
safety buffer zone had been. The Corps’ 2009 report not only put the community of Kivalina at 
risk, but it also appropriated ambiguity to turn the whole shoreline into an object under threat, 
able to mobilise million-dollar mitigation and relocation efforts. To a certain degree, people 
became figures that mattered less than boundaries: residents turned into instruments for 
authorising mega-scale engineering efforts to keep the line in (a certain) place. Future 
projections of how the shoreline was expected to move in the immediate future were crucial in 
the imagination of various catastrophic scenarios. 
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103: Aerial view of the island of Kivalina, 
AK. Landing in July 2013.
104: Communities with Erosion Concerns 
map by the US Army Corps of Engineers, 
as included in the 2009 Alaska Baseline 
Erosion Report.
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105: Predicted and Historical 
Receding Shorelines: 1975, 
1990, 1997, 2000, 2010, 2020, 
and 2030. Source: USACE, 
2009 Alaska Baseline Erosion 
Report. 
134
106: Annual Activity of the Upper Kobuk River Communities. Source: Douglas B. 
Anderson et al, Kuuvanmiut, 2011 (top).
107-108:  Ammassalik wooden map-sticks to represent the coast of Greenland. From 
‘Topografisk Atlas Grønland,’ Det Kongeglige Danske Geografiske Selskab, 2000.
109-110: Seasonal changes in the nomadic use of the landscape around Kivalina. 
Ernest S. Burch Jr. Kivalliñigmiut fall settlements and known caribou corrals (bottom 
left) and spring settlements on the coast (bottom right).
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111: Native village of Kivalina vs. Exxonmobil Corp., US 
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, 09-17490.
112: Map of possible relocation sites, Kivalina City 
Council, July 2013.
113: Aerial view of the village of Kivalina and landing 
track with frozen waters around it. Michael Brubaker, 
2011.
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As part of the practice-based research process, in 2012 the working group ‘Modelling Kivalina’ 
was set up to investigate the challenges of relocation.354 Our five-member team travelled to 
Kivalina in the summer of 2013, devising a method of three-way modelling for the process:355  
a. First, an actual model of the island was built using detachable items (individual houses, 
property lots, geological layers, pieces of infrastructure, and shoreline projections). This served 
as a conversational device in interviews to make people position themselves on the terrain. 
b. Second, the model itself was used in real time to understand the distortions of the territory 
and each interviewee’s involvement in Kivalina. Every interviewee would break the model apart 
and sometimes expand it with additional elements made ad hoc. 
c. And third, to diminish any perceptions of patronising foreigners coming with solutions, the 
project instrumentalised that privilege to access the offices of governmental bodies and map 
bureaucratic views on the conflict. The project proposed Kivalina as a model for other coastal 
communities dealing with climate change and the mitigation of coastal erosion.  
 
With this three-tiered approach the project aimed to understand the complexity of architectural, 
political, and environmental forces shaping the potential disappearance of the barrier island of 
Kivalina. It investigated the agents involved in speculation on the littoral and the incarnation of 
the shoreline as an assemblage of power. The fieldwork consisted of 35 interviews with 
institutions such as the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), the Environmental 
Protection Agency (EPA), the Department of Environmental Conservation (DEC), the Red Dog 
Mine corporation operating in the area, the Northwest Iñupiat Housing Authority (NIHA), the 
Northwest Arctic Borough (NWAB), the Alaska Federation of Natives, as well as residents of 
Kivalina, local leaders, elders, educators, and children. The modelling process was designed to 
incorporate past, current, and future visions of the changing landscape (Figs. 114, 115).  
 
Modelling conversations elicited two primary reactions, one from external bureaucrats in the city 
and the other from residents of Kivalina. From the perspective of bureaucrats in the city, arriving 
at a federal office with a 100cmx70cm box was both perplexing and exciting. Once the model 
was laid out on their meeting tables, the room acquired a new atmosphere, beyond the 
conventions of everyday meetings. The conversations always began by asking interviewees to 
situate themselves in the model, putting them on uncomfortable ground. Without accusing or 
questioning their role or degree of involvement in Kivalina, it became clear where and at which 
level they operated, their relationship to the field, and their physical engagement or distance to 
the context. As interviewers, we let them speak and interact with the fragmenting pieces. 
Bureaucrats working on mitigation assessments could barely situate houses, individuals, 
shorelines, or buildings. The space of Kivalina in the model was too detailed for their 
understanding of the territory, which is instead based on numbers and figures that add up to 
financial subjects at risk. Barely any civil servant in Anchorage touched on the geological layers 
of the underground (the shoreline, sediments, sand, clay, permafrost), despite those layers 
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being at the core of the disappearance of the island and the ‘necessity of its movement’.356 On 
the other hand, with the residents of Kivalina, the model was not detailed enough. Almost every 
interviewee needed to increase the detail of the object in order to conduct a conversation about 
the financialisation of the littoral. The conflict around the future projection of the shoreline and 
the erosion of their barrier island went far beyond the shoreline itself. The model was simply too 
small to accommodate the Inupiaq understanding of the territory and the different scales that 
manage the boundary between land and water. As part of the modelling process, different 
elements had to be added: nearby rivers, water sources, polluted areas, relocation sites, old 
nomadic camps, etc. In several interviews, the model spread over the entire floor of the 
community centre of Kivalina, where the interviews were conducted (and which is approximately 
5mx5m in area). Distant, contested sites and many other features of the landscape needed to 
be part of the conversation around the ambiguity of the shoreline. Furthermore, it soon became 
apparent that another device to model time was needed, as conversations with Kivalina 
residents repeatedly referred to how activities used to organise the daily and yearly cycle of the 
coastal community, and how those were changing with the new freezing point of the coast. Time 
was key to understand the construction of the spatial boundary. The facts that whales arrived 
earlier in the year or that special berries ripened later were crucial clues to the changing 
landscape. Climate alterations were not recorded by technological devices but by alterations in 
human and nonhuman activities, wrongly called ‘subsistence’ practices.357 A very simple 
roulette with hunting, fishing, and foraging seasons was produced on the spot to map the shifts 
in those seasons over the past decades.  
 
According to anthropologist Ernest Burch Jr., in his in-depth analysis of Alaskan Inupiaq 
communities, seasons were not divided into four rigid, three-month units but into flexible sets in 
which units were denoted by descriptive terms.358 The seasons of the Kivalliñiġmiut could be 
grouped into 21 periods measured by the liquid/solid condition of the shore and the ways they 
affect human and nonhuman mobility (hunting, fishing, and foraging): when snow starts to melt 
(upinġaġruaq); when snow gets soft and it is hard to travel on it (auksalakkaa); when sea ice 
breaks up (siqumitkaa); when sea ice is broken up but floating around (tuvaiyaġvik); when sea 
ice is all gone (sikuiġvik); when ice starts to form (qinugaa); or the time just after freshwater 
freeze (ukiuġaa). Seasons are not periods between specific dates, but fluid spans that overlap 
with each other—the season when caribou start growing fur on their horns can start before, 
during, or after the moment when ice starts to form. The perception of everyday time correlates 
to the events changing the surrounding space. The littoral in Kivalina is not based on a financial 
risk or mitigation line, but an incredibly large buffer zone, whose extent and variability determine 
human and nonhuman mobility, and the acquisition of food.  
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Apart from the solid or liquid state of the shore, a second outcome of the interviews was an 
understanding of the shifting timeframes in relation to changing colours. White is not as white as 
it used to be. Seal skins, no matter how hard they are scrubbed; now stay yellow, always a 
shade of off-white.359 This could be explained by toxins travelling through the ocean and 
accumulating in the seal fat via the food chain, or by new substances in the air creating an 
optical distortion between the human eye and the seal skin. As Susan Schuppli remarks, ‘the 
reflectance properties of snow are governed by individual grain size, impurities, liquid water 
content, surface roughness, and by the depth and density of the pack’.360 The white of the snow 
has indeed changed; in some Alaskan villages snow is acquiring a reddish tone, mainly caused 
by a new microscopic algae bloom that appears due to an accelerated snow melt. The resulting 
rust colour may be invisible to some, but a trained eye distinguishing shades of white on the 
frozen water surface can perceive it.  
 
In an interview with environmental engineer and public health researcher Michael Brubaker from 
the Alaska Native Tribal Health Consortium, he remarked how these perceptions are extremely 
accurate but hard to detect by conventional scientific devices, as the phenomena require 
inexistent technologies and metrics to compare datasets.361 Popular practices like observation 
of the blossoming time of wild fireweed can be crucial in the optical investigation of climate 
change, as its bright pink flowers function like a calendar. The petals fall off in a gradual 
sequence from the bottom to the tip and when all the flowers are gone, it is common knowledge 
across Alaska that there are only six weeks left until the first snowfall. Given that these ‘natural’ 
countdown systems are extremely useful in the local appreciation of climate variations, 
Brubaker launched a grassroots mapping initiative in Alaska, the Local Environment Observer 
Network (LEO), for people to systematically upload these observations from remote areas.362 
Active observers detect ‘unusual’ events such as early blooming plants, late-arriving migratory 
birds, or the appearance of algae blooms on the coast, all of which can contest governmental 
and scientific systems of measuring. Such an initiative can expose the failures of Western 
scientific objectivity by introducing relational approaches from Inupiaq knowledge. 
 
The interviews were synthesised in a comparative analysis by tracking the most used terms, 
mainly: self-determination, risk assessment, mitigation, disaster, catastrophe, and subsistence. 
The outcome exposed the ambiguity of the jargon: the same terms had multiple different 
meanings according to the interpretation or political agency of the interviewee. Both city 
bureaucrats and residents of Kivalina had to learn each other’s language to debate on ‘equal’ 
terms; the PR agent from the Red Dog Mine learned how to speak and vocalise perfect Inupiaq 
guttural language to prove his willingness to engage with locals, while the residents of Kivalina 
had to learn the language of financialised environments to read and understand the risk and 
mitigation decisions by the USACE. As Eduardo Viveiros de Castro remarks with his notion of 
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controlled equivocation, the question is how we can restore the analogies traced by indigenous 
peoples within the terms of our own analogies; or rather, what happens to our comparisons 
when we compare them with indigenous comparisons.363 Far from translation mistakes, the 
different understandings of the same term result from two opposing cosmologies, which fail to 
negotiate two different perspectives as if they were one. In sum, the multi-scalar coastal erosion 
and flooding was not a matter of rising sea levels, but about the construction of the shoreline as 
a set of equivocal understandings of self-determination, civil justice, mental health, food 
security, inhabitation, and ‘subsistence’ in the Arctic—that more than redefined, are yet to be 
decolonised.  
 
The critical outcome of the fieldwork for this thesis is revealed in one of the interviews with 
coastal engineers Harvey Smith and Ruth Carter from the Department of Transportation in 
Anchorage. Interestingly, they remarked how Spain is one of the most advanced countries in 
the world for coastal management and public access to the coastline.364 And yet, it could be 
argued that both Spanish and the US shores share many similarities in the mismanagement 
and conflicting interests around the need for infrastructure. Scientific objectivity in environmental 
impact assessment reports is mobilised in both contexts through neoliberal governance, and 
have resulted in cases where decisions are being indirectly driven by profit margins. A lawsuit 
from 2007 proved that the USACE had miscalculated a $112 million flood control scheme in 
Missouri, and required the USACE to demolish the new levee-and-pump infrastructure as the 
original economic rationale depended on a mathematical error, and the ‘newly protected’ town 
would flood just as often.365  
 
As part of the executive summary of the 2009 Alaska Baseline Erosion report, the Corps 
complained that due to their recent loss of power and autonomy, the possibility for mitigation in 
Kivalina was uncertain. In other words, the USACE stated that their loss of autonomy in 
managing funds was putting Kivalina even more at risk, as they could not ensure a successful 
delivery of mitigation programmes.366 That tension between the need for infrastructure and the 
power to manage budgets was pivotal to the demarcation of the shoreline in Kivalina. The 
interview with Smith and Carter unveiled a complex network of economic interests embedded in 
the 2009 report that had led to multi-million-dollar investments in risk mitigation, technical 
studies, geological analysis testing the adequacy of relocation sites, and engineering proposals 
for evacuation roads. The relocation cost of the village was estimated at the time in approximate 
$400 million. If divided by the number of residents in Kivalina, this implied $1 million in spending 
per relocated individual. Given that no Federal or State agency was granted to appropriate the 
funds for relocation, these conditions have been pushing the village into an ontological crisis.367 
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Before the relocation estimates started to exponentially rise and the shoreline became 
increasingly risky, it was the budget for the USACE that was under threat.368 After federal 
funding cuts, it was apparent that accelerating the impact of climate change could increase the 
need for ‘urgent’ funding allocation. The future projections of the shoreline and the assessment 
of coastal erosion, Smith and Carter remarked, had been exaggerated through a series of 
intentional miscalculations that excluded neutralising processes of accretion: 
To do the baseline erosion analysis [the USACE] had unskilled, not well-specialised, 
uneducated people, and they went out to the villages and asked: ‘Are you experiencing 
erosion?’ And everyone said, ‘Yes, of course’. And they don’t go out and ask, ‘Are you 
experiencing accretion?’ In fact any time they found accretion they didn’t know what to 
do with it, so they threw it out as bad data. Even villages, which had greater accretion 
than erosion, showed up as being eroded.369  
 
Despite misinformation and miscalculation, a planning study used those precise data sets for 
engineering decisions. The economy around climate change was channelled through 
scaremongering and the imminent threat of the eroding coastline. Apart from discarding ‘bad 
data’, the Corps distorted the littoral, exaggerating the risk coefficient in equations to calculate 
the future shoreline.370 Despite acknowledging the error in internal communications with Smith 
and Carter, it was never corrected in the public report. Smith and Carter unveiled the false 
attribution of damage as only a product of water, as State Farm Insurance had done by 
agreeing to insure only wind damage. As Smith stated, the Corps had not studied how the sand 
moves; they assumed it was all moving south, regardless of the fact that sand moves south in 
spring and summer, but north in the fall.371 
 
The Corps secured work for themselves in the future, as their declaration of ‘priority action’ in 
villages at ‘imminent risk’ would require them to test relocation strategies: seawalls, revetments, 
sand placements, erosion control assistance, and reports like the aforementioned 2009 Kivalina 
baseline erosion document. The economy of assessment and consensus building requires the 
menace to be kept alive. It is interesting to note that the US, despite being the archetype 
country for privatisation of services, has a public institution conducting environmental reports; 
whereas, Spain, often acclaimed for its public services, is subcontracting environmental impact 
assessment reports out to private companies. Indeed, the USACE needs constant threats, risk, 
and erosion processes to perpetuate imminent disaster to assert the necessity of that public 
institution. The USACE’s systematic use of catastrophic language, as opposed to the use of 
                                                
368 ‘There was a lot of money dumped into this whole thing [the Alaska Baseline Assessment and Coastal Control 
Action] and there is no money in a simple solution. The USACE is this huge hungry beast that is not being fed very well 
right now, with all the cuts in Congress and such.’ Harvey Smith and Ruth Carter in discussion with Modelling Kivalina 
working group, 30 July 2013. 
369 Ibid. 
370 Transcript – Harvey Smith: [T]here were some errors with the storm surge of 16 feet for Kivalina for the 100-year 
event. The Corps said a 100-year event was 16 on a computer model. [...]So we challenged the Corps, and they said: 
‘Oh, we had a coefficient of 2 where we should have just had 1. So they cut theirs in half. 
Ruth Carter: In the meantime, 16 was published.  
HS: The report was published, saying that you’re gonna be totally wiped off from the face of the earth, in a 50-year 
event. The truth is, with a 100-year event they are still not gonna be flooded [...] And they more or less agreed, but said 
‘We are not gonna change it’...  
RC:...unless you give us money. 
371 ‘When I studied the direction of sand, the Corps, all of their studies, nobody ever really did a study of the sand, 
surprisingly. But they assumed that the sand was all moving south. But I found no, [...] it moves south in spring and 
summer; fall, it moves north. [...]But the assumption was that that movement was south.’ Harvey Smith in discussion 
with Modelling Kivalina working group, 30 July 2013. 
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‘potential’, ‘possible’, or ‘probable’ to refer to the likelihood of those same events intensifies the 
need for rapid response. According to Smith and Carter, out of the 26 Priority Action 
Communities, only one was consistently eroding; the other 25 were subject to erosion-accretion 
cycles that did not necessarily prove negative growth in absolute terms, as coasts naturally 
recede and expand (Figs. 116, 117). In fact, in areas like Juneau and Anchorage, the rate of 
sea level rise is decreasing.372 Hence, it is not always appropriate to use catastrophic terms to 
refer to the coast of Alaska as a whole. 
 
It is important to note that Smith and Carter are not climate change sceptics or deniers, but 
have a critical approach to the instrumentalisation of climate change data to generate profit out 
of coastal catastrophes. The ways in which financial capital constructs space rely on the 
creation of fear, risk, and disaster. That violence not only infringes on the landscape, but also 
has serious and detrimental effects on coastal dwellers, as the exponential increase in mental 
health-related illnesses has shown.373 Therefore, the case of Kivalina epitomises the ways in 
which the shoreline is engineered and demarcated to accommodate the increasingly profitable 
global economy of risk mitigation. The USACE programme managed a peak budget of almost 
$50 billion in 2008 (cut to $20 billion in 2016), has territorial divisions in every ocean, and is 
present in 43 countries through a variety of ‘globally responsive infrastructural missions’ that 
‘deliver vital solutions to energise the US economy’.374  
 
Kivalina offers a unique case study to understand the financialisation of the coastal environment 
as a new political frontier for climate speculation. The liminal condition of the littoral serves to 
reveal a power structure that offsets both space and environmental damage and that values 
economic advantage over quality of life. Despite their radically different contexts, climate 
speculation in Kivalina and real estate speculation in Spain share many characteristics. In the 
context of both the post-Hurricane Katrina and the flood risk plan in Kivalina, the shoreline was 
pushed further inland based on a matter of urgency, interest, and security. In the context of the 
Spanish coast, the shoreline is constantly fluctuating in its demarcation in court, based on a 
matter of environmental preservation and a climate-sensitive response. This all lies at the core 
of water-critical landscapes or what Eyal Weizman frames as a ‘conflict shoreline’.375 Tidal 
zones have become the contested frontier in the architecture of climate mitigation and new 
power structures that collide with pastoralist and nomadic constructions of space. On top of 
human displacement, disappearance of biodiversity has become another tool to push coastal 
boundaries back and forth to keep capital circulating. Financially built environments rely more 
and more on scientific calculus and a need for lines that do not exist, and yet, are meticulously 
constructed.  
 
 
                                                
372 Ruth Carter in discussion with Modelling Kivalina working group, 30 July 2013. 
373 Michael Brubaker et al., ‘Climate Change in Kivalina, Alaska: Strategies for Community Health,’ ANTHC Center for 
Climate and Health, Alaska, 2011, 24-28. 
374 ‘US Army Corps of Engineers,’ September 2014, 
http://www.usace.army.mil/Portals/2/docs/USACE_101_Sep_2014.pdf 
375 Eyal Weizman, Erasure: The Conflict Shoreline (Göttingen: Steidl, 2014), 8-10. 
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2.3 Quantifying Space: Offsetting and No Net Loss 
Contrasting government speculation on the future of climate to private speculation on the 
financial value of nature, a more important question is raised: how can the coast, a 
quintessentially nebulous landscape, be at the core of hyper-accurate financial quantifications of 
space. Appointed ‘Nature’s banker’ by The Economist in May 2008, Mark Tercek, after 24 years 
at Goldman Sachs, became the CEO of The Nature Conservancy, the biggest environmental 
nongovernmental organization in the world.376 He shifted from being one of the primary sources 
for underwater mortgages in the housing crisis to investing in the preservation of the 
environment. In short, he went from speculating on housing to speculating on nature.   
 
But why is an investment banker trying to save nature? Tercek brings conservation and natural 
capital together in his bible for venture ecologists Nature’s Fortune: How Business and Society 
Thrive by Investing in Nature.377 Following the logic of real estate speculation, natural capital 
does not exist on its own, but it has to be built.378 Tercek’s views are crucial for understanding 
the invention of natural capital as a form of spatial offsetting and the manipulation of 
boundaries: ‘We need to get business, government, and individuals to understand that nature is 
not only wonderful, it is also economically valuable [...] Once everything has a price, the price 
creates an incentive to conserve’.379  
 
Tercek was not alone in redirecting himself toward extracting value through compensatory 
mitigation practices. Pavan Sukhdev left his position as Head of Global Markets for Deutsche 
Bank in India to become UN Ambassador for the Environment. John Fullerton, former managing 
director at JPMorgan, founded the Capital Institute in 2010 ‘to explore and affect the economic 
transition to a more just, regenerative, and thus sustainable way of living on this earth through 
the transformation of finance’.380 Fuller also became the Co-Founder and Director of Grasslands 
LLC, a holistic ranch management company, as well as the Director of New Day Farms Inc. 
Hank Paulson, former CEO of Goldman Sachs and former US treasury secretary under George 
W. Bush, facilitated a donation of 680,000 acres of (unsellable) wilderness in southern Chile 
from Goldman Sachs to the Wildlife Conservation Society to enhance its green credentials 
among shareholders.381 Its long-term security and the way it affects local democracies remain 
both uncertain, as there are no such precedents of private protection of the public interest.382 
 
Natural capital not only creates new financial products associated with the environment, but it is 
also key in the construction and destruction of wetlands. As part of the neoliberal project of 
                                                
376 ‘Nature’s Banker,’ The Economist, 13 July 2013, http://www.economist.com/news/business-books-
quarterly/21581710-lessons-nature-conservancy-natures-banker; ‘Green is Good,’ The New Yorker, 12 May 2014, 
http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2014/05/12/green-is-good 
377 Mark R. Tercek and Jonathan S. Adams, Nature’s Fortune (New York: Basic Books, 2013), Introduction. 
378 Ibid. 
379 Ibid. 
380 ‘Capital Institute,’ accessed 28 May 2017, http://capitalinstitute.org/director/john-fullerton/ 
381 ‘US Bank Donates 680,000 Acres in Tierra del Fuego,’ MercoPress, September 12, 2004, 
http://en.mercopress.com/2004/09/12/us-bank-donates-680-000-acres-in-tierra-del-fuego 
382 Emily Wakild, ‘Purchasing Patagonia: The Contradictions of Conservation in Free Market Chile,’ in ed. William L. 
Alexander, Lost in the Long Transition : Struggles for Social Justice in Neoliberal Chile (Lanham: Lexington Books, 
2009): 112-125. 
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financialising space, wetland policy in the US has been guided by George H.W. Bush’s notion of 
‘no net loss’ since the late 1980s. The policy was developed to protect the net quantity of 
wetland in the US, which has made them crucial to the urbanisation of both inland and coastal 
landscapes. The development of any housing complex, railway infrastructure, flood defence, 
military complex, urban settlement, or tourist resort that destroys natural habitats has to be 
balanced by the restoration of an ‘equivalent’ landscape elsewhere. For each acre of lost 
wetland, there should be at least one acre created or restored. Hence, the net amount of 
biodiversity is meant to remain ‘the same’ in terms of surface area, quality, or quantity: a new 
suburb built on a drained millenary wetland in California can be environmentally neutralised by 
restoring a comparable wetland elsewhere in the state.  
 
By definition, offsetting credits are the unit of environmental commodity to be traded. The unit 
can be a spatial dimension, like the area occupied by a certain landscape, or a functional 
measure, such as cubic meters of dry-season flow augmentation.383 In this ecological paradigm, 
where destruction is qualified as unavoidable, loss is accepted as an irremediable collateral 
damage to urbanisation and progress, but rendered ‘least of all possible evils’ by changing the 
perception of ‘yes loss’ into ‘no net loss’.384 Therefore, the No Net Loss policy poses a twofold 
problematic: it is legitimate to accept a loss, and that loss can be nettified. In sum, the logic of 
compensation legitimises damage. In such a scenario, architecture acquires the agency to 
destroy, displace, and replicate natural landscapes miles away from their current location. The 
offsetting of both space and responsibility jumps to the forefront of a mode of governance, 
where ambiguity encourages further circulation of profit and margins. 
 
In the same decade that No Net Loss policy emerged as a form of extracting value speculating 
from the environment – based on entirely unscientific calculations of return – the concept of 
‘biodiversity’ and ‘sustainable development’ also appeared in financial ecology. In the 1980s 
biologists shifted from providing facts about the natural world (already social constructions 
themselves) to start speaking of nature’s ‘values’.385 There are many ways of valuing, but unlike 
the concept of wilderness, the moment ‘natural variety’ appeared it easily became a commodity 
that could be exchanged, lost, gained, depleted, restored, quantified, and scientised.386 
Metaphors such as ‘balance of nature’ and ‘diversity yields stability’ disguise poor 
understandings of ecology.387 The biodiversity crisis relies on the human appreciation of value, 
as no conservation group has mourned, for instance, the extinction of the wild smallpox virus.388  
 
Wetland offsetting and the financialisation of biodiversity became even more profitable with the 
1997 Kyoto Protocol, when the first carbon offsetting schemes were formalised (Fig. 153). Air 
pollution in the Global North was accepted as a lesser evil of modernisation if compensated with 
                                                
383 Genevieve Bennett, ‘Alliances for Green Infrastructure: State of Watershed Investment 2016’, Ecosystem 
Marketplace, 15 December 2016, http://forest-trends.org/releases/p/sowi2016 
384 Eyal Weizman, The Least of All Possible Evils (London and New York: Verso, 2011). 
385 David Takacs, The Idea of Biodiversity: Philosophies of Paradise (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University, 1996), 5. 
386 Ibid, 27. 
387 Ibid, 107. 
388 Ibid, 38 and 63. 
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‘sustainable’ afforestation programs in the Global South to ‘enhance global biodiversity’. 
Offsetting projects planting forests turned environmental guilt into a tradable commodity. Some 
of the ethical contradictions were obvious, as in one of the first post-Kyoto offsetting projects, 
where the US-based Applied Energy Services promised to plant millions of trees in Guatemala 
in exchange for permission to construct a large, coal-burning power station.389 This project, they 
calculated, would absorb as much carbon dioxide from the environment as would be produced 
by the power station over its lifetime.  
 
Carbon offsetting is not only about CO2 mitigation. Assigning figures and drawing boundaries 
can automatically displace pollution to a different part of the planet. Citizens and corporations 
are increasingly consuming social responsibility; they are attempting to ensure their 
consumption – of goods and values – becomes a means of meeting their ‘social 
responsibilities’.390 Indeed, the ways in which any carbon footprint is neutralised through 
corporate social responsibility only exacerbates the still-colonial relationships between the rich 
and the poor, between high carbon-emitting nations right to pollute and low carbon-emitting 
nations obligation to cleanse. As in the case of Kivalina’s shoreline, the spaces involved in 
environmental reparations often have a colonial past that affects the balance of power.391 
 
In the name of the planet’s safety, environmental threats are producing a new form of neoliberal 
space. As part of the global risk landscape, fear is also calculated according to the severity of its 
economic damage. In the 2010 World Economic Forum, coastal flooding was evaluated in the 
range of $1 trillion damage potential, while biodiversity loss was in the range of $10-50 billion, 
similar to international terrorism.392 Only five years later in the 2015 forum, environmental 
threats had clearly become a much larger concern, whereas the subprime mortgage crisis had 
almost disappeared from the list.393 The failure of urban planning was demoted to the lowest 
ranking (the least risky and least likely), whereas the failure of climate change adaptation was at 
the top, together with weapons of mass destruction, biodiversity loss, and ecosystem collapse. 
This indicates how finance is to a certain extent less interested in the making of cities than in 
trading ecosystem services. It exposes the decreasing agency of urban planning in designing 
‘resilient’ spaces, which in turn should urge the architectural discipline to rethink urban planning 
at large and question why the making of buildings has become less relevant to global finance 
than disappearing species.  
 
In the contest between the construction of infrastructure and the preservation of ecology, 
environmental reports could be the basis for a new speculation bubble. Similar to the way in 
which State Farm works simultaneously as broker and consultant, top world banks, like 
                                                
389 ‘History of Carbon Offsetting and Carbon Trading,’ EBSCOHost, accessed 18 June 2017, 
http://connection.ebscohost.com/science/carbon-offsetting/history-carbon-offsetting-and-carbon-trading 
390 Ezra Rosser, ‘Offsetting and the Consumption of Social Responsibility,’ Washington University Law Review 89, 2011: 
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391 Melissa Leach and Ian Scoones, Carbon Conflicts and Forest Landscapes in Africa (New York: Routledge, 2015), 
Introduction. 
392 World Economic Forum 2010, in Jessica Dempsey, Enterprising Nature: Economics, Markets, and Finance in Global 
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Rabobank, loan money to agribusinesses deforesting the Amazon while selling them mitigation 
credits in afforestation projects.394 That double agency, far from being perceived as a conflict of 
interest, puts profit-making institutions in the position to teach sustainable ecological practices 
to profit-seeking corporations. In Enterprising Nature, Jessica Dempsey developed a taxonomy 
of actors operating in the market of biodiversity offsets to understand the role of ‘enlightened 
investor’ seeking win-win-win situations (biodiversity, development, and profit). She subdivided 
investors as ‘natural species’ according to their ecology-building capacity. In her ethnography of 
biodiversity market conferences, participants – who happen to be mostly white and Western, 
and whose natural habitats are conference rooms, cities, and airports – played different roles in 
redefining nature following sets of environmental services.395  
 
From the origin of No Net Loss to profiting from bioassets and local livelihood, what is emerging 
appears to be a new green space race. Eco-utilities and forest bonds are some of the 
instruments that are boosting the neoliberal quantification of space and determining how to 
classify and demarcate it. However, the main challenge for this form of speculation is how and 
whether to make offsetting calculations standard and universal. In order to securitise ecology, 
the ambiguity of demarcation would have to rely on standard measurements. Pierre Bourdieu 
stated that there are three forms of capital: economic, social, and cultural; they can be 
translated from one category to the other by means of economic conversions.396 He did not 
mention a form of investment coined after the 1973 oil crisis, when the accessibility of fossil 
fuels was under threat for Western powers. It was then that Ernst Friedrich Schumacher 
enunciated the idea of natural capital, which was picked up again by Paul Hawken, Amory 
Lovins and Hunter Lovins at the end of the twentieth century and expanded into the notion of 
natural capitalism.397 They framed it within the notion of eco-efficiency – how to make sense of 
nature by making money – and by arguing that environmental sensitivity is so necessary to 
shareholders that for the sake of business, corporations should be careful not to miss out.398 
 
Natural capitalism did not refer to capitalism as being a natural phenomenon to humanity, as it 
was misunderstood at the time, but as something embedded in the trading of nature. This vision 
implies that nature has its own assets waiting for human stewards to make the most of them. In 
the aftermath of the 2007 financial crisis, after Tercek and others started to translate the idea 
into what could become a new bubble, 39 global financial institutions signed the Natural Capital 
Declaration (NCD), establishing natural capital as an overarching financial framework in 2012. 
This coalition of interests made the connection between the construction of nature and the 
creation of value more explicit when they changed name to the ‘Natural Capital Finance 
Alliance’ (NFCA) to better represent ‘how they engage and collaborate with financial institutions 
                                                
394 Ibid, 171. 
395 Ibid, 167-178. 
396 Pierre Bourdieu, ‘The Forms of Capital, in Handbook of Theory and Research for the Sociology of Education, ed. 
John G. Richardson (New York: Greenwood, 1986), 241-242. 
397 Ernst Friedrich Schumacher, Small is Beautiful: A Study of Economics As If People Mattered (London: Vintage 
Books, 1993), Introduction; Paul Hawken, Amory Lovins and Hunter Lovins, Natural Capitalism: Creating the Next 
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and better understand natural capital risks, pursue opportunities and establish the foundation for 
resilient long-term economic growth that protects nature and societies’.399  
 
Extracting capital from nature requires a slightly different language from the negative 
scaremongering of disaster mitigation or raising awareness about endangered species. Instead, 
natural capital and biodiversity markets offer a more positive battle that sees restoration as a 
moral imperative. It highlights potential benefits rather than mourning effective losses. In order 
to attract shareholders and investors, key species or landscapes come to the fore, but it is not 
the most iconic and charismatic species that mobilise mitigation actions (such as the more 
public campaigns to protect endangered elephants, pandas, or blue whales on the verge of 
extinction). It is mostly ‘ugly’ and ‘unpopular’ creatures, many amphibious, who are the new 
protagonists of speculation on natural capital investments. Species, but also spaces, that are 
hard to define, unappealing, and ‘non-exotic’ to the populist Western eye like rats, worms, frogs, 
fungi, insects, and bacteria, and impenetrable, uninhabitable, degraded spaces like swamps, 
vernal pools, wetlands, marshes, and mangroves.  
 
Despite not being popular in Western ‘zoo culture’, these ‘useless’ species and ‘unproductive’ 
spaces are the most efficient and diverse actors in providing environmental services to 
speculate on. Their environmental restoration capacity is such that their multi-scalar effect on 
the biodiversity chain can provide even further economic exchange. Furthermore, the reason 
why such liminal creatures and spaces provide the largest profit margin can be attributed to the 
ambiguity of their circumstances: they can accommodate multiple properties and characteristics 
at the same time, precisely because of the impossibility to measure their extent or clearly 
classify their actions: they inhabit both land and water, brackish and fresh, above ground and 
underground, dark and light, aerobic and anaerobic realms. They exist at boundaries and are 
adapted to either side of a limit.  
 
Quantifying the contribution of wetlands to the environment is highly contestable, as no scientific 
metric system has been formulated yet. The accumulation of value around landscape units, 
especially in the American context, is still at odds with the ways in which environmental services 
are taking advantage of it. Paradoxically, even if restoration programs and protection areas 
have rapidly expanded, the net loss of wetland acreage has considerably increased and 
wetlands are more endangered today than they have been for decades.400 As an example of 
such regulatory failures, a project appraisal undertaken in Oregon found that for 58 permits 
issued between 1977 and 1988, which degraded 74 ha of wetland, only 42 ha of wetland were 
actually created.401 Likewise, in Florida, the Department of Environmental Regulation (DER) 
                                                
399 ‘Natural Capital Finance Alliance,’ 26 October 2016, http://www.naturalcapitalfinancealliance.org/2016/10/natural-
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found out that of 199 wetland creation projects launched under 63 permits between 1985 and 
1990, the success rate for tidal and freshwater wetlands was 44% and 12%, respectively.402  
 
It is not entirely clear what the actual acreage of existing wetlands is in the US. Theoretically the 
Army Corps of Engineers regulatory program quantifies the extent of wetlands permitted to be 
destroyed and the amount of mitigation required to replace them. However, Julie Sibbing 
remarks that the problem with the Corps’ data is that it accounts for all forms of ‘mitigation’. 
They put together the creation and restoration of former wetlands and the preservation and 
enhancement of existing wetlands or even upland buffers, which do not always result in actual 
gains of wetland acreage; for example, if a permit is granted to develop a 10 acre wetland in 
exchange for 20 acres of existing wetlands that are donated to a park district, the database 
would show this as a 10 acre gain, when in actuality the result is a net loss of 10 acres.403  
 
Protecting wetlands has in fact accelerated their disappearance, even as the forces of 
financialisation are masquerading the total as a net positive.404 Although the Clean Water Act 
and the Swampbuster disincentive provision of the Farm Bill protect wetlands in the US, every 
year thousands of acres of swamps and marshes are legally destroyed and converted into golf 
courses, shopping malls, and other forms of dry, lucrative ground.405 No Net Loss policies are 
based on a series of misleading concepts that have contributed to this situation: that all the 
functions and values of natural wetlands can be replaced and that the success of restoration 
can be evaluated in the short term. But despite the exponential loss of wetlands, there has been 
a growth of mitigation banks: in 1992 there were only 46 banks in the US compared to 219 in 
2001, 450 in 2005, and over 1,800 banks in 2013.406 
 
The so-called ‘restoration economy’ is estimated at $25 billion and relies on the USACE for the 
calculation of environmental value and the demarcation of spatial margins.407 The case of the 
Fort Worth District of the Corps in Texas is remarkable for the way in which they implemented 
the arithmetic of environmental credits. Given that wetlands are more expensive to restore than 
streams, credit buyers were using wetlands to offset streams and make higher profit margins 
than using streams to offset streams. The USACE realised that changing the policy to require 
developers to purchase stream restoration-based mitigation to ensure compliance would result 
in wetland bankers losing revenues. Therefore, they introduced a new 50-50 rule, whereby half 
of offsetting credits must come from a stream-based bank, while the other half can come from 
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any other aquatic-based restoration.408 The vision of ecology that the USACE put forward 
consisted in a compromise between the built and the natural environment by drawing a middle 
line to satisfy both environmentalists and developers.  
 
Another controversial case took place in 2011, when Pioneer Reserve LLC, a wetlands 
mitigation bank in Alaska, challenged the scientific objectivity of the US Army Corps of 
Engineers in court.409 Its founder, Scott W. Walther, had previously agreed with the USACE that 
165.8 acres of the Little Susitna River bank, located in the Matanuska-Susitna Borough outside 
Anchorage, could be turned into a wetlands ecosystem equivalent to 151.81 mitigation credits. 
In this case, the Alaska Railroad was looking to purchase credits that would compensate for the 
damage done by their new lines across the state, legally offsetting their action by conserving the 
Little Susitna River bank. But the USACE unexpectedly recalculated the numbers a year after 
the agreement and downgraded the initial 151.81 compensation credits to only 16.92.410 Given 
that each credit was initially worth $79,000, Pioneer Reserve LLC immediately lost $10.6 
million. The Army Corps argued that they had misidentified the type of landscape and, since it 
was not a binding agreement, they were entitled to reassess the material character of the 
wetlands. According to their new research, the wetlands were palustrine (meaning that they 
lacked flowing water), contained ocean-derived salts in concentrations of less than 0.5 parts per 
thousand, and were actually non-tidal.411  
 
Objectivity in the measurement of the multi-functionality of a wetland and its inhabitants is 
obviously challenging. However, the problem is not the accuracy of the quantification, but rather 
the need for another approach that challenges the financialisation of the environment. As 
Morgan Robertson states, the problem of measurement presumes that there is a priori no room 
for science as a shifting and constructed set of knowledges, and yet, the degree to which 
scientists can define nature as a stable external presence is the degree to which it can be 
rendered as a commodity and sold in markets.412 Furthermore, not only have banking 
institutions not settled upon a system of measurement, but they have not even agreed upon 
what the commodity is that they wish to measure.413 Standardised functional measurements, 
known as Rapid Assessment Methods (RAMs), have proliferated since the early 1980s. RAMs 
are sets of algorithms created by wetland scientists that use easily-measured characteristics 
(plant diversity or water levels) to make inferences about harder-to-measure ‘wetland functions’ 
(habitat provision, peak flow attenuation).414 These algorithms translate an empirical observation 
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(25% canopy cover) into a score (0.5).415 In November 1995, the USACE, the Environmental 
Protection Agency, and three other federal agencies jointly issued a report titled Federal 
Guidance for the Establishment, Use, and Operation of Mitigation Banks (Guidance).416 
However, the regulation is insufficient for evaluating the multiple and complex relational 
conditions across nonhumans in a wetland. USACE has chosen to use area, and not function, 
to quantify impact on a site: functions are measured in the imprecise but easy-to-use proxy unit 
of the acre.417  
 
It has become more and more apparent that surface area is inadequate to measure an 
offsetting operation. Compensatory restoration programmes measured in acres try to replicate 
the system of equivalent metrics of a tonne of CO2 pollution in the trading of carbon emissions. 
However, even carbon offsetting, which is also meant to be an objective calculus, has variable 
interpretations that depend on the resolution of the ruler. For instance, the amount of carbon 
that offshore wind farms can offset depends on the accuracy in the calculation of the electricity 
that is lost in the production or distribution of renewable energy. As electricity losses have 
different degrees of strength on their route from the production site to the domestic sphere, it is 
questionable to what extent the kilowatt-hours of energy produced in an offshore wind farm can 
be objectively converted into exact tonnes of CO2. It can significantly vary depending on the 
definition of the efficiency scale, and whether the single windmill or the entire power supply are 
considered. In an interview with climate bond analyst Claudius Kirchhoff, he acknowledged how 
global markets generally quantify only primary or secondary losses that take place in turbines; 
and leave out tertiary losses happening in the distribution networks, which would simply 
complicate the calculation.418  
 
There have been many attempts to quantify the units of offsets. The UN Framework Convention 
on Climate Change (UNFCCC) set standards for carbon trading as a way to solve climate 
change by offsetting damage. The Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD) tried to do the 
same. But contrary to the apparent simplicity of carbon schemes, the value of wetlands, 
biodiversity, and landscape loss is even more intricate to analyse than a tonne of CO2. Aiming 
to achieve an accurate system of measurement does nothing but complicate and perpetuate the 
ethical challenges of valuing nature. Initiatives like the New York City Street Tree Map, which 
map and assess the value of the ecosystem services provided by each of the 683,241 trees in 
New York City at $111,083,333.31, not only legitimise the destruction of the environment, but 
also masquerade it under a community-oriented grassroots initiative.419 The false idea that they 
constitute an ‘urban forest’ is helping developers to greenwash their activity and generates even 
more profit out of the environment. 
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2.4 Ambiguities of Demarcation at the European Investment Bank 
Trading in natural capital and mitigation banking in the US is being adopted by European 
institutions but adjusted to a more ‘sustainable’ approach in different pilot projects. The term has 
moved away from mitigation into better-sounding habitat banking. The US idea of No Net Loss 
was translated to become Net Gain for its European counterpart. The site of enquiry chosen for 
the practice-based research of this section was the European Investment Bank (EIB) in 
Luxembourg, the issuer of the most green bonds in the world (valued at €60 billion), which is 
currently in charge of discussing the international standard metrics for offsetting credits.420  
 
Fieldwork and production took place while in residence at their headquarters (see Project 
Dossier 2). The project was presented and installed in the atrium, and the residency period also 
facilitated access to some of the 2,000 EIB employees (investors, bond issuers, analysts, 
policy-makers). In an interview with Senior Environment and Biodiversity Specialist Eva 
Mayerhofer, she stated how offsetting mechanisms are the way to balance the social value of 
development with the environmental value of the landscape.421 Her vision is that without a price 
tag on nature – i.e. a valuation of a forest at €1 million or 10,000 credits in certain scale – local 
developers and decision-makers will not consider its preservation. For her, figures and metrics 
are required to understand the impact of certain actions, as the moment land is not protected is 
when it can be degraded. Mayerhofer also made it clear that contrary to common criticism, No 
Net Loss does not necessarily equal free license to offset.  
 
After different interviews and conversations with EIB analysts, the idea of the lesser evil for the 
compensation of unprotected landscapes can be summarised in three controversies around 
ambiguity: 
a. Metrics: After a series of difficult meetings and workshops aiming to achieve the EU 
Biodiversity Strategy 2020 with participants such as European policymakers, investors, 
developers, the European Landowners Associations, cement producers association, ports, 
NGOs, and environmental activists, the EU has still not agreed on common standards for 
quantifying the value and cost of biodiversity.422 Despite the EU’s commitment to reach an 
agreement by 2015, controversies around how and whether to assign value to landscapes – 
namely, which units measure ecology – have delayed the entire process. So far, the German 
restoration system that incorporates the idea of Ausgleichsregelung is the best reputed in terms 
of existing frameworks. It works in surface terms: 1 hectare of destroyed wetland is to be 
mitigated by 1 hectare of restored landscape. The case of the Bremerhaven wetlands 
restoration (2006) was offered as a pioneering reference of successful habitat banking. 
Nonetheless, there are not yet any cases of fully restored landscapes, as it takes 20-25 years 
for that to happen. In other words, habitat banking has no complete evidence of its 
effectiveness. 
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b. Control codes: Mayerhofer stated that ‘it is easier to do mitigation banking in 
developing countries, because there is no regulation’.423 While she laughed when saying it, the 
implication is that habitat banking, in its ambition to do good, to a certain extent takes 
advantage of still-colonial relationships in the financial sphere. The ideal model is considered to 
be the offsetting project run by Rio Tinto Mining Corporation in Madagascar, which has been 
offered as a poster child to show how the destruction of coastal mangroves can be 
compensated and restored through the creation of an ecological corridor elsewhere in the area. 
Furthermore, to control the perverse ethics of mitigation banking, an external third party is 
required to audit the process, like the EU Emissions Trading Scheme or the UN Environment 
Programme's World Conservation Monitoring Centre. Similarly, quality certifications like the 
Forest Stewardship Council (FSCTM), one of the world’s leading standards for responsible forest 
management, has been criticised for conflicts of interest, as their certifying agents are paid by 
the companies applying for certification. In order to be hired for future projects, it is in the 
assessors’ interest to not be too difficult. FSC positively certifies industrial monoculture tree 
plantations that have logged primary forests as ‘well managed’ despite the negative impact of 
clearance on the environment and local residents.424 
c. Responsibility: The main enemy of wetlands is not agriculture itself, but agricultural 
policies and subsidies from the EU, which are the main contributors to wetland drainage for land 
‘improvement’. The balance of authority in the European Parliament exposes the friction 
between preservation and destruction: the Commission for Agriculture and Rural Development 
has more power and budget than the Commission for the Environment. Hence, the outcome of 
the policies of the one and the other are biased to one side.425 In sum, uncoordinated efforts 
between departments are increasing the need for offsetting as part of the so-called ‘biodiversity 
strategy’. 
 
These three types of ambiguity reduce biodiversity to the leftovers of a clash between land 
speculation and financialised ecology. This especially applies to the Spanish littoral and the way 
the management of the coast depends on the value of the landscape. The processes of land 
and ocean grabbing are explicit in the way biodiversity is traded, as was clear in the frictions 
between the beetle and the seagrass described in the prologue.  
 
The clash of powers between the simultaneously destructive and restorative agency of the 
USACE and the EU has their equivalent in the naming of Spanish Ministries. The word 
‘environment’ as an institutional term first appeared in Spain in 1972, in the form of a 
commission within the Ministries of Public Infrastructures and Civil Works. In 1996, the 
conservative party created the Ministry for the Environment, as part of one of the most 
aggressive and pro-speculation land laws in the history of the country, which reclassified 
wildland into building land and used protection to disguise destruction. In 2007 the EU 
Environmental Liability Directive arrived in Spain bringing habitat banking, together with the first 
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plan to organise natural resources.426 In 2008 the socialist party combined the Ministry of 
Agriculture, Fisheries, and Food and the Ministry for the Environment into a single entity: the 
Ministry for the Environment, and Rural and Marine Life. Even if this Ministry is separated into a 
Secretary for Climate Change and a Secretary for Rural and Water Affairs, the attempt to 
distance itself from explicit agribusiness interests brought criticism for putting both sectors 
together behind a green curtain.427 In 2011 the Ministry was renamed again, this time as the 
‘Ministry of Agriculture, Food, and Environment’, openly returning to the economic interests in 
agribusiness over environmental concerns. The same conservative party in the following 
administration incorporated fisheries into the Ministry, renaming the institution for the third time 
in less than a decade, this time as the ‘Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries, Food, and 
Environment’. The natural capital of the oceans thus entered the frontier of value extraction.  
 
In order to investigate the link between real estate and habitat restoration, the practical project 
at the EIB reconsidered the notion of speculation by exposing some of the most-banked species 
to the analysts who were devising plans to financially regulate their endangerment. The main 
finding was that mitigation banking depends not only on the perpetuation of the possibility of 
extinction, but it also needs to keep that risk circulating in a profitable economic loop. Whereas 
the USACE and US mitigation banks depend on each other, in the case of the EU, it is the EIB 
that plays both roles in one. Mitigation or biodiversity banks in the US follow federal policy but 
have a clear orientation towards their private clients; whereas, the European Investment Bank is 
a semi-public entity whose ultimate client are the different EU states, concentrating both policy- 
and profit-making under the same roof. Given that habitat banking is less developed in Europe 
and that the EIB is something of a public bank supported by European nation-states, it is in a 
unique position to rethink the environmental terms of such transactions from a less 
commercially-driven approach and has the potential to project a radically different agenda. Its 
challenge remains how to critically use the consolidation of power at the EIB to benefit ecology. 
 
The final installation at the EIB in effect brought the most-banked species into the financial 
institution that regulates their value. The project involved first identifying the animals in order to 
reproduce their coos, growls, hee-haws, chirps, and twitters in the atrium of the headquarters of 
the EIB. According to the Ecosystem Marketplace Network – one of the reference indexes for 
mitigation banks, devised by Forest Trends, alongside its sister online site SpeciesBanking.com 
– the top seven most-banked species in the world in June 2016 were: vernal pool fairy shrimp 
(Branchinecta lynchi), California tiger salamander (Ambystoma californiense), vernal pool 
tadpole shrimp (Lepidurus packardi), Swainson’s hawk (Buteo swainsoni), coastal California 
gnatcatcher (Polioptila californica californica), San Joaquin kit fox (Vulpes macrotis mutica), and 
the western burrowing owl (Athene cunicularia hypugaea). This list, in which six of the seven 
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are state- and federally-listed endangered and threatened animals of California, indicates that 
these species inhabit three kinds of liminal spaces:  
a) Vernal pools, or small, shallow seasonal wetlands that appear and disappear according 
to rainfall and that, since the 1990s, have been well publicised as the sole home for 
certain amphibians suffering a worldwide decline;428  
b) Coastal sage scrub, which is found on sites valuable for real estate development and 
therefore vulnerable to common fires, many times intentional, that can wipe it out 
entirely and make space for new developments; and 
c) Grasslands, which have been turned into farming areas, and fragment their habitats. 
 
These endangered species inhabit spaces that have been labelled as ‘unproductive’ in order to 
legitimise their destruction. However, after the real estate bubble collapsed, the same forces 
that had previously pushed out their animal and plant inhabitants have shifted their 
understanding of the space and begun to build value out of their disappearance—not by means 
of buildings, but through financial transactions. Hence, the construction of disappearance itself 
has become crucial to this new form of speculation. More importantly, the extreme variability of 
the spatial margins of these unstable habitats has been turned into an environmental asset. 
Their constant fluctuation indeed provides for more profitable ecosystem services to trade with. 
Hence, according to that market logic, investors need species and spaces to be perpetually 
disappearing in order to continue being profitable: the more complex and difficult to define the 
endangered habitat is, the more assets and revenue can be produced in their changing 
definition. Contrary to a Darwinian evolution of species, in order to survive, banked species 
have to remain under threat of extinction.  
 
Under the title Speculations on Disappearance, the sound installation was constructed at the 
EIB in summer 2016. The top banked species unexpectedly emitted their sounds in the six-floor 
atrium. As part of capturing a representative sound for each species, the project was challenged 
to choose a single, specific sound to each of them. As in the case of the very vocal California 
Gnatcatcher, its pitch and song vary depending on gender and the point of time in mating 
season, and other sounds indicate nesting, call for food, feeding time, alarm, territorial disputes 
with adversary males, distress calls, mobs, sunrise or midday, etc. The specificities of the 
warbling, rasping, clucking, screaming, or rattling served as a tool to make more explicit the 
contradictions around the calculation of the average value of a habitat for banking purposes. 
The choosing of sounds sought to increase the complexity of quantifying environmental value 
and raised the question of whether the spatial margins of a dwelling space corresponded with or 
fluctuated in proportion to the reach of a bird’s voice throughout the day, year, or life cycle.  
 
Apart from raising ethical questions, sound compilation as a method also allowed the research 
to unpack and understand the very functioning of the EIB. The regulations around the 
production of the sound piece meant that the noise disturbance and frequency in the atrium 
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could not bother the staff ‘too much’. When employees walked past the EIB atrium and heard a 
couple of seconds of a high-pitched distress whistle, they thought birds had entered the building 
through the all-too-smart automatic roof openings that regulate temperature without mechanical 
heating or cooling systems. Bird removal had become a common task for housekeepers and a 
spectacle for workers watching them be removed from the building without hurting them. Some 
employees were worried that the live animals could not fly back out again, others were 
indifferent, and still others were excited by the possibility of seeing a live bird they can only 
experience from afar or calculate in figures. These different reactions expose the techno-
ecological failures of the building while opening up discussions around how and if to regulate 
species banking between workers from different departments. 
 
Processes dependent on the endangerment of spaces and species, as stated in the 
introduction, can be framed as what Bram Büscher and Robert Fletcher describe as capitalist 
accumulation by conservation: a mode of accumulation that takes the negative environmental 
impacts of contemporary capitalism as the basis for a newfound ‘sustainable’ model of 
accumulation for the future.429 It is this fictitious kind of conservation and commodification that 
perpetuates the circulation of interests or assets that sustain capitalism. In this process, 
compensatory mitigation or habitat banking relies on losses being classified as ‘unavoidable’, 
and on wetlands and species being converted into credits that can be withdrawn to offset 
debits.430  
 
The question of who is the best judge to assess these wetlands is at the core of the struggle to 
define the public interest and understand its instrumentalisation for monetary purposes. In some 
extreme cases, the assessment has been opened to auctions, allegedly to increase the 
commitment to environmental preservation; for example, in the 2001 BushTender experiment in 
Australia, landholders bid for the commission to improve the quality and extent of native 
vegetation.431 Environmental protection is used as a way to gamble with environmental 
destruction and vice versa. The challenge is how to take the idea of offsetting and ambiguity 
and use them instead as a form of resistance, as will be explored in the next chapter. 
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PROJECT 
DOSSIER 
2
Building on the ideas developed on Chapter 2, the appropriation of the notion of disappearance 
by financial interests is also reshaping and reshuffling coastal inhabitation. The object of the 
shoreline functions again as an object of inquiry that makes clear how the crisis of housing can 
be analysed through the structures that financially engineer the demarcation of the coast as a 
system of capital flows that take environmental risk as a token for real estate speculative action. If 
the first chapter dealt with the Spanish context and the impossibility of using current methods and 
conceptual frameworks to demarcate its present extent, Chapter 2 deals more with the uncertainty 
of the future projection of the shoreline. In the case of Hurricane Katrina, insurance companies 
are shaping the actual extent of the sea to reduce their liability in the case of ‘natural disaster’. 
Similarly, in the case of Kivalina, Alaska, it is the future projection of the coastline, and all the 
environmental assessment reports and evacuation works potentially needed, what has created a 
whole economy around projected catastrophes. As part of the practice, it proofed very useful to 
compare fieldwork in the Spanish and the US contexts, given that the Spanish case has begun to 
incorporate US models of capitalisation on coastal space and can shed light onto how the models 
from the American continent could be copied in Europe if neoliberal powers carry on with their 
current trajectory. Therefore, it is crucial to learn from their failures to anticipate and envision other 
alternative scenarios for the making of housing along the Spanish coast without being immersed 
in legitimising any decisions for the sake of climate change or sea level rise. 
This second Project Dossier is subdivided into three subsections. The first two compile the 
project developed in Kivalina (2F & 2G). New techniques of modelling space were developed 
to map the conflict around the demarcation of the shoreline. They required incorporating flexible 
understandings of thinking of the actual boundary between land and sea in order to deconstruct 
the violence that still-colonial forms of mapping inflict upon coastal Inupiaq residents. The 
modelling techniques eventually exposed the interests behind the US Army Corps of Engineers 
in exaggerating flood threats to perpetuate the littoral risk economy. In the third subsection (2H), 
disappearance is investigated through non-human species inhabiting the coast. Working from 
within the European Investment Bank in Luxembourg, which regulates the financial value of the 
protection (and endangerment) of coastal animal residents, the sound installation in the atrium 
worked as an experimental catalyst for opening up the discussions in the institution. Like the 
Kivalina models that we took to officers in Alaska, the sound beats at the EIB started also to 
make visible the four-dimensional construction of boundaries that should expand the current flat 
mapping of limits and rethink dwelling from another perspective different from one-dimensional 
zoning.
Project Dossier 2
F/ Modelling Kivalina
A collaborative project by Andrea Bagnato, Daniel Fernández Pascual, Helene Kazan, Hannah 
Meszaros Martin, and Alon Schwabe. Kivalina, AK, 2013.
As unpacked in Chapter 2, the publication of the 2009 ‘Alaska Baseline Erosion Assessment 
Report’ introduced a new perception of the demarcated shoreline in the way coastal threat was 
created to provide mitigation responses. Environmental responsibility and coastal inhabitation 
were put at the forefront of a new war on climate administered through housing ‘solutions’ for 
the Inupiaq population. Our project required alternative modelling processes to investigate the 
challenges put on residents along the shores of Kivalina, AK. They included different ways 
of modelling the contested objected of the shoreline as an assemblage of power in order to 
investigate how and whether decisions had been indirectly driven by profit margins. First, a 
disassembling model of the barrier island of Kivalina was built as a conversational device for a 
series of interviews (Figs. 118-122); then, the model was used to conduct and model interviews in 
real time in Alaska and understand territorial distortions according to the interviewee (Figs. 123-
139); and finally, the interviews were translated onto comparative diagrammatic representations 
of lexicon and places to understand how the same terms meant sometimes completely opposite 
things (Figs. 140-145). ‘Subsistence,’ ‘risk’, ‘season’, ‘land’, ‘water’, ‘inhabitation’ or ‘coastline’ had 
very different meanings for governmental bodies and for residents in Kivalina according to their 
own agendas or cosmogonies.
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118-120: The model of Kivalina was produced 
in seven cross-sections of the terrain containing 
detachable pieces that could facilitate 
conversations around the current extent of the 
solid ground in summer (plexi), houses (plexi 
cubes), property lines (etching), shoreline 
demarcations from past decades and future 
projections (copper wire), geological layers and 
permafrost (felt, foam, mesh), movement of sea 
elements (marbles), and winter layer of snow 
(white felt).
Project Dossier 2
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121-122: Use of the model indoor and 
outdoor. Preparing for interviews with 
residents at the community centre in 
Kivalina, where the base blank canvas 
allowed to extend the space represented 
in the model (top); and the model by the 
melting glacier outside Anchorage, on a 
site visit with Michael Brubaker (bottom). 
Both July 2013.
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123-132: Interaction with the model during interviews. Left column top to bottom: Susan Bell and Scott Ruby, 
Department of Commerce, Community, and Economic Development  - Division of Community and Regional 
Affairs (10/07/2013); Mike McKinnan, Denali Commission (10/07/2013); Kivalina City Council and Kivalina City 
Council meeting detail (16/07/2013); Kivalina Emergency shelter public event (24/07/2013). Right column top to 
bottom: Larry Hartig and John Madden, Alaska Department of Environmental Conservation (11/07/2013); Dianne 
Soderlund, Catherine Villa, Michelle Davis, Tribal Trust and Assistance Unit - Office of Ecosystems, Tribal and 
Public Affairs (11/07/2013); Julie Kitka, Alaska Federation of Natives (31/07/2013); and Sally Cox, Department of 
Commerce, Community, and Economic Development  - Division of Community and Regional Affairs (10/07/2013).
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133-135: The model during individual 
interviews conducted in the community 
centre of Kivalina with residents. It became 
necessary to considerably expand the 
realm of representation by adding a white 
blank canvas underneath and draw or build 
ad hoc elements and props throughout 
the conversations (lasting between 30 min 
to 2,5 hours). The method to map each 
conversation in real time worked best 
when 1-2 people were in charge of asking 
questions and 1-2 people simultaneously 
taking care of the visualisation of facts, 
places, tools, and time frames.
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136-137: Boat field trip to the 
coastal lagoon of Kivalina and 
up the river to visit the fishing 
areas and the structures to dry 
fish, where summer seasonal 
camps used to be located (top two 
images).
138-139: Improvised roulette 
with the different hunting, fishing, 
and foraging seasons built for 
the interviews in Kivalina, to 
better understand and visualise 
the overlap of food seasons 
throughout the year, and how 
they have been changing in the 
past decades (which seasons 
are starting earlier or later 
than others). There is no clear 
beginning or end between them; 
but the perception of time is a 
result of how different animals 
and plants organise the dietary 
cycle throughout the year. This 
became a useful resource to track 
climate transformations in the past 
decade.
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140-141: Processing the data from the 
interviews onto baseline maps, where the real 
time visualisations are drawn and compared 
more easily. 
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142-143: Combination of 
the data gathered from the 
interviews with topographical 
digital basemaps, contested 
objects and entities around 
the shifting shoreline, and 
the lexicon used on each 
interview with the most 
repeated terms and how 
they relate to the spaces 
mentioned throughout each 
conversation.
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144: The coast of Kivalina, 
aerial view of the tundra and 
the rich water system in the 
summer, before landing. July 
2013.
145: Results of the modelling 
process. Final public event in 
Kivalina, 27 July 2013.
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G/ Kivalina, The Coming Storm
Film by Modelling Kivalina working group: Andrea Bagnato, Daniel Fernández Pascual, Helene 
Kazan, Hannah Meszaros Martin, Alon Schwabe (UK, 2014, 36:35). In collaboration with: 
Re-Locate. With the support of: The World Justice Project Opportunity Fund 2013; Forensic 
Architecture; Goldsmiths University of London; and Haus der Kulturen der Welt, Berlin.
The Coming Storm is a visual investigation of the shoreline in Kivalina narrated through a selection 
of excerpts of the interviews carried out in Alaska during fieldwork in summer 2013. Kivalina is an 
Inupiaq village of 400 people situated on a barrier island in the Arctic, on the northwest coast of 
Alaska. In recent years, climate change has delayed the formation of sea ice, exposing the shore 
to autumnal sea storms, allegedly placing the existence of Kivalina increasingly under threat. The 
lack of basic infrastructure compounded by erosion and flooding, has pushed the village to seek 
relocation; a desire exacerbated by a series of scientific reports after calculating the projection of 
the future shoreline. In 2006 Kivalina sued the 24 largest oil and gas corporations, maintaining 
that they should be held accountable for the consequences of greenhouse gas emissions—and 
the disappearance of the ice layer that used to form in winter along the island—and therefore 
contribute to relocation costs. Following the failure of the legal forum to address Kivalina’s 
claims and the standstill of governmental relocation attempts, the project conducted a series 
of interviews with village residents, scientists, and political representatives to envision a new 
negotiation platform. 
The film itself explores the way imminent risk and infrastructural solutions have gone hand in 
hand and how environmental responsibility is constantly offset. The moving image features 
a compilation of scenes shot from 23:55 to 00:05 in the midnight summer sun, taken while at 
Kivalina. It is not the sunset but the clock what regulates time differences on site. Each shot blurs 
the horizon line from one day to the next by having the camera in the same position. Very little 
changes appear on camera, mostly weather variations, sky colours, cloud formations or wave 
patterns in the Chukchi Sea. The film is shot looking out onto the coming storms and the local 
fear derived from the failed seawall revetment built by the US Army Corps of Engineers that 
effectively ‘unprotected’ the coast. The voice over is a mix of recollections that dismantles the 
single narrative in place: that the shoreline is naturally eroding and that the village of Kivalina is 
going to disappear. The risk assessment economy has turned people into figures that matter less 
than boundaries, as residents became financial instruments to bargain mega-scale engineering 
efforts to keep a line in (a certain) place. The film intentionally avoids depicting human faces 
and focuses instead on the blurry lines of the sea to map the four-dimensional condition of the 
littoral and how a multiplicity of narratives need to reinvent inhabitation along the barrier island of 
Kivalina.
Accessible at: https://vimeo.com/155541333
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146-147: The Coming Storm, 2014. 
Film stills.
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H/ Speculations on Disappearance
Site-specific sound installation by the author and Alon Schwabe; in collaboration with Borja V. 
Conde. European Investment Bank, Luxembourg, 2016. 
Unexpected coos, growls, hee-haws, chirps, and twitters are permanently audible in the six-
storey high atrium of the EIB. They are emitted by the most banked species in the world: the 
new subjects of a financial bubble that extracts and trades value from endangered species, 
while legitimising the offsetting of environmental damage derived from urban development. 
Similar to how insurance companies push the shoreline in its demarcation landward, coastal 
preservation zones are allocated to regulate the endangerment of non-human inhabitants. They 
vocalize the emergence of the fictitious accumulation of (natural) capital. This planetary financial 
enterprise relies on the double meaning of banking: to generate profit (through investments) and 
to protect for future use. In the atrium as in the great outdoors, there is no need to know which 
animal produces each sound we hear. That is the winsomeness of the forest: the unexpected, 
unpredictable, unreliable, unforeseeable presence of an animal, right behind you. It is perhaps 
the non-knowing of species that makes them commodities. By playing into the tension in which 
a recording of animal noises both familiarizes and obscures their existence, the installation 
opens the door for a different conservation that deconstructs hyper-quantification. It replaces 
resources and services with the incalculable. From the origin of No Net Loss to profiting from 
bio-assets, what has emerged is a new green space race through a wilderness of investment. 
Eco-utilities and forest bonds are boosting the neoliberal quantification of space and determining 
how it is classified and demarcated. But the most-banked spaces and species should not have 
been commodified in the first place (and thus should cease to be banked) and environmental 
offsetting as a practice, bank-rupted. The coos, chirps, and twitter of the inhabitants of forests, 
prairies, swamps, and mangroves have to become louder to prevent humans from endangering 
their existence or nettifiying their numbers.
148-150: Installation view. EIB atrium where the sounds would 
occassionally make the world’s most banked species present, June 2016.
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151: Ugland House, where 18,857 offshore ‘shell’ 
companies are registered under the same address, 
George Town, Grand Cayman, 2015. Despite 
this annomaly, interviewees commonly repeated 
over fieldwork that the Cayman Islands ‘strongly 
adheres to international anti-money laundering 
and anti-terrorist financing standards’. The Ugland 
House is often compared with 1209 North Orange 
Street, Wilmington, Delaware, a similar address 
with over 285,000 companies registered in it.
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3– OFFSHORE 
Housing As Financial Littoral: 
The Real Properties of Immovable Estates 
 
‘Aqui, onde a terra se acaba e o mar começa…’ 
[Here, where the land ends and the sea begins...] 
 
—Luís de Camões, commemorative inscription at the 
Cabo da Roca lighthouse outside Lisbon, designed in 
1758 (three years after the tsunami), and built at the 
westernmost point of continental Europe. 
 
 
3.1 From Owning the Shore to Offshore Ownership 
The financial nature of housing in a neoliberal system has atomised the house object into 
smaller instruments to speculate upon (liabilities, credits, mortgages, shares, equity, securities, 
etc). Hence, this chapter tackles the housing problem and the failures of housing policy from 
within the problematic of that financialisation process. In other words, how the condition of the 
offshore—the financial space beyond the physical and regulatory end of the state which 
operates at an extra-state level—is entangled with the consequences of the crisis, but has also 
allowed for resistance attempts that precisely started on the shores of the pre-established 
system as a way to bypass it. The offshore is, by definition, a space situated at a distance from 
the shore, and thus at a distance from the social provisions traditionally provided by the state. 
Political economist Ronen Palan remarks how it is a secondary space, one that dominates 
international finance, trade, shipping, and telecommunications by differentiating the on-shore, a 
space subject to strict control, from the off-shore, a space with minimal state intervention.432 As 
of 2016, 60% of the world’s wealth is held in offshore jurisdictions, ranging from islands like the 
Bahamas, Bermuda and Jersey to offshore preferential tax regimes on-shore like Luxembourg, 
Delaware and the City of London. The Cayman Islands, for instance, hold around $1.7 trillion in 
banking assets.433 Buildings like the Ugland House, a small four-floor structure on the waterfront 
in George Town (the capital), serve as the registered address for almost 20,000 companies, 
including investment funds and capital market issuers (Fig. 151, previous page). The current 
vitality of offshore financial centres across the globe does not imply that the state is on the 
verge of disappearing; quite the opposite, these unregulated juridical spaces in which economic 
activities can develop more or less without hindrance seem more to reinforce the role of the 
state.434 In fact, the offshore is supported by the legal framework of the state system, and driven 
unwittingly by interstate competition.435 Furthermore, what distinguishes the offshore from other 
forms of international deregulation, is that: 
                                                
432 Ronen Palan, ‘The Emergence of an Offshore Economy,’ Futures 20 (1998): 63. 
433 ‘Cayman Offshore Banking,’ accessed 23 January 2017, https://www.cayman.com.ky/the-cayman-islands-a-
premiere-offshore-banking-center 
434 Ronen Palan, op. cit., 64. 
435 Jason P. Abbott and Mark P. Hampton, Offshore Finance Centers and Tax Havens: The Rise of Global Capital 
(Hampshire: Purdue University Press, 1999), 35. 
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[I]t drives economic activities into jurisdictions they should not have been in the first 
place. Strictly speaking, it does not make economic sense for the Cayman Islands to 
serve as the world’s fifth largest financial centre; […] and for the Marshall Islands, 
Vanuatu, or Liberia to be the world’s giant shipping nations. There is no obvious 
economic reason why small Pacific islands are at the forefront of the 
telecommunications revolution, nor why Guyana and Niue are the central rerouting 
areas for Internet porn. […] Offshore is therefore a form by which political and 
regulatory policies distort the relocation policies of international capital.436  
 
The offshore, a space both within and outside the law, is best represented by the idea of the 
flag of convenience: countries which offer their maritime flag registration to owners from other 
countries in exchange for low or non-existent taxes.437 That idea of convenience relies on 
remote, versatile places beyond the shores of the territory that sets the baseline reference, 
where governments sell sovereignty while declining or offsetting responsibility.438 The 
geographic distance that separates the onshore and the offshore allows for an intentionally 
ambiguous, malleable, and plastic juridical void, where restricted activities on one side are 
encouraged on the other. This chapter investigates the power contest between the shore and 
offsets by looking into the littoralisation of space. Following capital’s need for spaces of 
exception and exclusive economic zones, the offshore offers an opportunity for understanding 
contemporary forms of control and the abuse of power through the demarcation of space.439 At 
the same time, the simultaneous construction of profit and spatial margins sheds light on how 
the offshoring of ambiguity could become a form of resistance, precisely because of the multiple 
interpretations of a limit.  
  
In this regard, the littoral is intimately linked to the making of spaces of financial security and 
territorial exception. Contrary to associations between the offshore and the tax haven boom in 
the 1960-1980s, the offshore as an intentionally ambiguous space has operated for centuries. 
The extraction of overseas resources turned colonies into proto-offshore spaces, where 
otherwise forbidden behaviours and exchanges could easily occur both within and outside the 
law. However, transoceanic mobility between the onshore and the offshore was threatened by a 
series of forces, mainly piracy and wreckage, which pushed venture capitalists in large 
European harbour cities to develop complex insurance schemes. By spreading the risk of lost 
property, the probability of individual bankruptcy was considerably reduced. Some of the first 
European experiments in insurance were Genoa’s Lex Mercatoria regulations and Lloyd’s 
Coffee House (and later Register) in London, both of which attempted to manage risk and 
insurance and cover the potential loss of any fully loaded vessel overseas.440 While insurers 
developed abstract policies and financial tools against the potential damages of piracy, 
                                                
436 Ronen Palan, ‘The Emergence of an Offshore Economy,’ Futures 20 (1998): 64. 
437 Ibid, 69. 
438 Paul G. Buchanan, ‘Risk Assessment: Selling Sovereignty and Declining Responsibility. Flags of Convenience in the 
South Pacific,’ 36th Parallel, 28 Aug 2012, http://36th-parallel.com/2012/08/28/risk-assessment-selling-sovereignty-and-
declining-responsibility-flags-of-convenience-in-the-south-pacific/ 
439 Ronen Palan, op. cit., 69; Keller Easterling, Extrastatecraft: The Power of Infrastructure Space (London and New 
York: Verso, 2014), Chapter 1. 
440 Marine insurance schemes began applying ambiguity onto fire protection in the domestic realm after the 1666 Great 
Fire of London. This incident destroyed around 13,000 buildings in the city, leaving one sixth of the urban population 
homeless (80,000) and causing £8 million of damage. See Geoffrey Parker, Global Crisis: War, Climate Change and 
Catastrophe in the Seventeenth Century (Yale University Press, 2013).  
172 
governments hired those same pirates to attack the trading routes of neighbouring nations.441 
Rather than considering pirates, corsairs, buccaneers, and privateers as criminals, they were 
seen as both the ultimate enemy and the friend of all.442 They were agents of operational 
ambiguity, whereby international maritime powers like England, Portugal, and Spain could 
nominally respect peace agreements with each other while breaching them every time through 
outsourced attacks by privateers.  
 
Since the so-called Age of Exploration, distance from the onshore has coincided with the 
development of a visual representation of the littoral as seen from the sea, which was crucial for 
both navigation and cartography. As part of the securitisation of the shore, lighthouses that had 
been historically a defence against enemies, shifted to become optical and surveillance 
technology. They reduced the risk of wrecks by making the coast visible at night, during storms, 
or in misty weather. Portuguese writer Luís de Camões described the busy traffic in the Atlantic 
as a spectacle of the Machine of the World: an unprecedented era of shipping goods across the 
oceans.443 Camões’ Homeric-style work The Lusiads (1572) identifies the westernmost point on 
the shoreline of continental Europe as Cabo da Roca in Portugal, right outside Lisbon – that 
cape on the edge of the continent generated the illusion of a geographic limit to legality, as if the 
economic power structure within the European perimeter could be confined to it. ‘Where the 
land ends and the sea begins’ was chosen as the commemorative inscription to mark the 
outermost point in continental Europe. However, that is not necessarily true. Financial 
dispositifs, assets, investments, risks, uncertainties, and liabilities control and adapt the margins 
of the coast. The landward shoreline does not end where waves break on the beach; it 
stretches all the way to fluid offshore zones, where capital sits in ambiguous jurisdictions. The 
shoreline is an expanded buffer regulated by global finance. Its material composition includes 
grains of sand, silicates, and sea salt, but also data travelling in the form of electronic pulses 
through fibre optic submarine cables. These minerals that compose both the geological and 
electrical character of coastal margins turn the littoral into a liminal zone that does not end with 
Camões’ lighthouse; rather, it expands from the riverbanks of the City of London all the way to 
the Cayman Islands and beyond.  
 
Offshore spaces exist both overseas and within European shores, in places like Liechtenstein, 
or Andorra. But there are also hybrid spaces that act as intermediaries, between offshore and 
onshore, which have been designated as Outermost Regions (ORs) for the development of 
remote areas within the EU. ORs rather function as alongshore spaces that are autonomous 
and dependent at the same time. The Azores and Madeira for Portugal and the Canary Islands 
for Spain are examples of ORs. According to the EU, this special framework is meant to 
compensate for the geographical remoteness of these regions, as compared to the rest of the 
EU – for being too far from the shores of Europe.444 Nonetheless, the OR designation also 
                                                
441 Daniel Heller-Roazen, The Enemy of All: Piracy and the Law of Nations (Brooklyn: Zone Books, 2009), 178-180.  
442 Ibid. 
443 Luís de Camões, ‘The Lusiads,’ Chant X, accessed 26 June 2017, https://www.britannica.com/topic/The-Lusiads 
444 ‘Outermost Regions (ORs),’ European Parliament, accessed 23 March 2017, 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/atyourservice/en/displayFtu.html?ftuId=FTU_5.1.7.html 
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generates a very attractive and useful differential tax-regime that has created new circulation 
patterns for capital flows. Similarly, ‘Non-Self-Governing’ territories affiliated with European 
states, like Gibraltar and Turks and Caicos Islands, are trapped between full independence and 
postcolonial rule. After the recent financial crash, the reputation of offshore territories has begun 
to worsen. It is now clear that credit and mortgage institutions played an active role in provoking 
the crisis, in no small part by operating from offshore. As a result, global scrutiny has forced 
some offshore spaces to increasingly police and regulate their funds, or even further, it has 
forced onshore states to redefine what offshore space actually is. In 2007 Spain stopped 
considering Panama a designated tax haven, so that Spanish global construction and 
engineering corporations could continue to operate there without risking the label of ‘tax haven 
operator’.445 Under the controversial logic of double taxation agreements, this technical change 
in the definition of tax haven allowed for the same privileges to stay in place but now functioning 
more smoothly. Just by ceasing to refer to tax havens as tax havens, a series of offshore 
locations have disappeared from blacklists in the past five years: Dutch Antilles, Aruba, Cyprus, 
the United Arab Emirates, Hong Kong, the Bahamas, Barbados, Jamaica, Malta, Trinidad and 
Tobago, Luxembourg, San Marino, and Singapore. These changes follow the same logic as the 
Granadilla case from the prologue, where the government of the Canary Islands removed 
seagrass from their list of endangered species in order to legally destroy their coastal habitat.  
 
Offshore, overseas, and outermost constitute three spatial outcomes of an economy conceived 
around differential tax regimes that turn far away places into exceptional investment centres. 
They are spaces intimately linked to different systems of property ownership that take 
advantage of a simultaneously foreign and domestic condition.446 This has developed the 
relationship between housing and the shore into a new form of speculation, known as offshore 
ownership. In less than a decade, London has become an outstanding example of the 
proliferation of offshore ownership at a global level (Fig. 152). In Westminster – the UK’s richest 
borough – one in ten properties is held by an offshore company.447 Billions of pounds have been 
laundered by criminals and foreign officials through upmarket London properties bought and 
sold by anonymous offshore shell companies.448 As of 2016, 40,000 properties in London and 
almost 100,000 in the UK are owned by hidden companies offshore.449 In 2011 alone, more 
than £7 billion in offshore money was poured into Britain’s flats, houses, and office blocks. Of 
that, more than half – that is, £3.8 billion – of the transactions were through entities registered in 
the British Virgin Islands.450   
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449 Robert Booth, Helena Bengtsson and David Pegg, ‘Revealed: 9% Rise in London Properties Owned by Offshore 
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450 Editorial, ‘The Guardian View on Offshore Secrecy: Transparecy is Welcome But It’s Not a Housing Policy,’ The 
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152: Offshore ownership in London: The map 
shows all land and property registered in the 
name of an offshore company between 2005 
and July 2014. It uses data released following 
Freedom of Information. Freehold (in orange), 
and leasehold (in purple). Source: 
www.private-eye.co.uk/registry
48% of all London properties owned by offshore 
haven companies are in Westminster (11,457), 
and Kensington & Chelsea (5,836), UK Unmask 
The Corrupt, accessed 1 July 2017,
Source: www.ukunmaskthecorrupt.org/
interactive-london-property-map.php
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Offshore-owned flats are worsening the housing crisis by playing with the ambiguity of what the 
word affordable means. Loopholes like the UK’s Section 106 on ‘planning gain’ allows 
developers to bypass required affordable housing by declaring a development as ‘not 
commercially viable’.451 This tactic relies on a biased financial viability assessment that can 
easily be biased to justify the exclusion of ‘affordable’ homes and instead cater exclusively to 
upscale investors who rarely even live in any of the flats. They can be considered dwellers 
whose mission is not to dwell. Offshore-owned flats – financially-derived forms of housing – are 
fruitful for both developer and buyer; and are reshaping speculation as well as understandings 
of residence, citizenship, and occupancy. Apart from new spatial typologies, like investment 
housing, this market trend is leading to new anthropological phenomena and the emergence of 
an offshore class: Ultra High Net Worth Individuals, with more than $30 million in individual 
assets.  
 
 
3.2 Gambling with the Law: Loopholes, Circumventions, and Ambiguity as Resistance 
How did we find ourselves in a situation where the plunder of space and profit can move such 
large volumes of transnational capital via remote overseas islands? The origin of the legal 
conversion of real estate property into liquid assets sheds light on how the appreciation of 
space and housing can be challenged: is land really immobile, and to what extent legal fictions 
can distort that condition? Inherited from Roman law, houses have historically required a 
different legal framework of ownership from portable objects, such as furniture or cars, and yet 
today houses are one of the most fluid and transferable assets. Even if the earth is in constant 
rotation, the term real estate implies immovable property in many Western European 
languages: Italian immobili, Portuguese imobiliário, French immobilier, Spanish inmobiliario, and 
German Immobilien.452 These words all define the house as a material object fixed to the 
ground, assign it secure and theoretically non-fluctuating value, and connect it to a stable 
property boundary with rigid margins. 
 
The mobility of the house as an object, something that would be more difficult to consider as 
real estate, has nonetheless existed in nomadic societies for millennia, as well as in specific 
circumstances that conferred a certain value to houses as movable assets prior to neoliberal 
forms of speculation. Even today, there are still practices of mutual aid whereby every time a 
member wants to move, the whole village works together to detach the house from the ground 
and carry it to the new site, as in the Bayanihan practice in the Philippines or Gotong-Royong in 
Indonesia and Malaysia.453  
 
                                                
451 Oliver Wainwright, ‘Revealed: How Developers Exploit Flawed Planning System To Minimise Affordable Housing,’ 
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452 Barry Smith and Leo Zaibert, ‘The Metaphysics of Real Estate’, Topoi 20 (2001): 161-172. 
453 Communal work or mutual aid as part of the act of collectively moving houses: ‘The traditional Filipino house, the 
“bahay-kubo,” can be moved using wooden poles which are carried from the old place to the new one. This requires a 
group of people to lift and carry the house on their shoulders.’ See ‘Filipino Culture: Bayanihan,’ accessed 28 May 2017, 
https://everything-filipino.com/filipino-culture-bayanihan-the-filipino-value-that-must-be-retained/; Clifford Geertz, Local 
Knowledge: Further Essays in Interpretive Anthropology, (New York: Basic Books. 1983). 
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Homeownership, understood as the possession of immovable property, may be a deeply held 
Western value, but the flourishing of cultural values is not independent of promotion and 
subsidy by state policies.454 The state has the power to generate building booms, and thus the 
associated profit margins, deeply entangling itself in real estate speculation and homeownership 
as forces that increase the value of space. Graham Turner argues that carefully designed 
inequality is at the base of real estate bubbles, which far from being an accident, are a 
necessary component to expand free trade at all costs.455 This has been widely discussed in 
urban studies, economics, and sociology following the 2007 financial crisis.456 In a context 
dominated by market uncertainty and spatio-legal ambiguity, housing as a speculative form – far 
from real estate as immovable property – is a matter of legal fictions and constant shifts, of 
ambiguity and circumventions, of the redefinition of land value, zoning alterations, and the 
reclassification of space. The speculative character of both terms, immobility and property, 
perpetuates social violence even through the profit embedded in the margins of affordable 
housing. 
 
In fact, the perverse moment when housing became affordable was also the moment that 
housing changed from a universal right first to become a commodity, and later an asset. Rather 
than being limited to the socially excluded, the disabled, the elderly, refugees/asylum seekers 
and the homeless, affordability has been constructed for lower income groups in society and 
has now climbed its way up to the middle class.457 Affordable housing in United States’ public 
policy originated with the 1974 Housing Act, Section 8 and in a more explicit way with the 1986 
Affordable Housing Act passed during Ronald Reagan’s presidency; in the UK, it happened with 
the Right-To-Buy, part of the 1980 Housing Act under Margaret Thatcher’s stewardship. As it 
moved to Spanish shores, homeownership penetrated citizen’s minds through both policy-
makers and property development lobbies. Affordable housing policies that emerged worldwide 
around the 1970-1980s unsurprisingly paralleled the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea, 
(UNCLOS), the Coastal Law in Spain, No Net Loss wetland policy and mitigation banking. They 
all configure a logic of calculated ambiguity applied to a notion of capital as the circulation of 
boundaries; a littoralisation of space under the disguise of the public interest and the common 
good. 
 
Critical housing approaches by Peter Marcuse have focused on exposing the false intentions 
behind what appear to be well-intended policies.458 In his analysis of different housing 
programmes in US history, Marcuse enunciates the ‘myth of the benevolent state’ by exposing 
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the instrumentalisation of housing for political purposes under the disguise of the common 
good.459 National housing policies have done little to alleviate citizens’ needs, but instead 
constitute a populist masquerade for both market speculation and a short-term easement of 
social unrest.460 As an extreme case, the 1934 National Housing Act in the US strengthened 
racial segregation by allowing banks to refuse to grant mortgages in communities of racially-
determined areas. Through redlining, as the practice was called, blocks demarcated within a 
dark red perimeter on ‘mortgage risk maps’ would be excluded from funding facilities and 
stigmatised for allegedly unreliable payments (Fig. 153). Even worse, the practice of reverse 
redlining followed, whereby a lender or insurer specifically targeted non-white debtors, not to 
deny them loans or insurance, but rather to charge them more than could be charged to a 
comparable white consumer.  
 
US housing policies have been the way to make citizens perceive housing as a solution to 
national crisis, when in fact, these housing policies have mainly secured the economic status of 
the privileged. As Marcuse pointed out, the two Tenement House Acts from 1867 and 1901 
originally set minimum standards for housing; however, rather than aspiring to promote hygienic 
housing, they eventually facilitated land speculation while appeasing the immigrant draft riots 
from 1863.461 Similarly, the Great Depression 1929-1939 was appeased by both the National 
Housing Act of 1934 and the Wagner-Steagall Housing Act 1937; the end of WWII was followed 
by the Veteran Housing Programs, the GI Bill (low interest and zero down payment home loans 
for servicemen), and the 1949 Housing Act, which opened a market for a new typology of 
single-family suburban homes; the 1968 Peace Protests were followed by the 1968 and 1970 
Fair Housing Acts; and the 1973 Oil Crisis was followed by the Housing and Community 
Development Act, Section 8 in 1974.  
 
The myth of the benevolent state became more explicit during the Reagan era, 1981-89, when 
housing markets were believed to function better without supervision or the intervention of the 
state. It led to the invention of another myth, that of the meddling state, which associated state 
intervention with deterioration and deceleration in meeting housing needs. But despite a long list 
of examples of state deregulation, housing has nevertheless been such a crucial matter that 
state involvement has never been completely discarded. Black Monday in 1987 was followed by 
the 1988 State Apartment Incentive Loan Program (SAIL), the Homeownership Assistance 
Program (HAP), the Fair Housing Amendment Act (FHAA) and the Housing and Community 
Development Act. The economic crisis of the 1990s was followed by the State Housing 
Strategy, Cranston-Gonzalez National Affordable Housing Act, Low-Income Housing 
Preservation and Resident Homeownership Act, William E. Sadowski Act, State Housing 
Initiatives Partnership Program (SHIP), East Central Florida Regional Planning Council 
(ECFRPC) Affordable Housing Methodology, Adequate Housing Rule, and Public Housing 
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Reform Act. Finally and more recently, the 2007-2008 financial crisis was followed by the 
Housing and Economic Recovery Act 2008.  
 
The political construction of housing shortage and systemic lack has paved the way for a need 
to supply housing solutions and services. After 144 years of real estate enclosure in the US, 
Phillip Anderson has concluded that there is a direct relationship between crisis, land sales, and 
real estate construction as the world’s worst economic downturns have always been preceded 
by land speculation.462 Furthermore, policy responses in some cases even worsen the crisis 
they aim to solve, either because of the urgency under which they are conceived or the 
neoliberal agenda of the policy-maker.463 This puts into question the real need for housing policy 
and the possibility of both its independence and its benevolence. In other words, the neoliberal 
threat to housing has been ‘democratised’ through a triple process of state insecurity that Isabell 
Lorey describes in her analysis of the government of the precarious: precariousness of the lives 
and bodies of dwellers; precarity as a spatial order; and precarization as a form of 
governance.464  
 
Similarly, housing policies in the UK have historically been put into law immediately after the 
most dramatic recessions. The 1851 Landlord and Tenant Act was passed after the Panic of 
1847. The 1890 Housing of the Working Classes Act after the Long Depression 1873-1896. The 
1909 Housing, Town Planning, &c. Act came after the Panic of 1907; the 1919 Housing, Town 
Planning, &c. Act was made law after the 1919 post-war depression; the 1930 Housing Act 
followed the Great Depression 1930-31; the 1944 Housing (Temporary Accommodation) Act 
during WWII; the 1961 Parker Morris Committee report on public housing and anthropometric 
standards was after the 1961 recession; the 1977 Protection from Eviction Act came after the 
Banking crisis 1973-75; the 1980 Housing Act introduced the right-to-buy and the 1980 Local 
Government, Planning and Land Act ended the mandatory requirement to build houses; the 
1985 Landlord and Tenant Act and 1988 Housing Act Section 8 followed the early 1980s 
recession and removed government funding for new housing; the 1996 Housing Act was 
passed after the early 1990s recession; and finally, the 2011 Localism Act Part 7 on Housing 
was passed after the 2007-2008 crisis. 
 
Dismantling the welfare state in the name of the common good is a fallacy that has been used 
by neoliberal governments in favour of austerity measures.465 When analysing the 
financialization of homeownership and housing rights through mortgages, insurance, and 
investments, Raquel Rolnik argues that a growing consensus was formed alongside the rise of 
neoliberal economy, according to which governments should renounce their role as suppliers of 
affordable housing and support market demand rather than directly providing opportunities 
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themselves.466 This implied creating conditions, institutions, and regulations to support pro-
housing financial systems and promote homeownership according to principles of reliance on 
private property and market forces.467 Similarly to the shoreline, homeownership and housing 
rights have been littoralised. Indeed, housing has become a coast: a speculative process 
through which the house is not merely a built object, but a four-dimensional construct that is 
atomised into shares and margins to gamble with.468  
 
Housing rights are not only being fought between onshore and offshore interests, but even more 
so around inhabitation on coastal grounds. As in the case of Kivalina, the violence of climate-
related events has encouraged even further the masquerade of neoliberal logics of investment, 
risk, and mitigation as environmentalism. Building up coastal dunes has been considered one of 
the most efficient methods to offset ecological disasters like flood damage, hurricanes, and 
beach erosion, rationalising the confiscation of private land for the public good.469  
 
Eminent domain or compulsory purchase is the power of the sovereign to take private property 
for public use without the owner’s consent in exchange for ‘just’ compensation.470 Eminent 
domain and its equivalents have traditionally been used in Anglo-Saxon and continental law to 
take private property for a public purpose; for example, demolishing a house in order to protect 
the coast, to build an airport, etc., with a fair economic compensation allocated to the 
expropriated owner. However, traditional eminent domain programmes have been exploited in 
the way they cope with housing rights and climatic alterations. The seizure of property for the 
common good has also been used by states to remove undesirable citizens for the sake of 
hygienic urban planning.471 Even further, legal battles to decide the degree of justice in ‘just 
compensation’ still revolve around the ambiguity of special or general benefits, as if that 
dichotomy could be clearly polarised. A general benefit is typically referred to as a benefit held 
in common with neighbouring lands; whereas special benefits are roughly defined as benefits 
that ‘are direct and peculiar to the particular property’.472 For example, most courts would 
consider the widening of a road in a large city a general benefit, but building a highway along an 
isolated property would likely be considered a special benefit.473  
 
This ‘benevolent’ market has violently evicted, impoverished, and disenfranchised thousands of 
inhabitants along European shores, playing with the binary thresholds between private and 
common interest; the right to stay and compulsory eviction; and ecological destruction and 
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mitigation.474 The abuse of eminent domain or compulsory purchase is performed through the 
ambiguity of ethics.475 William R. Maurer remarks how the debate on the forced confiscation of 
property escalated after the 2005 Kelo v. City of New London decision, when the US Supreme 
Court ruled that state and local governments can seize homes and transfer them to private 
developers.476 In a similar way, in the village of El Puig, in Valencia, Spain, century-old 
fishermens’ houses on the waterfront were demolished for being too close to the water after the 
government failed to artificially nourish the beach (Fig. 154). By not replenishing sediment along 
that small strip of the coast (unlike their ever-reliable maintenance at nearby expensive resorts), 
the old, small structures were condemned to disappear in order to keep the coastal buffer zone 
intact. However, their destruction made way for a new seaside resort just a little bit inland from 
the location of El Puig’s fishermen houses.   
 
In resistance to their dispossession, dwellers have been challenging power structures for 
centuries. The ambivalence between self-legislation and coercion was already pointed out by 
Jean-Jacques Rousseau, in reference to how self-governing citizens must simultaneously be 
subjects as well.477 As Isabell Lorey remarks, it is only in this coincidence of subjugation and 
freedom, of regulation and empowerment, that the governability or self-governability of 
sovereign subjects can be achieved.478 One of the most remarkable illustrations of this 
ambiguity is the emergence of the 40-shilling freehold societies in England 1840s. In order to be 
politically enfranchised, citizens had to own at least 40 shillings worth of property. Hence, new 
land societies were formed in order to change the balance of political power by extending the 
number of 40-shilling freeholders to a larger disenfranchised population. The society bought an 
estate and divided it into plots worth 40 shillings to be purchased by members with borrowed 
money.479 Colin Ward outlines similar strategies, such as the one-night house in 19th century 
Wales (Tŷ Unnos) or the occupation of caves in England.480 In the urban realm, the abusive 
window tax, hearth tax, and brick tax in the UK were each immediately followed by resistance 
tactics implementing ad-hoc circumventions to each one: walling up the windows, closing 
fireplaces, and using larger bricks. 
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153: City limits through 
racially profiling mortgage 
risk: Redlining practices to 
demarcate urban zones where 
mortgages should not be 
granted, Chicago, FHA 1938 
(top).
154: Intentional erosion: 
Letting a beach naturally erode 
– avoiding human nourishment 
of the beach – makes it 
possible to demolish buildings 
that were previously further 
inland than now. El Puig, 
Valencia, 2011. (bottom).
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In 2013 the publication of ‘Paying Paul and Robbing No One: An Eminent Domain Solution for 
Underwater Mortgage Debt’ changed the status quo by using speculative tactics against 
speculative practices.481 Authored by Cornell Law Professor Robert Hockett, it called for the 
reinterpretation of existing legal frameworks for eviction in the US. Hockett proposed bypassing 
the impediments of the system through collective agency in order to shape a more hopeful 
scenario for indebted households.482 The right to property is listed under the Universal Human 
Rights and is included in most democratic national constitutions.483 But in Hockett’s approach, 
property is not only material real estate but also intangible entities, subjectively defined. Hence, 
private debt can also be subject to expropriation for the common good. This is equivalent to the 
logic of the Public Trust Doctrine and the common good that applies to tidal zones, but tweaking 
that collective usership in order to house individuals as part of a larger community of dwellers.484 
 
Responding to the social upheaval after the recent economic crisis, Hockett and others 
proposed this sort of reverse-eminent domain, popular in a range of scholarly publications since 
2008.485 Using the ambiguity implicit in the common good, the idea was embraced by a minority 
of local governments in the US.486 Democrat Richard Alarcón advocated for reversing eminent 
domain in the Los Angeles City Council in 2012 to reduce the incidence of foreclosures by 
redefining the public good of eminent domain, – that is, by using eminent domain to prevent, 
instead of promote, foreclosures and by seizing intangible mortgages, instead of material 
property.487 Mayor Wayne Smith from Irvington, New Jersey, proposed similar legislation on 
friendly condemnations in July 2013, and Mayor Gayle McLaughlin from Richmond, California, 
teamed up with Hockett to devise a scheme through his nonprofit group of venture capitalists 
Mortgage Resolution Partners.488 Bypassing the impediments of the law, they relied on 
collective agency to renegotiate debt, involving federal, state, and local governance.489 From 
Hockett’s perspective, the creative redefinition of the common good was legitimised by the 
social burden of losing a home, given that evictions add blight to communities, devalue housing 
prices across the board, and increase public safety concerns.490  
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This inversion of eminent domain found opposition in different spheres, the main concern being 
the violation of the obligation of contracts laid out in the US Constitution.491 Right after Hockett’s 
concept was put into practice, the Securities Industry and Financial Markets Association, the 
American Bankers Association, the National Association of Realtors, and some major investors 
mounted a concerted opposition campaign, which included flying lobbyists to California city halls 
and pressuring Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, and the Federal Housing Administration to use their 
control of the mortgage industry to ban the practice.492 At a national level, representative John 
Campbell, Republican of California, introduced a counter-bill in 2013 that would prohibit Fannie, 
Freddie, and the FHA from making, guaranteeing, or insuring a mortgage in any community that 
had used eminent domain as a mode of resistance to foreclosures.  
 
The redefinition and adaptability of eminent domain constituted an imminent threat to 
established markets when used as a form of neoliberal activism in response to the abuses of 
speculation. Furthermore, the legal construction of the common good also exposed the abstract 
character of real estate by questioning how immovable immovable property is.493 Given that real 
estate can be defined as a social contract between an owner of an object and an entity deprived 
of that object, the conditions under which that negotiation takes place is what sets the terms for 
either possession or reversing that possession. 
 
Although Robert Bird argues there is no place in contemporary constitutional systems for 
ambivalent interpretations, the arbitrary application of power has found a comfortable home in 
eminent domain doctrine.494 Zygmunt Plater and William Lund Norine define this condition as 
the capricious character of eminent domain.495 Hans Lindahl introduces another term to define 
it: alegality. For him, legal disorder can be classified into illegal and alegal acts.496 By 
deconstructing the insecurity associated to the alegal, the ambiguity of alegality can be 
reimagined as a productive tool. For lawyer and researcher on Spanish corruption cases Diego 
Vera Jurado, in countries like Spain the abuse of authority in urban planning through eminent 
domain is not a result of inadequate laws to prevent it, but instead the one-sided interpretation 
of these laws according to each judge’s political and ethical agenda.497 However, media 
coverage since 2008 of dramatic evictions and eminent domain abuse along the coast in Spain 
has shifted the judgement of previously neutral arbiters. Without changing the laws, trials today 
tend to favour indebted households more than they had before the housing crisis began. In this 
sense, the ambiguity of the law relies on the ethical stance of the arbiter.498  
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Ambiguity is here instrumentalised through what could be called a double-edged public interest, 
where the threshold is precisely the matter of concern. In the current Spanish Constitution, 
several articles reference to the legal figure of ‘public interest’. The term intentionally leaves the 
law open for interpretation; but almost every mention of the common good or the public interest 
refers to the economics of land use, the construction of housing, or real estate speculation. 
Several authors have indeed criticised the juridical problem of an imprecise definition of public 
interest.499 According to Pablo Acosta Gallo, the use of the term public interest in the Spanish 
Constitution is purely a tactic, a wild card that allows for different administrative positions.500 The 
ethics of taking private property for public use or taking public property for private use are 
completely determined by who defines the common and the good in the common good. Indeed, 
the public interest and the common good work as ambiguous legal fictions.  
 
 
3.3 The House Always Wins: Lotteries to Circumvent Debt 
Governments, private charities, and civic groups have turned to lotteries and gambling as a 
means of financing the public good, infrastructure, and services for over 500 years.501 Strategies 
to provide immediate or long-term funding to cover expenses or deficits in most cases go 
beyond the conventional role of public institutions when they are inoperative, uninterested or 
overwhelmed.502 Gambling and lotteries as fundraising mechanisms have been criticised as 
neither being particularly equitable nor particularly efficient means of revenue generation.503  
 
The national lottery in the UK did not acquire a legal status until John Major’s government in the 
early 1990s embraced it.504 Passed in 1993, the National Lottery Act established a national 
lottery in the UK, the proceeds of which were to be spent on the public good – as opposed to 
the typical applications for taxes, such as infrastructure or education. Hence, lottery money 
acquired a contradictory position of being additional while also crucial. The National Lottery was 
to fund supplementary investments beyond basic needs for the common good of the population. 
With 28p per pound to be dedicated to good causes and capital projects, an era of accidental 
architectural patronage began.505 In the UK, the fantasy of winning eventually built the extension 
of the British Museum, the Eden Project in Cornwall, the Turbine Hall in the Tate Modern, the 
Millennium Dome, the Millennium Bridge, and the Millennium Point in Birmingham, among 
others. Paradoxically, the unnecessary became emblematic of society. 
                                                
499 Peter Häberle, Öffentliches Interesse als Juristisches Problem: Eine Analyse von Gesetzgebung und 
Rechtsprechung (Bad Homburg: Athenäum Verlag, 1971).  
500 Pablo Acosta Gallo, ‘El Interés General Como Principio Inspirador de las Políticas Públicas,’ Revista General de 
Derecho Administrativo 41 (2016). 
501 John Morgan, ‘Financing Public Goods by Means of Lotteries,’ Review of Economic Studies 67 (2000): 761-762. 
502 Annual revenues of the overall EU gambling market reach €84.9 billion. See ‘Gambling,’ European Commission for 
Growth, accessed 2 June 2017, http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/gambling/index_en.htm 
503 Mary O. Borg, Paul M. Mason and Stephen L. Shapiro, The Economic Consequences of State Lotteries (London and 
New York: Greenwood Publishing Group, 1991); David O. Gulley, and Frank A. Scott Jr., ‘The Demand for Wagering on 
State-Operated Lotto Games,’ National Tax Journal, 46 (1993): 13-22. 
504 John Major, ‘How I Gave Hope to the Poor,’ New Statesman, 8 November 1999, 
http://www.newstatesman.com/node/150187 
505 Rowan Moore, ‘The Buildings that Won the National Lottery Jackpot – The Hits and Misses,’ The Guardian, 2 
November 2014, https://www.theguardian.com/artanddesign/2014/nov/02/national-lottery-funding-buildings-won-jackpot-
architecture-hits-and-misses 
185 
But as always, the precise determination of what constitutes public good and public need is 
ambiguous. Major was criticised on the left for re-establishing the lottery system, based on the 
fear that lottery sales would be greatest among poorer people most in need of hope.506 The 
gambling addiction of the poor would pay for the monumentality of the nation. As for Major, an 
advocate for the freedom to choose whether or not to play, the national lottery rather engaged 
everyone in the collective rebirth of cultural life in Britain.507 Contrary to his innocent patriotism, 
there is scholarly research showing the poor play the lottery more than wealthier groups.508 
There is an inverse relationship between the socioeconomic position of players and likelihood of 
lottery gambling, matching self-perceived social deprivation with stronger desires to play.509 
 
Thus, the question arises of whether lotteries are more effective at financing the public good 
than other voluntary schemes.510 Lotteries rely on the addictive pleasure of gambling across an 
anonymous (but rarely wealthy) population, while private donations exploit citizens’ desire for a 
public reputation. In 1884, the Statue of Liberty pedestal was built following a campaign by 
newspaper magnate Joseph Pulitzer, where 125,000 New Yorkers contributed $100,000 over 
six months, the majority of which were $1 or less. Not only did personal pride play a significant 
role during the crowdfunding phase, but the production of architecture and urban identity was at 
stake: just like insurance, by spreading the costs and benefits among a group of citizens, the 
common good is financialised. Conventional lottery, often reinforcing class division, is eventually 
how the poor pay to enhance public space/cultural institutions, whereas donations are the way 
in which the wealthy get spaces named after them. 
 
Interdependence in resource distribution has been classified into three categories: domination 
(one individual decides the allocation of resources on behalf of the rest), communal sharing 
(resources are pooled and access is given to everyone), and lottery (resources are pooled and 
one individual takes everything).511 Hence, lotteries operate in an ethically blurry zone between 
total domination and communal sharing. The ethics behind shared value carry a twofold logic 
according to the return of the investment. At a monetary level, crowdfunding distinguishes 
between debt and equity, depending on whether contribution to the common pool implies no 
direct return, a form of reward, a lending interest, or a share in the venture.512 
 
                                                
506 John Major, ‘How I Gave Hope to the Poor,’ New Statesman, 8 November 1999, 
http://www.newstatesman.com/node/150187 
507 Ibid. 
508 Jens Beckert and Mark Lutter, ‘Why the Poor Play the Lottery: Sociological Approaches to Explaining Class-based 
Lottery Play,’ Sociology 47 (2012): 1152-1170. Accessed 15 October 2014.  
509 The binary poverty-gambling can be subjectively observed at an urban scale in the higher concentration of lottery-
selling stores and betting agencies in lower income neighborhoods. 
510 John Morgan, ‘Financing Public Goods by Means of Lotteries,’ Review of Economic Studies 67 (2000): 763. 
511 Daniel Nettle, Karthik Panchanathan, Tage Shakti Rai and Alan Page Fiske, ‘The Evolution of Giving, Sharing and 
Lotteries,’ Current Anthropology 52 (2011): 750-751. 
512 There are four basic types of crowdfunding: a) Donations: unidirectional gifts like in GoFundMe, Crowdrise.com; b) 
Rewards: contributors do not receive shares but some sort of reward, like in Kickstarter and Indiegogo; c) Equity: 
contributors become investors and receive shares in exchange like in OfferBoard, CircleUp, OurCrowd, ASSOB.com.au, 
AppVested, I-Bankers.com, CrowdCube, Symbid, Crowdfunder.com, EnergyFunders, KlondikeStrike; and d) Debt: also 
called ‘peer-to-peer lending,’ where lenders receive a debt instrument that pays interest return, like in Prosper, Funding 
Circle, LendingClub or in CommonBond, Sofi, Zero Bound to crowdfund college debt. See Jason Futko, ‘Equity vs. Debt 
Crowdfunding,’ Crowdfund Insider, 24 September 2014. 
186 
Lotteries have been used as an alternative source of revenue to fund large national projects: 
major land grabs, construction of the Great Wall of China, fortification of cities in the 
Netherlands, colonisation of Native American territories, the appropriation of Palestinian land, or 
simply fund wars.513 The first modern national lottery in Spain was organised right before the 
proclamation of the first democratic Constitution in the country’s history, which took place in 
Cádiz 1812. Not coincidentally, the same text redefined water from being ‘eminent’ to ‘public’ 
domain.514 Back then, it was the lottery, the Constitution, and the public domain that acted as 
the pillars of the proto-democratic modern Spain.  
 
In the UK, the National Lottery is promoted by Camelot Group Lotteries Limited under the 
slogan ‘serving nations’ dreams’.515 At an urban scale, neoliberal market strategies have allied 
with city councils or independent citizens to carry out renewal projects with Camelot funding. 
Furthermore, representative of the idea of ‘paying for your city’ – which alleviates city authorities 
from the responsibility of allocating necessary funds – several prominent online platforms have 
grown within this problematic circulation of capital for the public good, among them: 
Citizinvestor, Civic Sponsor, IOBY, and Spacehive. The latter is used by the Mayor of London in 
the same way that New York City Council uses Kickstarter. The platforms promote both social 
entrepreneurialism and collective funding of the public good (two things that not always have 
common goals), and at the same time justify cuts in public spending.  
 
As a response, collective fundraising technologies have used speculation to avoid profit-driven 
debt. As an offshoot of the Occupy Wall Street Movement in New York, the Strike Debt! initiative 
started in 2012 consisted of a decentralised network of debt resisters, including activists, artists, 
and organisers. It was born to collect donations in order to pay off anonymous debt, claiming 
that most individual debt is illegitimate and unjust.516 Their debt resistance generated the You 
Are Not A Loan campaign, whereby the collective would ‘buy debt for pennies on the dollar,’ but 
instead of collecting it, they would abolish it.517 Their aim was to help liberate debtors at random 
through a campaign of mutual support, good will, and collective refusal; all proceeds of which 
went directly to buying and cancelling people's debt. 
 
This set of circumvention tactics are described by Michel Feher’s as ‘investee activism’, which 
argues that the twenty-first century social struggle against neoliberalism cannot be fought in the 
same terms as nineteenth and twentieth century demonstrations outside factories. Instead, 
neoliberal violence requires other forms of resistance that incorporate speculation as a tactic. 
Embedded in Feher’s investee activism are crucial referents developed within the Spanish 
indignados movement; namely, public shaming against mortgage abuse in Barcelona and 
                                                
513 David F. Weiman, ‘Peopling the Land by Lottery: The Market in Public Lands and the Regional Differentiation of 
Territory on the Georgia Frontier,’ Journal of Economic History 51 (1991): 835-860. 
514 Erik Swyngedouw, Liquid Power: Contested Hydro-Modernities in Twentieth-Century Spain (Cambridge and London: 
MIT Press, 2015), 71. 
515 Camelot Group not only appropriates Arthurian mythology in its own name, but it also renamed its new draw 
machines after Arthur, Guinevere, Lancelot and Merlin for a better selling of hope. This entanglement of magic, dreams, 
honor, faith and the provision of a unique safe shelter like the Camelot Castle, eventually constitute another form of 
domination. See ‘Camelot Group,’ accessed 2 April 2015, http://www.camelotgroup.co.uk/news/uk-national-lottery-news/ 
516 ‘Your Are Not A Loan,’ Strike Debt!, accessed 28 November 2016, http://strikedebt.org/ 
517 Ibid. 
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Madrid.518 Known as escraches, these initiatives would target and invade the private sphere of 
public figures, namely politicians responsible for evictions and abusive housing policies. A 
typical escrache consists on gathering outside the private home of those politicians, or 
accompanying them on their morning walk, while holding signs and banners remembering their 
degree of responsibility in the unhousing of indebted families. Through their tactics, the Spanish 
Plataforma de Afectados por la Hipoteca (PAH) has managed to prevent 2045 households from 
losing their home and rehoused other 2500 people that had already lost it.519 Taking this 
approach a step forward and aiming to work alongside the notion of shareholder activism, this 
thesis looks at initiatives like Hockett’s reversal of eminent domain as a proactive way to subvert 
neoliberal violence. By exposing reputation, littoralisation applies here as a process of 
offshoring the onshore; in other words, a platform for political constituents to challenge financial 
capital by simultaneously working within and outside the system.  
 
In a time when indebtedness is jeopardising basic human needs, including the right to housing, 
unexpected and creative mechanisms of relief have arisen. When governments and institutions 
fail to provide solutions, unprecedented reactions from inexperienced actors emerge. 
Interestingly, this destabilising moment in financial capitalism also shows its way of working by 
revealing citizens’ dependency – both economic and psychological. These moments impact not 
only how citizens react, but also basic understandings of capital – such as the shift in housing 
from a social right to a form of currency. When faced with situations like these, society as a 
whole changes, and therefore, moments of relief, rupture, and reinvention appear.  
 
As a practice-based project, this chapter offers the case study of a self-organised house lottery 
in Andorra, a (former) tax haven that has recently lost its status. The house lottery was a way to 
crowdfund debt after the 2007 crisis. Sergio Trouillet Alba and Mónica González Lagunilla could 
not afford the mortgage on their second home in Andorra after it was purchased during the real 
estate boom for an unrealistic, speculative value. The lack of buyers and the disastrous fall in 
property prices precluded the possibility of selling, obliging the young couple to pay the 
contractual debt they could not afford or accept foreclose. Unlike in the US, there is no deed-in-
payment in Andorra. They therefore looked for alternatives and ventured to launch a legal, 
online raffle which, through the sale of 10,000 tickets at €70 apiece, was meant to raise the 
necessary funds to pay off their loan and award a lucky winner a debt-free home.520  
 
In order to provide a legal framework for their initiative, they reached out to Ripoll law firm to 
develop a contractual agreement that would set the guidelines for the lottery, while establishing 
a precedent that could be applied in similar cases.521 Even if legal supervision was required, the 
guidelines were freely available online. According to Trouillet, their bank gave its unreserved 
                                                
518 Led by the Plataforma de Afectados por la Hipoteca (PAH), accessed 7 May 2017, 
http://afectadosporlahipoteca.com/category/propuestas-pah/escrache/ 
519 Ibid. 
520 Their raffle revolved around a property consisting of a 100m2 duplex with a 22m2 terrace, 3 double bedrooms, 2 full 
bathrooms, a kitchen, a large living room, a dining room, a parking space, and a storage room.  
521 See Project Dossier 3. 
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agreement to the idea of the lottery, seeing it as a win-win for both parties.522 The contract 
stated that the winner of the raffle would receive complete ownership of the unit with all 
community expenses paid for until the date of the notarial acquisition. The final draw was to 
take place as soon as 10,000 tickets were sold.523 The house was to be won completely free of 
taxes, since the expenses for the legal transfer – 4.5% of the value of the house – were already 
budgeted and covered by the lottery. The raffle was not organised with the goal of making a 
profit, but rather to raise the exact amount of the debt and corresponding fees. 
 
The lottery in Andorra (2013) is a pioneering example of circumvention tactics to deal with 
exorbitant interest rates. The raffle provides a framework for circumventing a mortgage contract, 
where a lucky participant wins a house, the bank recovers debt, and Trouillet and González lose 
their debt. The house lottery in Andorra failed. Its end was scheduled for 15 August 2013, as the 
Andorran government was changing gambling laws in a way that would prevent such 
crowdfunding initiatives from happening again. By that time, the couple had not managed to sell 
all the tickets, and instead had to return the raised funds back to all participants.  
 
Apart from the house lottery in Andorra, there have been other attempts to raffle property in 
different countries. Charity fundraising through house lotteries and other profit-oriented 
initiatives have nonetheless been excluded from this thesis, since they do not contribute new 
narratives of investee activism.524 The cases that were instead chosen turn gambling into a 
resource for resistance to the housing crisis through ambiguity in the law. Even if in different 
geographical locations and juridical frameworks, the cases compiled in the Project Dossier 3 
share one elemental concept: circumventing existing regulations in order to relieve 
indebtedness when the state fails to offer support.  
 
3.4 The Housing Act: Organisation of a House Lottery in Lisbon 
In the third quarter of 2012, over 1,100 houses in Portugal were repossessed by banks to 
refinance debt.525 Like in other countries after the financial crisis, the foreclosure of indebted 
properties simply added assets to the geography of offshore ownership without empowering 
households or addressing the problem. However, in parallel to the pioneer case in Andorra, an 
equivalent raffle was launched in the outermost region of the Azores archipelago. The 
organiser, Nuno Miguel Amador da Costa Paiva, set out to raffle his home in San Miguel de 
Azores by selling up to 40,000 tickets at €5 apiece. He took advantage of the autonomy of the 
offshore territory to set up a house lottery that was otherwise not allowed in continental 
Portugal, as the Vice-President of the Government of the Azores Autonomous Region 
authorised the raffle before the Portuguese Ministry of Internal Administration declared such 
lotteries illegal.  
                                                
522 Sergio Trouillet, in discussion with the author, 13 April 2013. 
523 If a minimum of 9,500 tickets was not sold by August 15, 2013, the organiser would decide to proceed with the draw 
or, alternatively, cancel the lottery and return the money to every participant (minus €1 in management fees of online 
wire transfers). 
524 See ‘Raising the Roof for Charity,’ accessed 3 May 2014, http://raisingtheroof.net/; and ‘Win Your Dream Home,’ 
accessed 3 May 2014, https://winyourdreamhome.co.uk/ 
525 ‘Thousands of Homes Repossessed,’ Portugal Resident, 2 October 2012, http://portugalresident.com/thousands-of-
homes-repossessed 
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Framing the house lottery as a mode of resistance that uses ambiguity and loopholes in the 
gambling law to explore debt relief alternatives, the practical component of this chapter 
consisted of organising a similar lottery in Lisbon. Titled The Housing Act, the project was 
commissioned for the Lisbon Architecture Triennale 2013, within the New Publics 
programme.526 It explored the abuses of neoliberalism from within and replicated the process 
from Andorra and the Azores.527 Not only did the obstacles to implementation in Portugal reveal 
the existing power structures, but they also inspired new circumventions to those rules. In that 
sense, the research methodology is one of productive failures, as every obstacle created the 
need for a redefinition of the method itself. This section is structured around eight obstacles and 
the devices or tactics generated to bypass them. The project involved advice from Abreu 
Advogados and their expert on Corporate and Commercial Law, Intellectual Property, IT, and 
Gambling Law Elisa Pereira, who aids a number of international corporations on organising 
raffles in Portugal.528 Firms like Coca-Cola require such services when launching a ‘lucky cap’ 
raffle to win a car, for example. Working together for a year, the local law firm provided their 
expertise as well as guidelines on the threshold between legality, illegality, and alegality and 
lawful circumventions of the law.  
 
Obstacle No. 1:  Monopoly of Gambling Activity 
Circumvention No. 1:  Rename ‘Gambling Activity’  
The Portuguese Gambling Law Lei do Jogo DL 422/89, passed in 1989 and modified six times 
prior to the most recent version, DL 111/2011, was the framework shaping The Housing Act. An 
upcoming modification that would regulate some of the lesser-defined transnational loopholes of 
online gambling had already outraged many in the remote gambling sector.529 The Housing Act 
had initially set out to turn the lottery guidelines into an open-source manual, globally available 
to organise any house lottery, however, the necessity of specific circumventions tailored to 
particular legal obstacles precluded a universal method. Hence, the open-source side of the 
project was dropped from the very beginning. Nonetheless, the guidelines and contract would 
still be available online as a basis for future iterations.  
 
The first obstacle was that the owner of the Portuguese gambling monopoly also happened to 
be one of the largest landowners in Portugal. Any gambling activity in Portugal must be 
approved by the Santa Casa da Misericórdia (the Holy House of Mercy), which has controlled 
gambling in the country and its overseas territories through a network of outposts all over the 
former Portuguese empire since its foundation in 1498. The Holy House of Mercy is a charity 
that empowers the poor according to a Christian morality, and national gambling money is one 
of the main sources of funding for its activities. Its other main source of income is real estate, 
either historically owned by the Foundation or inherited from deceased, pious citizens. Popular 
                                                
526 Chief curator of the Triennale was Beatrice Galilee; and curator of its New Publics programme was José Esparza 
Chong Cuy. 
527 Keller Easterling, Extrastatecraft: The Power of Infrastructure Space (London and New York: Verso, 2014), 222. 
528 Abreu Advogados is one of the leading law firms in Portugal and the 2011 Legal Team of the Year at the British 
Legal Awards. 
529 Ana Torres Pereira, ‘Lei do Jogo em Portugal Vai Tornar o Mercado Inviavel para os Operadores de Apostas 
Desportivas,’ Jornal de Negocios, 3 July 2013, http://www.jornaldenegocios.pt/empresas/turismo---
lazer/detalhe/lei_do_jogo_em_portugal_vai_tornar_o_mercado_inviavel_para_os_operadores_de_apostas_desportivas 
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knowledge claims that Santa Casa inherits a property a day on average.530 In September 2010, 
Santa Casa, which also holds an exclusive right to Internet sports betting, opposed the 
Portuguese government’s attempt to liberalise the online sector, and lobbied to keep control of it 
as the most adequate way of protecting the people from gambling-related psychological 
problems. Catholic moral was used to shape citizens’ spiritual discipline while protecting their 
own assets.531 Not only did Santa Casa refuse to participate in the house lottery, but they also 
refused any permit to run a gambling activity on Portuguese grounds. Santa Casa’s prohibition 
was bypassed by not organising any gambling activity. Instead, The Housing Act had to remove 
any component purely based on luck. 
 
Obstacle No. 2:  Taxes on Games of Chance 
Circumvention No. 2:  Games of Skill Are Not Taxable 
Apart from Santa Casa, there exists a second body supervising gambling: the Portuguese 
Ministry of Internal Administration (MAI). According to national gambling law, for every game of 
chance, and even more when real estate is to be awarded, a proportional amount of the prize is 
taxed and must be paid before the game is launched. Nonetheless, this rule does not always 
apply. Raffles are extremely popular in Portugal during summer festivities in rural areas, 
generally with the aim to collect petty cash for a local cause, and where prizes like a live turkey 
are often given away. If these situations were to strictly follow gambling laws, organisers would 
have to pay the government approximately half the value of the turkey in advance in order to 
apply for permission to organise the raffle. However, the value at stake is so irrelevant that 
rarely anyone follows the protocol. But if the prize consists of real estate property worth 
€200,000, €100,000 plus additional fees needed to be paid to MAI before the application to 
obtain permission can be submitted. According to the lawyer’s estimations and experience, this 
would take a minimum of two months.  
 
Two indebted households had managed to get permission to organise house lotteries in the 
Azores in 2012, again taking advantage of the EU Outermost Territory status, which had shifted 
MAI’s position from neutral ignorance to straightforward antagonism. MAI had recently 
announced that house lotteries were illegal and that any raffle or contest had to be validated by 
their general secretariat. The offshore lottery cases in Azores had somehow challenged the role 
of the Portuguese authority and terminated their openness to evaluating such applications 
properly. The way to bypass taxation on the prize again required the removal of any component 
of chance.  
 
Hence, luck became a matter of skill arbitrated by a jury. The lottery thus had to become a 
competition, and appear as an advertising-driven raffle. Given that it was part of the Lisbon 
                                                
530 This claim kept reappearing in a number of interviews with local Lisbon activists, but could not be grounded with 
official data. 
531 Immediately after, the European Court of Justice ruled against Santa Casa in a similar long-term dispute with 
Austrian-based sports betting house bwin, hence, succeeding in setting the foundations to open up the gambling 
monopoly. See Daniel Macadam, ‘Santa Casa Snipes at Portuguese Online Gambling Reform,’ 17 September 2010, 
https://gamblingcompliance.com/premium-content/insights_analysis/santa-casa-snipes-portuguese-online-gambling-
reforms 
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Architecture Triennale, The Housing Act was re-framed as an ‘architecture skills contest’. The 
media strategy for the project had to carefully word its communication as a contest where the 
prize consisted of a house, rather than selling a house through a contest. Since The Housing 
Act had ceased to be a formal lottery, no physical ticket could be sold. Taking advantage of the 
outdatedness of the gambling law from 1989, whose later modifications did not even properly 
respond to online, remote gambling, the project devised instead online participation fees. By 
blurring the geographical location of the participation fee, ambiguity in whether the location of 
the participant or the location of the award was most relevant also offered legal protection in 
case of a lawsuit.532 According to the law, a skills contest had to use the term pasatempo 
(pastime). Eventually, the competition brief was to answer a simple question in 150 characters, 
approximately the length of a tweet. If the formulated question lacked a real answer, it would 
allow for different interpretations, which could become a productive input for the development of 
the project. The question chosen was: What is the value of a house? 
 
Obstacle No. 3:  Impartiality of Value Judgment 
Circumvention No. 3: Crowd-Voting 
Skills contests require a neutral value judgment through an arbiter/referee/jury who decides 
impartially and intelligently, which meant the jury required independent and external members. 
But instead of a physical judge, in order to make the process public, the voting was to be done 
online. Rather than relying on the individual opinions of a body of judges, the project aspired to 
base the decision on an audience formed by transnational voters. This online voting avoids 
erroneous judgement by individuals partaking in subjective decisions. However, it has also been 
questioned in the case of political elections whether full anonymity is possible and whether 
online voting jeopardises the chances of non-discriminatory access to the election process.533 
Concerning anonymity, The Housing Act aimed precisely for the opposite, given that full visibility 
of the voter's’ identity would attract more supporters.  
 
Far from implying a better form of democracy, online voting still does not rely on equal 
empowerment of participants, since the more extended social networks, the more possibilities of 
success. Even if the software was designed in order to avoid recurrent voting, prioritising 
popular online users was still an ethical challenge. This was taken as a lesser evil, and became 
an advantage in the ultimate aim of fundraising. Participants requesting votes from their social 
networks could function as a useful marketing campaign relying on a sort of improvised chain-
effect, which would in turn spread the knowledge of the contest to larger circles. Thus, 
participants themselves would disseminate the concept of The Housing Act. The public display 
of answers was pivotal for the project. The website interface showed the submitted responses in 
two forms: on random display, and organised by date of entry and popularity. The Housing Act 
                                                
532 The house lottery in Andorra already contemplated the risks of money laundering encouraged by this digital 
condition. The organisers introduced a guideline limiting the maximum amount of tickets bought by one individual. 
Purchases of more than 214 tickets, or €14,980, were subject to an act of money laundering or terrorist financing, and 
therefore had to provide information on the source of funds and the true identity of the beneficial owner. 
533 Mieke Loncke and Jos Dumortier, ‘Online Voting: A Legal Perspective,’ International Review of Law, Computers & 
Technology 18 (2004): 59-79. DOI: 10.1080/13600860410001674742 
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online platform was constantly updated so that any viewer could see the winning answer and its 
corresponding vote count in real time.  
 
Obstacle No. 4:  The Material Transaction of Entering a Contest 
Circumvention No. 4: Buying Services   
A lottery ticket or a competition entrance fee is neither a legitimate title nor a contract 
legitimising the transfer of real estate property from one party to another. In skills contests, the 
prize itself has to be a secondary subject. In raffles organized through bottle caps on soda 
bottles, all buyers or raffle-participants receive one litre of soda, even if they do not win. The aim 
of the soda company is not to give a car away, but to sell more beverages. In order to follow this 
logic of advertising-driven contests, the material value of the object of transaction had to be 
supplemented or emphasised. Participants in The Housing Act had to receive an asset in return.  
 
Entering The Housing Act architecture competition, the receipt or ticket had to equate to 
something that every participant was entitled to receive regardless of the chances of winning 
the prize. A receipt is the material object that results from an exchange agreement between two 
or more parties in order to prove, undo, or alter the transaction. In most cases, the receipt 
carries no material value, the value is only to secure against future attempts to deny that such a 
transaction ever occurred. Like debt, the receipt becomes a form of speculative currency. But 
the object of transaction had to follow the philosophy of the organiser, in this case the Lisbon 
Architecture Triennale. Hence, taking advantage of the context of the project, the receipt 
equalled a Lisbon Architecture Triennale membership. The economic value of such membership 
consisted of access to e-publications and VIP events, and was similar in price to the actual 
participation fee for the competition (€30-50). Indeed, the Triennale agreed to this option, as 
they would also benefit from increasing their membership. 
 
Obstacle No. 5:  Raffling a Property One Does Not Own 
Circumvention No. 5: Shared Ownership 
Even if 70% of Portuguese citizens are indebted and The Housing Act was not for private gain 
but for the public interest, solving only one household’s debt was not regarded as in the public 
interest. Although the lawyer saw this as a weak point in the legal case, we argued that 
precisely because of its unique character it provided a prototype test for the common good. In 
order to transfer the ownership of property from one subject to another, it has to be owned by 
the first subject. When seeking an indebted property to raffle, determining the actual degree of 
indebtedness or ownership that the project could work with was significant. Should the chosen 
house have already covered over 50% of its mortgage, so that the household would own more 
than half of the house? What situation would offer the most common good? Which proportion of 
the total debt should the fundraising process cover: the original value that the household had 
paid, the current value of the house, or the remaining amount on the mortgage? Given the 
multiple possible scenarios, this question had to be solved according to the specific case of the 
property to be raffled, once it was found. 
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The fractional condition of ownership in instalments also posed challenges for the legal 
consultant, especially because The Housing Act, as an organising agent, had no shares in the 
ownership of any piece of real estate. This was nonetheless crucial for simplifying the taxes on 
the transmission of the property to the winner. The fees of the public notary certifying the 
transmission, which had to be included in the fundraising process, would be significantly 
reduced if the house was transferred from the indebted owner straight to the winner, without any 
intermediary transmission to the Architecture Triennale. Therefore, to bypass the lack of 
ownership and reduce the taxes of the transmission, there were two options: either the 
organisers became co-owners of the indebted property; or the indebted owner became co-
organiser of The Housing Act through a private partnership agreement. The latter option was 
obviously more feasible. 
 
Obstacle No. 6:  The Supporting Bank Threatens to Pull Out 
Circumvention No. 6: Re-negotiate Reputation and Creditworthiness 
The main sponsor of the Lisbon Architecture Triennale was Caixa Geral de Depósitos (CGD), 
one of the largest savings banks in Portugal. However, the CGD refused to help find solutions to 
problems in Portuguese society it was accountable for. Instead, Portuguese banks have 
adopted the strategy of improving their reputation by renegotiating mortgages on a one-to-one 
case and without much publicity. Given the large number of properties being repossessed and 
accumulated by banks, one of these common readjustment measures consisted of moving an 
indebted customer into a smaller house also owned by the bank. By means of exchanging a 
large property for a more affordable one, the indebted customer reduces the amount owed to 
the institution while avoiding immediate eviction. This renegotiation ensures the bank’s liquidity, 
and also perpetuates the agony of mortgages for indebted households.  
 
However, the CGD agreed to collaborate with The Housing Act to explore alternatives together. 
Their role was to provide a ‘toxic’ property from one of their indebted customers and try to 
devise a win-win-win situation. This would also ensure that the owner of the property was an 
organiser of the competition. However, after initially agreeing on the benefits of approaching the 
social drama of indebtedness from the angle of the project, the CGD’s Department of Finance 
and Real Estate Business worried that the project would increase the already-damaged public 
reputation of the bank. On top of that, they argued that making 10,000 people pay for one 
person’s debt was hypocritical. In an unexpected reaction, the bank felt its image was at risk 
and threatened to terminate any involvement with the Triennale if The Housing Act were to go 
ahead. This confrontation led to a critical moment with the curatorial and executive team, as the 
possibility of losing their sponsorship implied the cancellation of the whole Triennale, putting all 
the staff at risk of losing their positions and salaries.534  
 
Not only did the savings bank threaten to withdraw its support. One of the most respected and 
trustworthy institutions defending the public interest and the common good in Portugal, the 
                                                
534 A similar situation had already happened two years before The Housing Act started, when the Ministry of Culture of 
Portugal, the former main sponsor of the Triennale, was simply disestablished in 2011 from the country after the cuts. 
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Portuguese Consumer Protection Association (DECO), did as well.535 Functioning as an 
independent national observer, DECO bears tremendous influence by channelling citizens’ 
complaints to the upper echelons of power and implementing measures against everyday 
political and economic abuse. In 2000 DECO filed 152 complaints regarding debt from citizens 
who could not pay their mortgage; in 2012 they filed 5,407, over 35 times more.536 In discussion 
with lawyers from DECO about emergency rehousing practices implemented by banks, they 
warned of a new housing bubble. In order to reduce the amount of vacant properties in stock, 
banks were giving better mortgage conditions to those purchasing their own repossessed 
properties than what they were offering for houses on the open market. This had led to a critical 
situation where the association of real estate agencies in Portugal had begun to fight against 
banks for unfair competition and conflicts of interest.  
 
DECO also initially agreed to collaborate on The Housing Act and provided dozens of letters of 
complaint from consumers who had approached them desperate for advice, as well as 
photographs of their underwater properties, and all without disclosing any private information. 
DECO even began offering citizens the possibility of raffling their indebted property through the 
project. However, as with CGD, after three months of collaboration, DECO decided to pull out. 
Given the misunderstanding that the project was generating among citizens approaching them 
for debt-relief consultancy, DECO expressed that they could not risk their own reputation as 
neutral arbiters by offering this sort of solution. Either they provided answers to people’s 
problems or they did not. It was unacceptable to gamble with the everyday struggle of indebted 
citizens.  
 
Despite losing the two main institutional allies, it was agreed to go ahead and work more closely 
with the legal consultant to demonstrate that nothing illegal was being done. On the one hand, 
losing the bank as a collaborator implied that the media strategy had to be completely detached 
from their name if their sponsorship of the Triennale was to continue. On the other hand, losing 
DECO as a collaborator implied that the project would need to find a property directly from an 
indebted household willing to independently take part in the experiment. 
 
Obstacle No. 7:  The Misfunctioning Empowerment of Citizens 
Circumvention No. 7: New Alliances 
Although the 2007 Treaty of Lisbon introduced the European Citizens’ Initiative (ECI), a tool to 
allow citizens to propose legislation to the European Parliament, Portuguese housing activism 
struggled with the difficulty of modifying their misfunctioning legal system.537 Any ECI requires 
backing from at least 1 million EU citizens, coming from at least 7 out of the 28 member states. 
A similar instrument exists at the Portuguese level to bring a citizens’ initiative to the national 
parliament with 35,000 signatures. However, the only time that such an attempt managed to 
                                                
535 Associação Portuguesa para a Defesa do Consumidor was funded only two months before the Carnation Revolution 
1974, the event that marked the end of dictatorship and the beginning of democracy in the country. 
536 DECO, report on Indebtedness 2013. 
537 The rules and procedures governing the citizens' initiative are set out in an EU Regulation adopted by the European 
Parliament and the Council of the European Union in February 2011. It nonetheless started operating in 2012.  
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force a debate in the Portuguese Parliament the MPs discussed the reform for less than 10 
minutes, discouraging others from attempting again.538 If the financial forces affecting the 
housing crisis are increasingly an economic issue on the European and global scale, the 
challenge for housing activism is to move more and more towards a transnational framework of 
action. Portugal was the first European country to recognise the right to housing in a national 
constitution after the UN Charter of Universal Human Rights, but like its neighbouring 
Mediterranean countries, the country is hurt by the lack of a common housing policy across the 
EU.539  
 
Even if the ECI is based on shifting the geography of active democracy, current power 
structures together with such a divided approach to housing across the EU still constitute a 
significant burden. The Housing Act revealed the lack of collaboration among housing rights 
activism in Europe, and even within the city of Lisbon and Portugal, that results from mistrust 
and variable approaches. A former member of a Lisbon-based housing activist group, HABITA, 
had used the organization mission to build her own political career straight into City Hall, 
generating suspicion and scepticism about actual interests in fighting together for the common 
good. 540 The question of whether non-governmental activists should appropriate governmental 
practices as a tactic has emerged across a multiplicity of approaches to the housing crisis in 
Lisbon.  
 
Constant fear of spokesmen taking over a collective aspiration perpetuates the disorganisation 
across housing rights activists. In meetings with local actors, those of us working on The 
Housing Act were warned to avoid these dynamics and were recommended to regularly publicly 
assert the project as an aggregator without any ambition for leadership in the housing 
movement.541 While the legal problems with the lottery were still developing, The Housing Act 
website was launched, but intentionally limited to a public archive of non-state actors in and 
outside Europe fighting for more humane housing policies. The fact that there is neither a 
common European policy on housing struggles nor a common platform aggregating 
transnational housing activism put us in a position to provide one.542 The database of networked 
knowledge on housing struggles blurred national borders. It visualised how regions in Southern 
Europe mainly struggle with evictions and indebtedness, whereas northern countries fight for 
more rent control. This, in time, exposed the divide between Mediterranean and Northern 
European nations in the approach to the housing question; a distinction in how national 
governments have subsidised either homeownership or rentals, and the ways speculative 
interests have emerged differently in each context. 
 
Apart from indebtedness, the second main struggle that emerged in conversations with housing 
activists was the end of old tenancy agreements. A new law about to be passed in Portugal 
                                                
538 Architect and activist Tiago Mota Saraiva (Ateliermob), in discussion with the author, 18 August 2013. 
539 Portuguese Constitution 1976. Art. 65 
540 Housing activist Rita Silva (HABITA), in discussion with the author, 19 August 2013. 
541 Ibid. 
542 ‘The Housing Act,’ www.housing-act.com (defunct) 
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while The Housing Act was being developed would oblige any tenant paying dated rental 
amounts to immediately terminate the agreement and vacate the corresponding dwelling. This 
implied a dramatic quantity of evictions for tenants who had been living in the same home for 
decades. Furthermore, it would open the market for European developers to renew derelict 
properties in downtown Lisbon, something that was previously not economically viable. This 
lobbying operation, which was also implemented in Spain in January 2015, appropriated the 
narrative of solving the national economic crisis as well as the housing problem by creating new 
speculative developments that would attract offshore ownership. Once again, turning the city 
into property was part of the neoliberal engine for the circulation of capital. This has made 
Portugal an attractive and lucrative market for offshore ownership, boosted by new EU 
regulations that offer citizenship to non-EU buyers of real estate worth at least €500,000.543 
Paradoxically, Lisbon has now turned into an attraction for a new wave of young European 
migrants, who are escaping the violence of unaffordable rentals in Northern European cities and 
freelancing remotely. 
 
Obstacle No. 8: The Possibility of Not Selling All Participation Tickets (Insurmountable) 
In a meeting with sociologist and legal scholar Boaventura de Sousa Santos in Lisbon, we 
presented all the obstacles and circumventions to the project. He encouraged The Housing Act 
to nonetheless go ahead:544  
Why are you so worried about following the law? Our politicians have been constantly 
breaking the law, being involved in serious criminal activity, taking this country to 
bankruptcy, and they are still in power. Why should you worry about trying to do good to 
society while breaking a law that they do not even respect?!  
 
Despite his encouraging words, in August 2013, the legal consultant for the project withdrew, 
refusing to risk their reputation as one of the best-respected Portuguese law firms. Even if the 
lottery/competition was to go ahead, the possibility of not selling all participation tickets was still 
unresolved. Following Andorra’s model, returning the money to participants was proposed as a 
last attempt.545 As an initially agreed disclaimer, each participant would have to accept the 
chance of getting their money back if all the tickets were not sold. However, lawyers argued 
about the insufficiency of such a procedure in the Portuguese legal context, since expectations 
for a prize cannot be created without delivering the prize. This, and the possibility of any lawsuit 
against us (with or without reason), became a serious matter of legal concern. 
 
One week before the official launch of the project and after a very intense year of meetings, 
interviews, skype calls, phone calls, translated mediations, and field visits, The Housing Act was 
officially cancelled.  
 
Even if the intended outcome never happened, the failure to launch the lottery was nevertheless 
a method for investigating how to operate through circumvention. Despite all the criticism and 
                                                
543 DLA Piper, ‘Real Estate Investment in Portugal: The Legal Perspective,’ accessed 18 October 2014, 
http://www.dlapiperrealworld.com/export/sites/real-world/brochures/downloads/Portugal-Investor-Guide.pdf 
544 Boaventura de Sousa Santos, in discussion with the author, 23 April 2013. 
545 Through online transfers minus €1 administration fees. 
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moral dilemmas encountered along the way, the most interesting outcome was the shift in the 
way collaborators first loved the project and then rejected it as totally unethical or detrimental to 
their public reputation or easily misconstrued by third parties. It is precisely that level of self-
interest to protect themselves from ambiguous judgements that made them change their mind, 
which remains the most valuable revelation of the project. Furthermore, it showed the real 
possibility of operating within and outside the limit, of circumventing the law, and of 
instrumentalising the ambiguity of what is legal or illegal within gambling for deviant purposes. It 
is in all the obstacles encountered, where the logic of a counter-speculative system of 
littoralisation unveils new horizons for resistance. 
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This section departs from the notion of the Offshore as introduced in Chapter 3 to look at the 
housing crisis and the existing shift from owning the shore to offshore ownership. The project 
then investigates counter-speculative systems. It takes Robert Hockett’s reversal of eminent 
domain as a reference to bypass the impediments of the underwater mortgage debt system 
and shape a more hopeful scenario for indebted households. As explained in pages 188–197, 
the project of the house lottery in Lisbon looked at Andorra and Azores as sites of exception 
where also alternatives to the housing crisis were devised by residents that took advantage of 
ways to reverse the law while staying within the law. As part of the practice methodology, the 
project established a year-long working relationship with a Portuguese lawyer with expertise on 
gambling cases, while working with housing activist movements. Analogous to the way in which 
the boundary of the shoreline is redefined to accommodate interests and generate real estate 
profit margins, the littoral condition helped instead to detect opportunity scenarios to overcome 
the inequalities imposed by the lack of a housing politics in post-crisis Iberia. The project here 
serves to propose a shift from deterritorialisation–the removal of ties between culture and place–
towards littoralisation: a framework that this thesis puts forward to incorporate the boundary as 
a constantly shifting entity and productive blurry buffer zone. Taking as a reference model the 
constant redefinition of what offshore space actually is, the project developed in this section takes 
advantage of that condition operating beyond the realm of the state to identify loopholes that can 
operate as a form of resistance in the housing crisis. In this sense, the littoral becomes a condition 
to navigate financially built environments and propose alternatives to the exploitation and abuse 
inflicted by power structures in their failure to solve housing inequalities. Hence, zoning and other 
processes related to the demarcation of buildable land as unpacked in this thesis, culminate 
here by associating littoral and housing, obstacles and circumventions, as successful forms of 
practicing within a collaborative transdisciplinary understanding of the architectural discipline.
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I/ The Housing Act
A site-specific project by Daniel Fernández Pascual, for the 2013 Lisbon Architecture 
Triennale, New Publics Programme, curated by José Esparza Chong-Cuy.
Photographic series of the house lottery in Andorra by Simona Rota, 2013 (Figs. 155-164 
in this and upcoming pages); other international cases of house lotteries to circumvent debt 
(Figs. 165-175); and The Housing Act launch in Lisbon, 2013 (Figs. 176-179).
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165: House Lottery AZORES-1, Portugal.
Indebted organiser: Nuno Miguel Amador da Costa Paiva. 
Location: Rua do Jogo 1, 2º D, Ribeirinha, Ribeira Grande, San Miguel, Azores 
Archipelago (EU Outermost Territory).
Lottery Dates: 23 December 2011 (launched); 2 January 2012 (authorised); 22 
December 2013 (end). 
Number of Tickets: Up to 40,000 tickets.
Ticket Price: €5
Total value to be raised: €80,000
Selling via: email and website.
Sold: 25% of the tickets
Other features: built in 2007; living room, two bedrooms, kitchen, bathroom and 
balcony. 
The organiser had authorisation from the Vice-President of the Government 
of the Azores Autonomous Region. However, after the Portuguese Ministry of 
Internal Administration declared such lotteries illegal, nobody bought any more 
tickets. 
Web: https://sites.google.com/site/rifoapartamento/  
Phone conversation held with Nuno Miguel Amador da Costa Paiva. 23 August, 
2013
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166-167: House Lottery AZORES-2, Portugal.
Indebted organiser: João Fontinha. 
Location: Rua dos Moinhos 5, Furnas, San Miguel, Azores Archipelago (EU 
Outermost Territory). 
Lottery Dates: 10 May (launched) - 1 October 2012 (end). 
Number of Tickets: Up to 35,000 tickets
Ticket Price: €5
Total value to be raised: €100,000
Selling via: phone, e-mail, local shops and Facebook page.
Sold: around 8,000 tickets.
Other features: 75% renovated. 120m2 built area and 100m2 usable area.
Fontinha’s salary was €1,500/month. After becoming unemployed with a 
€600 monthly subsidy, he could no longer afford the €400 monthly mortgage. 
According to a telephone conversation held in August 2013, Mr Fontinha aimed 
to raise just the value of his debt without any additional profit. Eventually, 
Fontinha only raised 30% of the total amount of money he needed. In a 
sympathetic reaction, the semi-autonomous government of Azores decided to 
buy the house and donated it to a family in an even harsher economic situation.
Web: 
https://www.facebook.com/pages/Doar-Casa-Furnas/418317628199931
http://www.idealista.pt/news/imobiliario/habitacao/2012/02/06/6116-rifar-a-casa-
para-pagar-ao-banco
http://expresso.sapo.pt/desempregado-vende-casa-em-rifas-para-pagar-divida-
ao-banco=f702946
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168: House Lottery ELVAS, Portugal.
Indebted organiser: Elsa Carvão.
Location: Terrugem, Elvas 
Lottery dates: September 2012 - December 2013.
Number of tickets: 15,000
Ticket Price: €5
Total value to be raised: €75,000
Sold: 1,000 tickets
Other features: The organiser followed the model authorised in Azores, which 
was declared illegal in continental Portugal. Aware of the risk of not having an 
authorisation, desperate indebtedness encouraged her to continue the lottery. 
Carvão had already spent the money she raised on medicines to palliate her 
Parkinson. The house was to be won without any debt attached to it. According 
to a phone conversation held with Carvão, she approached the Lawyers 
Association to request an authorisation, who declined her request for lack of 
information. The same happened to her in the Finances department; the City 
Hall had not got back to her and the Ministry of Internal Administration already 
declined her petition without providing any alternative. To date of conversation, 
Ms Carvão acknowledged not knowing the due taxes for such a fundraising 
process. 
Web: http://rifoapartamento.com/
Phone conversation held with Ms Carvão, 25 August, 2013.
169: House Lottery AVEIRO, Portugal.
Indebted organiser: Rui Caetano, Aveiro. 
Date: 2009
Location: Rua Nª SRª de Fátima 8, Ouca, Vagos, Aveiro, Portugal
There have been more unsuccessful house lotteries attempts at a very small 
scale with little mediatic impact in Aveiro (http://aminhacasapor5euros.com/), 
Algarve, Mafra, Covilhã and Setúbal.
Web: http://moradiabarata.blogspot.it/
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170: House Lottery NEW SOUTH WALES, Australia.
Indebted organiser: Peter Brandson
Dates: July 2014
Value of the house: $2.6 million.
Location: South Coast of New South Wales, Australia.
Other features: Campaigner against the National Australia Bank for short-notice 
unprecedented eviction after a predatory lending practice. In his statement, 
Brandson refused to go to court to solve the dispute, even if expecting to win, 
since he argued, the law favoured banks and was quite improbable for him to 
be reimboursed even a fraction of the damages on top of his debt.
http://www.abc.net.au/news/2014-07-17/predatory-lending-in-banks-
widespread-malpractice-activists-say/5603256
171: House Lottery MARYLAND-1, USA.
Indebted organisers: Karen Crawford and Dennis Kelly. 
Location: Hancock, Maryland.
Raffle dates: December 2007 - March 2008.
Ticket price: $100. 
House price: bought for $375,000. 
Sold: 6,500 tickets. 
Other features: The organisers required the collaboration of the nonprofit San 
Mar Children’s Home. San Mar entered into a contingency contract to pay for 
the house with raffle earnings only if those earnings reached a certain level. In 
the end, extra $200,000 were raised on top of the needed amount, which the 
organisers donated to charity. Afterwards, the organisers paid back their debt 
and moved back into their previous home.
Web presence:
http://www.seattletimes.com/business/real-estate/desperate-home-sellers-try-
hand-at-raffles/
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/09/25/garden/25raffle.html?pagewanted=1&_
r=3&ref=garden
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172: House Lottery MARYLAND-2, USA.
Indebted organisers: Tom and Dianne Walters
Location: Edgewater, Maryland. 
The two USA top home raffle companies at their peak in 2009 were Charity 
Home Raffle (CHR) and USAHomeRaffle.com. CHR conducts raffles for high-
end homes. USA Home Raffle is a Maryland-based association of lawyers and 
an internet portal where (indebted) homeowners can upload their own house 
to the database and where non-profit organizations can choose the best-fitting 
candidate to support with helping to organise a legal raffle. They function as 
an intermediary platform connecting nonprofit organizations with individual 
homeowners who are looking to raffle their home. They warn against organising 
your own a raffle, as ‘in the US, in order for a home raffle to be legitimate, 
it needs to be conducted through a non-profit organization.’ According to 
their website, home raffles in the US have been happening on a large scale 
benefiting non-profit organizations since the early 1990s. 
Web: http://www.usahomeraffle.com/
 
173: House Lottery HAWAII, USA. 
Indebted organisers: Julie Sigwart and Michael Stinson
Location: Maui, Hawaii.
Date: 2008
Participation requirements: Skills Contest. $100 participation fee and an essay 
responding to the theme: ‘Aloha, what does it mean to you?’ The results were 
to be judged by a group of prominent members of the community. Since the 
contest was not a game of chance, state approval was not required, and 
teaming with a nonprofit group was not necessary.
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174: House Lottery PHILADELPHIA, USA.
Indebted organiser: Scott Bernard.
Location: Philadelphia.
Date: 2008. 
Participation requirements: Skills Contest. $49 entrance fee and a copy of a 
black-and-white line drawing to be downloaded and then coloured by hand. 
Three judges  – a Philadelphia artist, a local business owner and a former 
mayor of the town – were to pick the twenty ‘most-creative’ entries. Selected 
images were to be displayed online in order for the public to vote for a winner.
175: House Lottery CASTELLÓN, Spain.
Indebted organiser: Mª Amparo Bolumar Aznar
Location: 19 Calle Esperanza, Segorbe, Castellón.
Lottery Dates: 30 March 2014 - 29 March 2015
Number of Tickets: 40,000 tickets
Ticket price: €10
Original value of the house: €90,077.86
Location: c/ Esperanza nº19, Segorbe, Castellón, Spain.
Other features: The house is 141m2 distributed in four floors; two balconies, 
patio, living room, four master bedrooms, two bathrooms, one toilet. It is the 
first house lottery authorised in the country by the Finance Ministry’s Executive 
Management of Gambling Regulation to be implemented only at a national level 
(24 March 2014). After the legal struggles to authorise it, organisers will use the 
same online platform to feature more lotteries in the future. As of July 2017, no 
other lottery has taken place.
Web: http://lotohome.es/
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176-179: Public launch of The Housing 
Act, Praça da Figueira, Lisbon, 
Portugal, September 2013.
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Towards Onshore Offshoring as a Platform for Political Constituency  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
‘He had brought a large map representing the sea, 
Without the least vestige of land: 
And the crew were much pleased  
when they found it to be 
A map they could all understand.’ 
 
—Lewis Carroll, The Hunting of the Snark: An Agony in 
8 fits, 1874. 
 
 
 
The housing crisis has been investigated through the complex architecture of financial 
instruments that delineate space. By looking at the littoral as a paradigm of ambiguous 
demarcation of boundaries, this project has deepened into some of the neoliberal forces 
shaping housing, land and borders. By looking at the entanglement of risk and ownership, 
globalisation of mortgage, risk instruments, housing acts, geological processes, and climate 
events, it reveals how architecture, land and national sovereignties are eventually redefined 
through the making of housing inequality. Hence, the notion of the financial littoral has been 
proposed as a conceptual tool to unpack the institutional, insurance and banking forces that 
utilise the demarcation of borderlines to govern and generate profit margins, and ultimately, 
control forms of inhabitation and forms of residence among neoliberal subjects.  
 
Housing ‘affordability’—the littoral alike—is a process affected by the ambiguity of a multiplicity 
of territorial and architectural thresholds that are ultimately regulated and ruled by political 
decision-making: the creation of supply and demand, the subsidies to access a housing object, 
the taxonomies that define what a house is and how it is to be organised, the normative 
construction of its dwellers, or the definition of its value as an tradable asset. This set of 
questions opens up further discussion on whether governance and resistance could also be 
practiced through ambiguity and circumventions.  
 
Far from being treated as a universal right, housing—either in the form of an inhabited home or 
evicted household—has become a financial asset within the neoliberal understanding of politics, 
ecology, and economy in the Global North. Not only do governments and real estate markets 
speculate on the value of the home, but activist responses can also use speculation to resist the 
violence of housing shortages. Profiting from the alegality of grey areas, eminent domain was 
lawfully reversed in the US in order to avoid foreclosures. The ambiguous possibility of 
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imminent eviction allows the common good to be used against foreclosure, for the sake of good 
will within a community. Similarly, a house lottery independently organised in the Outermost 
Territory of the Azores challenged eviction procedures by crowdfunding ways to address 
indebtedness. These experiences could become a paradigmatic moment in the struggle against 
the abuse of underwater mortgages. The very redefinition of the common good and the public 
interest can make the same law operate in opposite directions, where eminent domain prevents, 
instead of promotes, foreclosure.  
 
The use of the three main objects of analysis that structure this thesis—the shore, the offset, 
and the offshore—introduce a multiplicity of practices and formats to redefine the future role of 
architecture as a critical mode of enquiry for the housing question, one that takes advantage of 
speculation and deals with financially built environments. Housing and real estate were at the 
epicentre of politics, and one of the main causes for the 2007-2008 global financial crisis. 
Architecture was responsible for the indebtedness that immediately followed. Like any other 
demarcated boundary in urban planning schemes, the shoreline is less a line without width than 
a complex four-dimensional construct that changes in scale over time in order to generate 
profits for different interests. The offset, like the shoreline, is a mechanism for extracting value 
out of the common good and protecting the environment for the sake of ‘safe’ urbanisation. And 
the offshore, despite existing and not existing at the same time, offers clues for appropriating 
alegality and introducing a new understanding of critical space within a global circulation of 
financial instruments associated with contemporary dwelling.  
 
Operating through carefully calculated ambiguity, these three concepts unveil the shoreline itself 
and how it plays the role of a political and ecological dispositif. The shoreline is used in this 
dissertation as a device to understand littoralisation as a process, whereby ambiguous margins 
are adapted not only to create more profit, but also to appropriate profits in their malleability. 
This not only reveals the current crisis of para-empiricism, which uses factishes to legitimise 
further financialisation of space, but it also reframes architecture as a discipline that is 
increasingly obligated to engage with the construction or destruction of financially built 
environments. In that regard, the architecture discipline, which initially produced the material 
qualities of housing boom-oriented economies, should also be accountable for delivering ways 
out of the crisis and imagining approaches to the future construction of inhabitable space. The 
use of these three conceptual objects, stemming out of the encounter between the end of 
buildable land and the beginning of the coastal commons, has made apparent that relying only 
on the traditional governance of the commons and limited understandings of the margins of the 
built environment is not enough. Conventional architectural tools to analyse, explore, challenge 
and reshuffle these systems have also become obsolete.  
 
The set of three Project Dossiers are organised around the three different chapters, and in turn 
subdivided into sections with different iterations of the project. They constitute a set of ad hoc 
processes that aim to understand the housing problem by looking at it through the lens of the 
financial littoral. Distributed along the three chapters, the practice utilises multidisciplinary tools 
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to expand the field and agency of the architectural discipline. They indistinguishably operate as 
practice-based research and research-based practice. As it becomes apparent that 
conventional maps failed to depict the shoreline by flattening a four-dimensional set of relations 
onto a one-dimensional line, the methodologies used in the practical component of the 
dissertation required to expand and deploy other ways of modelling space: critical readings of 
satellite photographs, analysis of the visual imaginary of the coast (still and moving), cooking 
geopolitical edible maps that deconstruct the territorialisation of value, lecture performances to 
raise awareness around the actual role of architects, site-specific real time modelling of 
conversations, installation of sound devices, and organisation of house lotteries to challenge the 
limits of foreclosure. This (a priori heterogeneous) set of practices attempts to reconfigure the 
notion of value under neoliberalism and configure a field towards critical financial thinking of 
spatial constructs. In sum, it is an assemblage of techniques to devise a methodology that could 
investigate the mapping of globalised housing boundaries beyond their conventional forms of 
representation. 
 
Consequently, the practice component of the dissertation is crucial for the investigation of the 
questions developed in the main conceptual framework of the written chapters. It is by this 
multidisciplinary and transdisciplinary approach that some of the achievements, lessons and 
encounters are indebted to long-term collaborations with different forms of expertise outside the 
orthodox architectural discipline. Having been in conversation with lawyers, financial investors, 
environmentalists, geologists, activists or coastal engineers, not only has the project achieved 
to forge new alliances and relationships outside the more disciplinary ones, but more 
importantly, it has also managed to create another form of practising architecture along the way. 
Besides, the actual exploration of the multiple possibilities that these interactions have allowed 
for have facilitated a new insight into how to practice responsibly in ways that could re-imagine 
spatial conflicts and at the same time reach new critical audiences. 
 
Contemporary inhabitation, which is deeply immersed in neoliberalism, is developing new tools 
to fight for the common good, at the same time as it questions the nominal benevolent 
governance imposed upon it. Instead of a matter of extreme necessity, this thesis has argued 
that eminent domain is rather a matter of a created necessity based upon calculated forms of 
ambiguity. New tactics of resistance are nonetheless using that ambiguity and gambling in the 
offshore to confront the injustice and violence embedded in housing, urban, and territorial 
policy-making. The ambiguity of grey zones and the speculative governance of the blurry 
constitute an operational framework to read and resist neoliberal politics of inhabitation. It allows 
legal tactics around the housing crisis to operate in opposite directions by redefining the 
common good. Still, the entanglement between real estate and immovable property can be 
commandeered through productive forms of ambiguity, shifting it toward a common good 
defined beyond neoliberal interests.  
 
The dissertation started by identifying how the housing crisis is deeply embedded in an 
environmental crisis in the understanding of space, and eventually, an erosion of democracy. 
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This translates not only into a crisis of representation of territorial, geological and zoning 
boundaries, but also in a crisis of empiricism in the way that biased scientific reports have been 
instrumentalised for the construction of infrastructure or have legitimised the lack or need for 
further development. Hence, spatial margins and real estate profit margins are one; in the way 
the common good has been appropriated to generate income for the interest of those in power 
positions. Hence, alternative scenarios have started to redefine the common good and the 
public interest as forms of operation within neoliberal environments. It would not be surprising to 
see more of these experiments appear in the near future as other ways of practicing: counter-
systems of power that learn from, and appropriate, corporatism; something that could be framed 
as counter-corporate activism, using the tools of neoliberalism to chip away at neoliberalism 
itself. Resources like speculation can become new tools to challenge existing logics of power 
and inequality. They appropriate a neoliberal format and then distort it, in a way indebted to 
Michel Feher’s notion of ‘investee activism.’ In a society organised by investor-investee 
relationships, resistance focuses on social antagonisms specific to financial markets 
(stakeholder activism in the stock market, borrower activism in the bond market, collateral 
guarantor activism in the derivatives market, etc.) and speculates on the potential for a more 
equitable society.  
 
The main contribution of this dissertation is to expand into the architecture of the economic 
crisis by starting to build up a framework around the notion of ambiguity within the littoralisation 
of space. At the same time, this opens up the need for further research into the possibilities and 
limitations of the architecture discipline, even if understood in an expanded way. More work 
needs to be done around individual agency in global phenomena of capital circulation in order to 
start framing geopolitical constructs that embrace variability of boundaries as an integral part of 
them. This thesis also opens the door for further work to move beyond the Foucauldian logic of 
boundaries as circulation of capital, and instead, toward understanding capital as the circulation 
of borderlines. In that regard, the concept of the financial littoral can bring out together an 
understanding of space that rethinks the processes that led to the collapse of the housing 
boom, as well as new ways to resist in an era of neoliberal financialisation and littoralisation of 
space.  
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